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Chapter 1:  
Introduction  
1.1 Cultural Diversity and Justice 
in Guatemala 
In December 1996 a 35-year-old conflict 
between the army and the guerrilla in 
Guatemala came to an end. Throughout 
years of negotiation the guerrilla and the 
Guatemalan government had reached 
several agreements that promised reforms 
in a number of areas. One of these agree-
ments, ‘The Accord on Identity and 
Rights of the Indigenous Peoples’ (AIDPI 
1995), concerns the complex relations 
between Guatemala’s ethnic groups, and 
proposes a number of reforms to redress 
the indigenous peoples’ situation of mar-
ginalisation and discrimination.  
This accord, together with the reces-
sion of political repression and the rein-
troduction of democratic elections since 
1985, has lead to a growing debate on the 
relations between ethnic groups1 in 
Guatemala, and in particular the relation-
ship between the indigenous peoples and 
the Guatemalan state. Moreover, during 
the last two decades, Guatemala has 
experienced a proliferation of indigenous 
organisations that vindicate indigenous 
rights and struggle to change the status 
quo. Issues such as the official status of 
the indigenous languages, the official re-
cognition of community norms, and con-
stitutional reforms raise controversy and 
are much debated in Guatemala today. 
Since the reintroduction of democratic 
elections, Guatemala has taken important 
steps towards democracy. However, the 
question of what role of ethnic identity 
should play in the organisation of the 
                                                     
1  ‘Ethnic group’ refers to a group that is bound 
together by an identity based on a perception of 
common ancestry (Adams 1995:59-81, Eriksen 
1995:59). Adams (1995) discusses and rejects 
other definitions of ‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethni-
city’. He argues that the central characteristic of 
‘ethnicity’ is the reproduction of an identity, 
not particular cultural elements, biology or 
class. In chapter 3 I discuss the notions of eth-
nic identity and ethnicity. 
Guatemalan democracy still remains unre-
solved.  
The complex issues raised by the 
implications of ethnic diversity for justice 
in modern-day democracies are also the 
focus of academic efforts within fields 
such as political science, philosophy, and 
social anthropology. Processes of globali-
sation, patterns of migration, and the 
velocity of cultural change force us to re-
consider how we understand national 
identity, the nation-state and democratic 
institutional organisation and decision-
making. These processes not only raise 
questions about why and how certain phe-
nomena, such as the proliferation of 
ethnic conflicts, occur, they also challenge 
how one perceives the rights and obliga-
tions of citizenship in modern democra-
cies. A main concern is how to achieve 
peaceful and stable relations between 
different ethnic groups within a state, 
while respecting the ideals of freedom and 
justice central to democracy. 
This thesis is an attempt to analyse the 
implications of taking cultural diversity 
into account when discussing the elabora-
tion of a just political system and just 
policies in Guatemala. I will do so by exa-
mining two different answers to how 
cultural differences should be accommo-
dated in democratic states. These two 
approaches or policies, which I call ‘non-
discrimination’ and ‘recognition’,2 can be 
outlined as follows: non-discrimination 
requires that the state is ‘neutral’ when it 
comes to the particular cultural identities 
of its citizens. According to this approach, 
the state should not seek to identify, pro-
tect or promote any particular ethnic iden-
                                                     
2  These approaches or policies receive a number 
of names in the literature (Walzer 1994 and 
1995, Glazer 1995, and Kymlicka 1995 a and 
b). ‘Non-discrimination’ is elsewhere referred 
to as ‘benign neglect’, ‘the neutral model’, ‘uni-
versalism’, or ‘liberalism I’. ‘Recognition’ is 
called ‘the group rights model’, ‘the corporatist 
model’, and ‘liberalism II’. 
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tity or cultural. Recognition, on the other 
hand, requires that the state gives explicit 
recognition to the particular cultural iden-
tities of its citizens. Recognition is usually 
given in the form of rights that differenti-
ate members of one group from another, 
for example by granting degrees of politi-
cal autonomy to one or several ethnic 
groups, or by guaranteeing the members 
of a group a certain quota of representa-
tion in the country’s political system. 
Both approaches have a long history in 
liberal political theory (Kymlicka 1995a). 
The focus throughout this thesis will 
be on the highly acclaimed works of the 
Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka, in 
particular his book Multicultural Citizen-
ship (1995a). This book is perhaps the 
most thoroughly argued liberal defence 
for ‘recognition’ yet published. As a re-
sult, more emphasis will be placed on the 
discussion of ‘recognition’ than ‘non-dis-
crimination’. The main aim of this thesis, 
that of understanding the implications of a 
liberal approach to multicultural justice in 
Guatemala, entails an attempt to assess 
both Kymlicka’s defence of ‘recognition’ 
and his critique of ‘non-discrimination’.  
Political liberalism, or liberal political 
philosophy, provides the normative 
framework within which the discussion 
here will take place; it will also serve as a 
kind of standard against which the impli-
cations of ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘re-
cognition’ in Guatemala will be weighed. 
Political liberalism is perhaps the major 
school of thought within contemporary 
political philosophy, and it is the political 
tradition within which Kymlicka writes. 
Another standard by which the implica-
tions of ‘recognition’ and ‘non-discrimi-
nation’ will be judged is political unity, 
though it is here given far less emphasis 
than political liberalism, and it does not as 
such represent any school of thought 
within political philosophy. Political unity 
is the concern that an approach to justice 
in multicultural societies must not make it 
impossible or difficult for different ethnic 
groups to co-exist within one country. I 
will return to both political liberalism and 
political unity below. Before that, how-
ever, I will give a brief outline of what is 
to follow. 
The remainder of this chapter includes 
a discussion regarding political liberalism 
and political unity, then a brief note on the 
methodology employed, in particular a 
discussion of the empirical sources used. 
This is followed by an introduction to 
Guatemala that focuses on the relationship 
between ethnic groups and the state, rac-
ism and discrimination, and the indigen-
ous organisations’ attempts to change 
their situation of political and economic 
marginalisation. I conclude this chapter 
by arguing in favour of the relevance of a 
discussion on cultural diversity and justice 
in Guatemala. 
Chapter two presents Kymlicka’s and 
other authors’ defence of ‘recognition’. I 
then turn to the issues of whether there are 
any conflicts between individual rights 
and so-called group rights, and whether 
the numerical size of a particular group is 
of any consequence for considerations of 
justice in multicultural democracies. The 
last section of this chapter presents 
Kymlicka’s principal critique against 
‘non-discrimination’ and how I believe 
that critique can be met. I try to illustrate 
the implications of this defence of ‘non-
discrimination’ by looking at a number of 
policy areas where cultural difference is 
of great relevance in Guatemala. 
Chapter three takes the discussion one 
step further by examining what ethnic 
groups are, both what they appear to be 
empirically in Guatemala, and how they 
can be conceptualised theoretically. The 
conceptualisation of ethnic groups that 
seems to correspond best with Guatemala 
is one that is at odds with Kymlicka’s, and 
this, I argue, has implications for con-
siderations of liberal justice. The discus-
sion in this chapter is concluded with a 
critique of ‘recognition’. 
While ‘recognition’ assigns formal 
political power and competencies to 
groups, ‘non-discrimination’ prohibits 
this. Chapter four explores arguments in 
favour of and against both approaches in 
Guatemala by examining the issues of 
political participation and political auto-
nomy. I conclude this chapter by discus-
sing likely consequences of ‘recognition’ 
and ‘non-discrimination’ for political 
unity in Guatemala. 
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The last chapter summarises the pre-
ceding discussion by seeking to answer 
whether ‘non-discrimination’ or ‘recogni-
tion’ is the best approach to justice in 
Guatemala. I conclude by suggesting a 
third approach that may solve at least 
some of the dilemmas created by both 
‘non-discrimination’ and ‘recognition’. 
1.2 Political Liberalism and Politi-
cal Unity  
Political Liberalism 
Fundamental to political liberalism is the 
value of ‘equality’ understood in the sense 
that the interests of each member of the 
community matter, and matter equally. 
Put another way, egalitarian theories 
require that the government treats its 
citizens with equal consideration; each 
citizen is entitled to equal concern and 
respect (Kymlicka 1990:4). 
Kymlicka (op.cit.) argues that ‘equal-
ity’ can be seen as the foundational value, 
not only in political liberalism, but in all 
contemporary theories of justice. How-
ever, as Anne Phillips (1995:36) under-
lines, equality can be taken to imply 
different things. It could for example 
mean that ‘all citizens should have equal 
power over outcomes, that all preferences 
should be given equal weight, or…that all 
citizens should have an equal chance of 
voting for the winning candidate’. It is 
possible, Phillips (op.cit.) argues, ‘that in 
order to give people equal power over 
outcomes we have to weight their prefer-
ences unequally; or that in order to protect 
minorities we have to give their votes 
some additional weight’. The ambiguities 
of ‘equality’ are of particular relevance 
for multicultural societies. Amy Gutmann 
defines multiculturalism as  
 
 the state of a society or the world contain-
ing many cultures that interact in some 
significant way with each other. A culture 
is a human community larger than a few 
families that is associated with on-going 
ways of seeing, doing and thinking about 
things (Gutmann 1993:171).  
 
Multiculturalism refers not only to the 
characteristics of a country, but also to 
policies that give recognition to and pro-
tect cultural identities:  
Multiculturalism – the acknowledge-
ment and promotion of cultural pluralism 
as a feature of many societies … multi-
culturalism celebrates and seeks to protect 
cultural variety, for example, minority 
languages. At the same time it focuses on 
the often unequal relationship of a minor-
ity to mainstream cultures (Jay et al. 
1995). 
Gutmann (1994:3) argues that ‘the 
challenge [of multiculturalism] is endemic 
to liberal democracies because they are 
committed to the principle of equal repre-
sentation for all’. Equal representation for 
all is problematic in multicultural demo-
cracies because, as Will Kymlicka puts it,  
 
 political life has an inescapable national 
dimension, whether it is in the drawing of 
boundaries or distributing of powers, or in 
decisions about language, schooling, 
courts and bureaucracies, or in the choice 
of public holidays. Moreover, these in-
escapable aspects of political life give a 
profound advantage to members of major-
ity nations (1995a:194). 
 
In modern, liberal democracies, decisions 
that are of vital importance to minority 
groups are often left to the processes of 
majority decision-making, leaving minori-
ties at a profound disadvantage. If equal-
ity of rights is to be respected, ‘the ines-
capable dimensions of national life’ need 
to be taken into account. This may require 
measures that protect the cultures of min-
ority groups from the dominance of 
majority groups. This is also an issue of 
social and political stability, since it is 
likely that not giving minority groups any 
protection against being outvoted on 
issues of importance to the survival of 
their cultures, will lead to increased ten-
sion and perhaps conflict. What is needed 
is a conception of justice in multicultural 
democracies that is both based on equality 
and accommodates cultural difference. 
Both ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘recogni-
tion’ can be seen as instruments for 
achieving this, ‘non-discrimination’ by 
ignoring culture altogether, ‘recognition’ 
by identifying and usually giving legal 
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status to the different cultures that the citi-
zens belong to.  
According to political liberalism, ‘the 
primary function of the state, and of poli-
tics generally, is to do justice to individu-
als, and in a pluralist society ethnicity is 
simply one of the background conditions 
for this effort’ (Walzer 1995:154). I will 
regard ‘political liberalism’, ‘liberal poli-
tical theory’ and ‘liberal equality’ as 
essentially the same.3 Political liberalism 
can be seen as an attempt to articulate and 
defend the ideals that underlie modern 
liberal democracies. According to this 
theory, ‘the good society is one which is 
not governed by particular common ends 
or goals but provides the framework 
rights or liberties or duties within which 
people may pursue their various ends, 
individually or co-operatively’ (Kukhatas 
1995:231-2). 
The liberal political ideal is that of a 
society where every individual can freely 
choose a life according to his or her 
values and convictions, and where every-
one is given the possibilities to revise 
these values and convictions at his or her 
own free will. In the words of Will 
Kymlicka: ‘a liberal state should ensure 
that all citizens have the liberties and 
resources needed to make informed deci-
sions about the good life, including the 
right to question and revise traditional 
cultural practices’ (1995b:15). The func-
tion of the state is to provide and guaran-
tee the same rights and conditions for all 
citizens to pursue their own perceptions of 
the good life. These rights are reflected in 
and guaranteed by a constitution. All citi-
zens are considered equal in rights and 
moral worth, and the individual is given 
moral primacy over any collectivity. 
Membership in ethnic groups is only valu-
able to the degree that it is valuable for 
particular and identifiable individuals 
(Føllesdal 1996:62). Community life mat-
ters because it matters to individuals, but 
the community cannot for any reason be 
                                                     
3 The literature on political liberalism is very 
extensive, and I will say little on the debates 
within and the criticism against this theory, 
with the exception of the debates on multicul-
turalism. The works of John Rawls (1971 and 
1993) are essential for anyone interested in this 
type of theory. See also Will Kymlicka (1989, 
1990, and 1995a).  
invoked to violate the fundamental rights 
of the individual.  
The requirements needed to meet the 
liberal ideal can, according to Gerald 
Doppelt (1998:230), be grouped into 
three. First it requires ‘the absence of 
coercive impediments – oppressive laws 
and others’ interference’. Secondly, it is 
often argued that ‘the additional presence 
of certain enabling resources and policies 
– education, health care, income, employ-
ment, etc.’ should be included. The third 
type requirement is ‘recognition’, by 
which I understand that the cultural survi-
val of particular groups in a country will 
be ‘acknowledged as a legitimate goal’ 
(Taylor 1994:63).  
‘Recognition’ will usually take the 
form of ‘group-differentiated rigths’, and 
my focus throughout this thesis will be on 
these. However, it is possible that some 
sort of recognition can be of great impor-
tance for members of ethnic groups even 
when this recognition does not lead to any 
rights for the persons in question. I will 
return to this possibility in the next chap-
ter. The essence of group-differentiated 
rights is ‘the right of a group to limit the 
economic and political power exercised 
by the larger society over the group, to 
ensure that the resources and institutions 
on which the minority depends are not 
vulnerable to majority decisions’ 
(Kymlicka op.cit.:7). I will use the term 
‘group-differentiated rights’ synonym-
ously with ‘cultural rights’, as they are 
rights of ‘cultural groups’ or ‘cultures’. 
Group-differentiated rights represent 
Kymlicka’s modification of, or addition 
to, liberal theory, and there is far less con-
sensus on the need for and justification of 
these. Kymlicka argues that ‘a compre-
hensive theory of justice in a multicultural 
state will include both universal rights, 
assigned to individuals regardless of 
group membership, and certain group-
differentiated rights or ‘special statuses’ 
for minority cultures’ (1995a:6). I present 
Kymlicka’s defence of group-differenti-
ated rights in chapter 2. 
Kymlicka (1995a) distinguishes 
between three different types of group-
differentiated rights: ‘polyethnic rights’, 
‘special representation rights’, and ‘self-
government rights’. Polyethnic rights are 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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‘intended to help ethnic groups and religi-
ous minorities express their cultural par-
ticularity and pride without hampering 
their success in the economic and political 
institutions of the dominant society’ 
(op.cit.: 31). Polyethnic rights are thus 
guarantees for ethnic groups against vari-
ous forms of discrimination, and may take 
the form of public funding for cultural 
practices. The aim of polyethnic rights is 
to lessen the impact of assimilation 
(Doppelt 1998); their purpose is to facili-
tate integration into, not autonomy from 
the dominant culture’s institutions 
(Kymlicka 1997).  
The two other types of group-diffe-
rentiated rights entail recognition of 
groups in a much more comprehensive 
way. ‘Special representation rights’ are 
various rights and measures aimed at 
guaranteeing that a country’s political 
institutions or political parties reflect the 
diversity of the country’s population. A 
common example is to reserve a certain 
number of seats in the legislature for cer-
tain groups or assure that political parties’ 
electoral lists include members of minor-
ity groups.  
Lastly, ‘self-government claims (...) 
typically take the form of devolving poli-
tical power to a political unit substantially 
controlled by the members of the national 
minority, and substantially corresponding 
to their historical homeland or territory’ 
(Kymlicka 1995a:30). They are often 
associated with groups that have been 
involuntarily incorporated into a larger 
political unit.  
A difference between these types of 
rights is that whereas polyethnic rights 
concern the content of specific policies, 
self-government and special representa-
tion rights aim at giving groups the means 
to influence policies. This distinction 
plays an important role throughout this 
thesis, because I will argue that ‘non-dis-
crimination’ is incompatible with assign-
ing the means to influence policy directly 
to groups. Polyethnic rights, on the other 
hand, are from my viewpoint not only 
compatible with ‘non-discrimination’, 
they are also required by that view. How-
ever, my interpretation of these differs 
from that of Kymlicka. Whereas 
Kymlicka ties the enjoyment of these 
rights to membership in particular groups, 
I will argue that it is possible to consider 
polyethnic rights as general and funda-
mental individual rights, or as derivative 
of these. 
Political Unity 
A central concern the in discussion of 
multiculturalism and justice is political 
unity. By political unity I have in mind 
the peaceful coexistence of different cul-
tural identities within one country. There 
are perhaps exceptional cases where the 
best solution is to split a country into two 
or more independent political units. How-
ever, in a world with a multitude of ethnic 
identities, and where ethnic groups are 
often intermingled or share the same terri-
tory, it would simply be impossible to cre-
ate a country for each single ethnic group. 
In the words of Kymlicka (1995a:196): 
‘in general there are more nations in the 
world than possible states, and since we 
cannot simply wish national conscious-
ness away, we need to find some way to 
keep multinational states together.’ Practi-
cally all countries in the world today are 
multiethnic, a fact any theory of justice in 
modern states must take into account. One 
way or another, ethnic diversity must be 
incorporated into the single political 
framework of the state.  
Secondly, to deny the possibility of 
ethnic coexistence implies seeing ethnic 
identities as polar opposites. As I will 
argue in more detail in chapter 3, ethnic 
groups are seldom the only source of 
belonging and identification of a person, 
and there are likely to be many individu-
als who find it difficult to fit into any 
clear-cut ethnic category. Moreover, the 
idea of ‘ethnically pure’ states, where the 
terms of inclusion and exclusion are based 
only on membership in ethnic groups, is 
in my view inherently discriminatory, and 
has therefore no place within a liberal 
political framework. I discuss whether 
‘recognition’ or ‘non-discrimination’ is 
most consistent with political unity in 
chapter 4. 
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1.3 On the Approach, My Field-
work in Guatemala and the 
Sources Used 
To explain the approach or ‘method’ used 
here I will rely on a concept from John 
Rawls (1971:48); ‘Reflective equilibrium’ 
is a state ‘reached after a person has 
weighted various proposed conceptions of 
justice and he has either revised his judge-
ments to accord with one of them or held 
fast to his original convictions’. For my 
purposes this implies comparing the 
implications of ‘non-discrimination’ and 
‘recognition’ in Guatemala, and seeing 
whether these correspond with the funda-
mental values of political liberalism and 
with the concern for political unity.  
The search for reflective equilibrium 
can be seen as a valuable method, whether 
one believes it is a device for finding 
moral truths, or simply that it is of practi-
cal value to make our convictions cohere 
around a set of principles (Sayre-McCord 
1996). However, ‘recognition’ and ‘non-
discrimination’ are not ‘tested’ so as to 
merit total rejection, because the ‘test’ is 
not complete. The number of considerati-
ons taken into account here is necessarily 
limited, and any conclusion cannot be but 
preliminary. The search for reflective 
equilibrium is likely to go on forever 
(Rawls 1993:97). The result of this search 
for reflective equilibrium does not there-
fore constitute a final judgement on what 
is to be considered the most adequate 
approach to liberal justice in Guatemala, 
much less generally. 
The authors of the theories on justice 
in multicultural democracies draw the 
great majority of their examples from 
North America and Europe. One of my 
assumptions was that new insights could 
be gained by examining situations outside 
of that context. I therefore chose a ‘case-
study’ of Guatemala. Yin (1994:13) de-
fines a case-study as ‘an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary pheno-
menon within its real-life context, especi-
ally when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident’.  
I acquired most of the documentation 
and conducted a number of interviews 
while conducting fieldwork in Guatemala 
between October 1997 and March 1998. 
The documentation consists of articles in 
social science journals and a number of 
studies by both Guatemalan and non-
Guatemalan researchers. I have also used 
a variety of articles in Guatemalan news-
papers and magazines, and reports and 
other documentation from both non-gov-
ernmental organisations and governmental 
agencies, and I attended a number of con-
ferences addressing multicultural issues 
that provided valuable insights. The sour-
ces used in social science can have two 
basic functions (Dahl 1973:38). They can 
either provide information on ‘facts of 
matter’, or they can be used as testimony 
of someone’s opinions and way of think-
ing, both of which I use here. 
To what extent then do my descripti-
ons of the Guatemalan context, the ‘facts 
of matter’, correspond with the observati-
ons of others? Yin (1994) calls the issue 
of correspondence with observation ‘con-
struct validity’, and he indicates three tac-
tics for increasing construct validity: 
using multiple sources of evidence (trian-
gulation), having key informants review 
drafts of the study, and increasing reliabil-
ity. Triangulation is sought achieved in 
this study by using a number of different 
sources, both interviews and an assort-
ment of documents. When such divergent 
sources converge around a particular con-
clusion, one may have greater trust in that 
conclusion. Sometimes, however, differ-
ent sources may disagree. When this 
occurs it will be discussed or otherwise 
indicated in the text.  
I used review by informants by inviting 
a number of people with knowledge of the 
subject comment on earlier drafts. I have 
taken care both in the phases of collecting 
information and in the analysis and writ-
ing of the thesis to let my informant’s 
personal expressions prevail. Reliability 
means that the operations of this study can 
be repeated, by myself or someone else, 
and produce the same results. Therefore, 
when relevant, the sources are referred to 
in the text, and transcripts of the inter-
views are accessible. Reliability also 
depends upon the degree of transparency 
in the collection and analysis of data, in 
making clear to the reader how and under 
which circumstances the information was 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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gathered. I shall therefore develop this 
topic a bit further.  
The material I collected does not 
represent the opinion of any particular 
group in Guatemala, much less the 
Guatemalan population at large. Survey 
data that could be of use solely to my 
arguments here is largely non-existent. 
My aim has been to understand opinion, 
not measure it. I interviewed 39 persons, 
most of whom work in indigenous organi-
sations, in addition to some government 
representatives and politicians, and a few 
Guatemalan researchers. They were cho-
sen due to their participation in public 
debates, or because they are supposed to 
have influence over policy related to mul-
ticultural justice. I deliberately chose per-
sons known to hold different opinions. 
The majority of the interviews took place 
in the Guatemalan capital, Guatemala 
City, and lasted from 1 to 7 hours. Three 
shorter studies were realised outside the 
Guatemalan capital, and these are referred 
to in chapter 4.  
The interviews were ‘open-ended’ in 
nature, which is perhaps the most com-
mon type of interview in case-studies 
(Yin 1994:84). I asked the persons I inter-
viewed, my informants, both about 
opinion and about facts of matter. In addi-
tion, some of them were helpful in sharing 
their insights on more theoretical issues. 
The interviews were to some extent also 
‘focused’ (Yin 1994:84-5), in the sense 
that they centred on a set of predefined 
issues and questions, such as the nature of 
ethnic identity, political participation, 
political autonomy, indigenous organisati-
ons and indigenous rights. I also adopted 
the questions to suit each particular inter-
view. For my interviews I relied on hand-
written notes, which are generally less 
accurate than tape recordings, but are 
time-saving and can make the informant 
feel less inhibited. The names of my 
informants are not mentioned in the text 
because I hope that anonymity may pre-
vent what is written from having any 
direct personal consequences (Yin 1994: 
143), and because a few of my informants 
explicitly requested to remain anonymous. 
When conducting interviews care must 
be taken to ensure that the questions asked 
do not lend themselves to misinterpreta-
tion and ambiguities. One should also 
seek to avoid the possibility that the ques-
tions shape the answers. I sought to lessen 
these dangers by letting the first couple of 
interviews serve as a ‘pilot study’, where-
by the questions were tested and revised. 
Many of my informants gave valuable 
feedback on the questions. Moreover, pos-
ing the same questions to persons of 
divergent political opinions is another 
technique I used to reduce the chance that 
the questions were leading (Yin 1994). 
Butenschøn (1980) underlines that if the 
respondents feel uncomfortable or sur-
prised by the questions, or if the respon-
dents feel that they are in a subordinate 
position, the quality of the answers one 
gets is deteriorated. Answers can also be 
tactically motivated. I took care in seeking 
to avoid such dangers when I approached 
people and when I conducted the inter-
views; fortunately, with one exception all 
my interviews took place in a friendly and 
open atmosphere. I will not speculate as 
to whether the informants were actually 
telling me what they believed or not, I 
will simply take their statements of opi-
nion at ‘face value’.4 
At the moment of analysing the docu-
mentation and in particular in the analysis 
of the interviews there is a danger of mis-
interpretation. This danger is increased 
when, as in my case, information is col-
lected in and concerns a somewhat unfa-
miliar cultural context. A technique for 
improving one’s understanding of an alien 
cultural context is to focus on dialogue 
with the natives. This way, the researcher 
can seek to change his or her bias by 
receiving correction (Burawoy 1991). An 
advantage of the semi-structured way I 
conducted the interviews is that this inter-
action was facilitated. Triangulation is 
another way of reducing the chance of 
misinterpretation. Some of the informants 
were familiar with the theories I use here, 
and could therefore comment on the con-
cepts I used directly. Lastly, but most 
importantly, my familiarity with the 
region and with Spanish, as well as the 
five months I spent in Guatemala during 
                                                     
4  This is the same approach as that taken by 
David Stoll (1993) in his well-known study on 
the Guatemalan civil war in the Ixil indigenous 
area. 
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the fieldwork and subsequent visits,  have 
been very useful for getting a grasp of 
Guatemalan politics and culture. Never-
theless, misinterpretations of the material 
and inaccuracies in the translations, as 
well as factual mistakes, may occur, and 
these are my exclusive responsibility.  
Yin (1994) suggests the following cri-
teria for a ‘good quality case-study’: that 
few significant sources have been 
ignored, that the major rival interpretati-
ons and opinions are presented, and 
success in bringing prior expert know-
ledge to the study. I hope the following 
pages of this thesis will convince the 
reader that these criteria have been met.  
Lastly, an ethical aspect of this study 
should be underlined. Social science 
administered by ‘outsiders’ can be both 
damaging as well as helpful for those who 
live in the societies that are studied 
(Warren 1998, Watanabe 1994). This con-
cern is particularly relevant in Guatemala, 
where studies by foreign anthropologists 
of the indigenous peoples in Guatemala 
have been numerous. For example, some 
of these studies executed in the 1950s and 
1960s predicted the demise of the indi-
genous culture (Adams 1995, Gálvez et 
al. 1997b:39-40, Gálvez et al. 1997c:42-
3). Many of indigenous people I spoke 
with in Guatemala underlined how this 
prediction has had harmful consequences 
for them. Social science does not operate 
in a vacuum; there is a danger of reflexiv-
ity in that the researcher’s opinions and 
analysis has real-life consequences. The 
limitations of this study should therefore 
be strongly kept in mind should anyone 
wish to draw practical political conclusi-
ons of what is written here.  
1.4 The Guatemalan Context 
On Ethnicity in Guatemalan History 
The Maya historically inhabited a vast 
area covering today’s Guatemala, Belize, 
the southern parts of Mexico, and parts of 
Honduras and El Salvador. Prior to 2000 
BC there was a single Mayan language, 
which gradually evolved into a number of 
different languages with varying degrees 
of inter-relatedness (Coe 1993:24). The 
historical Maya are perhaps best known 
for their achievements in astronomy, writ-
ing, complex religions and social systems, 
and the construction of pyramids and vast 
cities. This civilisation suffered a collapse 
around 800 AD, and the great Mayan cities 
of the lowland jungles were abandoned. 
When the Spanish conquerors in 1524 
arrived in the area that later became 
Guatemala they met a number of indigen-
ous groups, most of which spoke a Mayan 
language. Though these groups were not 
politically united and frequently at war 
with each other, they shared many cultural 
elements. On the Pacific coastal plains 
lived a number of rather small non-Maya 
groups: Pipil, Zoque, and Xinca. The 
Spaniards brought with them new disea-
ses, which together with the violence of 
the conquest and forced labour quickly 
decimated the indigenous population. It 
took centuries before the population 
recovered its pre-conquest size. Nonethe-
less, the number of indigenous remained 
high in comparison to other parts of Cen-
tral America. 
During the colonial period, the indi-
genous were subject to forced labour and 
obliged to pay taxes. The colonial powers 
sought to substitute indigenous languages 
with Spanish, and the indigenous religion 
with Catholicism. There were numerous 
minor rebellions throughout this period 
that met violent repercussions (Dary 
1997). The attempt to assimilate the indi-
genous culture was rewarded with limited 
success. The indigenous resisted assimila-
tion by maintaining their religious and 
cultural practices in secrecy and by bring-
ing their own cultural elements into 
Catholic rituals and beliefs. The indigen-
ous communities, though formally subject 
to the Spanish monarchy, did keep a 
substantial degree of political autonomy. 
Traditional indigenous institutions, such 
as the ‘council of the elders’ were also 
given formal recognition by the Spanish 
authorities in exchange for providing 
labour and tribute. This is the origin of 
Guatemala’s parallel system of authori-
ties, which to some extent persists today.  
After 1540, the colonial power sought 
to keep the two groups separate, and the 
Spaniards were prohibited from settling in 
indigenous communities by law. How-
ever, a new group quickly emerged as a 
consequence of the contact between these 
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two cultures: the mestizo or ‘mixed-
blood’. The mestizo, or Ladino, as they 
later came to be called, were stigmatised 
by the colonial authorities, but also 
enjoyed certain privileges compared to the 
indigenous, such as being exempt from 
forced labour and certain taxes (Adams 
1997, Dary 1994). This gave incentives 
for many indigenous to ‘ladinise’; by 
changing language and customs they 
endeavored to be considered ‘Ladino’ to 
avoid the disadvantages of the ‘indigen-
ous’ status. The Garifuna, a group of 
Caribbean and African origin, probably 
started settling in Guatemala towards the 
end of the eighteenth century (Arrivillaga 
1998). 
Central America proclaimed indepen-
dence form Spain in 1821, and Guatemala 
became an independent state in 1838 
when the Central American Federation 
fell apart. Guatemala’s first constitution, 
from 1825, put an end to the formal segre-
gation of indigenous and the descendants 
of the Spaniards, the criollo. Though the 
Ladino were still regarded as second-class 
citizens, the nineteenth  century saw this 
group gradually come to power at the 
national level (Woodward 1971:64). The 
influx of Ladino to indigenous communi-
ties increased, but in areas with a signifi-
cant proportion of both Maya and Ladino 
a system of parallel authorities continued 
to exist. Locally, the Ladino dominated 
the public institutions set up by the state, 
whereas the indigenous maintained sepa-
rate institutions for decision-making and 
conflict resolution. The occupation of 
indigenous lands gained new impetus, 
particularly from the 1880s and onwards 
when the right to collective ownership of 
land was abolished.  
Despite the formal existence of demo-
cratic institutions and a system of civil 
and constitutional rights, Guatemala 
remained ruled by a series of presidents 
who made themselves life-long dictators 
until 1944. A new system of forced labour 
was introduced by inducing the indigen-
ous into debt, a debt repaid by manual 
labour on the plantations of coffee, sugar 
and other crops. This, in addition to the 
so-called ‘vagrancy laws’ subjected huge 
numbers of the indigenous to temporary 
forced labour (Sieder 1996:61-74). To 
achieve cultural assimilation of the indi-
genous, the state relied heavily on an edu-
cational effort, but the results were 
meagre (Gálvez et al.1997c:39).  
The Guatemalan revolution of 1944 
brought an end to the era of dictatorships 
and inaugurated a ten-year period of 
reform-oriented democratically elected 
governments. The state’s policy towards 
the indigenous, however, changed little, 
though the practice of forced labour was 
attenuated. The indigenous continued to 
be denied equal rights and political parti-
cipation. A successful coup in 1954 
brought the Guatemalan military to power 
with the support of the USAs government. 
In 1962, a few disaffected army officers 
left for the eastern mountains to inaugu-
rate a guerrilla struggle that would last 
almost 35 years. Gradually, the guerrillas 
became inspired by Marxism and the 
experience of the Cuban revolution. This 
first wave of insurrection was crushed by 
the army by the late 1960s and did not 
affect the indigenous to a large extent, 
since it took place in an area of the 
country inhabited mostly by poor Ladino 
farmers. In the 1970s the army continued 
its violent repression of all urban opposi-
tion, and in a number of fraudulent electi-
ons high-ranking military officials were 
elected presidents. Social mobilisation 
grew toward the end of the decade and 
there were protests by farmers and the 
labour movement against the dictatorship.  
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, sig-
nificant transformations were taking place 
within traditional Mayan communities as 
these were drawn into the global eco-
nomy. A reform movement within the 
Catholic Church, the ‘Acción Católica’, 
prompted the growth of a new group 
within indigenous communities. Young 
Maya who had turned away from Maya 
tradition, usually called ‘catequistas’, 
opposed the more traditionally inclined of 
their fellow community members, the so-
called ‘costumbristas’.  
In 1975 the guerrillas opened up a new 
front in the indigenous highlands in the 
northwest, and the war took a new turn. 
The guerrilla leadership, none of whom 
where indigenous, chose to recruit in the 
Mayan areas (Smith 1991:32). This re-
cruitment was not unproblematic (Payeras 
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1980), but had greater success after the 
army increased its counterinsurgency acti-
vities. By 1981-82, the majority of the 
guerrilla foot soldiers were rural Maya.5 
The killings became more indiscriminate 
and entire villages were wiped out as part 
of the army’s counterinsurgency strategy. 
The Guatemalan Truth Commission (CEH 
1999), sponsored by the United Nations, 
documents no less than 626 massacres 
committed by the army. More than 80% 
of the approximately 200,000 people 
killed during almost 35 years of war were 
indigenous. 3% of the total number of 
killings are attributed to the guerrilla, 
whereas 93% are attributed to the army 
and its associates. Between 0.5 and 1.5 
million people fled or were forced to 
leave their homes, many of whom ended 
up in refugee camps in Guatemala’s 
neighbouring countries. The army’s 
strategy, which in addition to the 
massacres included the burning of crops, 
systematic use of torture, ‘disappearances’ 
and terror to scare the civilian population, 
has been classified as an attempt to 
commit genocide on the Maya (CEH 
1999). Respect for civilian lives and 
indigenous culture seems to have been 
lacking also from the guerrillas’ stand-
point, and the Truth Commission docu-
ments numerous massacres, and incidents 
of use of torture and terror by the 
guerrillas.  
By 1984 the guerrillas were militarily 
beaten, but the war continued until 1996, 
though at a much lower intensity than in 
the early 1980s. A new constitution was 
introduced in 1985, and in 1986 a demo-
cratically elected government took seat. 
Elections have since then been regular, 
and considered by most external observers 
to be relatively free and fair, despite the 
persistence of a number of deficiencies of 
the Guatemalan democracy. The party in 
                                                     
5  The degree of popular support for the guerrilla 
movement, and the causes of this support, are 
complex and controversial issues. The debate 
can perhaps be structured between those who 
see the guerrillas largely as a result of (mas-
sive) popular uprising against oppression (Arias 
1990, Falla 1992), and those who emphasise 
that recruitment can be understood largely as a 
result of the dynamics of the war and the use of 
force (Le Bot 1995, Stoll 1993). See also the 
report of the UN Truth Commission (CEH 
1999).  
power at the time of writing is the Partido 
de Avanzada Nacional (PAN), frequently 
characterised as ‘neo-liberal’. At the elec-
tions on 7 November, 1999, the right-
wing populist party Frente Republicano 
Guatemalteco (FRG) won a majority of 
the seats in the Congress, a substantial 
part of the municipalities, and came close 
to winning the Presidency with 48% of 
the votes. A run-off for the Presidency is 
to be held on 26 December, 1999 between 
the candidates of the FRG and the PAN, 
the two parties that received most votes 
on 7 November. 
The Accord in Identity Rights of the 
Indigenous Peoples (AIDPI 1995) was 
signed in 1995 between the Guatemalan 
government and the guerrillas. The 
Accord states that the Xinca, Garifuna and 
Maya are ‘peoples’ with rights, and lists a 
number of Mayan languages and the 
‘fundamental elements’ of Mayan iden-
tity. The government accepts to undertake 
a number of measures to eliminate dis-
crimination, such as revising all Guate-
malan laws. The Accord underlines that 
‘all languages deserve equal respect’ and 
lists a number of measures to be taken by 
the government concerning this issue as 
well as education, protection of religious 
sites, constitutional reform, recognition of 
traditional forms of authority and deci-
sion-making, land rights and more. 
Central to the agreement is the notion that 
recognition of indigenous rights is con-
ductive to national unity (Plant 1997). 
Other proposals imply an extension of 
indigenous autonomy, such as the recog-
nition of community law and the strength-
ening of municipal government.  
Not all sectors of the Guatemalan 
society have been pleased with the 
Accord. Some argue that the Accord has 
negative implications for national unity. 
The legal status of the agreement has also 
been controversial; several commentators 
have argued that the Accord was ‘illegal’ 
because one of the signatories, the guerril-
las, was an ‘illegal group’. In part due to 
this controversy it was deemed necessary 
to turn the Accord into something perma-
nent and of indisputable legal status. 
Moreover, in the Accord the government 
commits itself to promote constitutional 
reforms that redefine the Guatemalan 
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nation as united, multiethnic and multi-
lingual.  
After negotiations throughout 1998 
and considerable international pressure, a 
proposal for constitutional reform (Siglo 
Veintiuno 1998a) was reached as a com-
promise between the forces that compose 
the Congress. A goal of these reforms, 
according to one Maya, was that ‘the con-
stitution should reflect the national reality 
with all its particularities and differences, 
and thus be converted into a social con-
tract indicating an agreement and a re-
sponsibility of all with no exclusions’ 
(Pop 1997). The proposal listed the indi-
genous languages that are to be consid-
ered ‘official’, and thus have equal status 
with Spanish, though with a more limited 
degree of application. The other signifi-
cant novelty of the proposal was the 
incorporation of indigenous ‘community 
law’ into the official legal framework, dis-
cussed in chapter 4.  
The proposal, which received formal 
support from all major political parties, 
was rejected by a majority in the 16 May, 
1999 referendum in which only 18% of 
the electorate voted. The proposal was 
attacked by the political ‘right’, and the 
referendum had to be postponed once due 
to claims that the procedure for the refer-
endum violated the constitution. The 
referendum was seen by most external 
observers as being of great importance for 
the continuation of the peace process and 
democratic reform. 
Discrimination, Racism, and the Guate-
malan State 
An obstacle to the creation of a 
democracy in Guatemala which accom-
modates cultural difference, is the prevail-
ing perception of ‘natural hierarchies’ of 
culture and ‘race’. The official version of 
what it is to be Guatemalan has been one 
of cultural homogeneity (Palma 1996:46, 
Solares 1997:8), and by equating ‘being 
Guatemalan’ with their own cultural char-
acteristics, the Spanish-speaking elite in 
Guatemala have sought to legitimise their 
control of the Guatemalan state. A 
wealthy Ladino minority dominates politi-
cal life in Guatemala, and this elite has 
utilised the state and the laws to further its 
own interests (Palma 1996:46, Sieder 
1996:14). Ideas about cultural assimila-
tion of the indigenous into the Spanish-
speaking culture have been reflected in 
the attempts of the Guatemalan state to 
create a national identity that includes all 
Guatemalans, through policies aiming at 
the assimilation of the indigenous by 
replacing the indigenous cultures with the 
Europeanised culture of the Spanish-
speaking elite (Cojtí 1996a:84). Indigen-
ous cultures have been looked upon as 
opposed to ‘European culture’, and the 
latter has been considered synonymous 
with ‘civilisation’ and ‘development’. 
According to Carol Smith, 
 
 the general state policy has been to target 
Indians for work, ignore their ‘backward’ 
traditions, allow a few of the more ‘civil-
ised’ to become Ladinos, and brutally 
mow down any who pose a direct chal-
lenge to Creole or Ladino dominance 
(Smith 1991:31).  
 
There is an ongoing discussion in Guate-
mala concerning what it means to be 
‘Guatemalan’, and what role ethnic identi-
ties should play in the Guatemalan politi-
cal system. This is not simply a discussion 
of who belongs to which groups; it is also 
a discussion that affects the distribution 
and legitimisation of political power. 
Estuardo Zapeta (1997:4) argues that dis-
cussing Ladino identity implies ‘touching 
hegemonies, interests, privileges, history-
myths, structures, paradigms, ...it means 
touching and rearranging the State itself’. 
According to John Watanabe,  
 
 to become skilled, educated, influential, or 
simply part of modern Guatemalan soci-
ety, it would seem Maya must first cease 
to be Maya. Even when they do learn 
Spanish, don Ladino clothes, and enter 
Ladino trades, however, Ladinos have 
little reason to accept them as anything 
other than déclassé ex-Indians (Watanabe 
1994:31). 
 
Relationships between ethnic groups vary 
in different parts of the country. For 
example, according to some of my infor-
mants, in the Verapaces region differ-
ences in wealth are given far more social 
emphasis than differences in ethnic iden-
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tity. Many of Guatemala’s non-indigenous 
are also marginalised economically and 
excluded politically, and some Guatemal-
ans therefore argue that racism is not 
particularly prevalent in Guatemala; dis-
crimination is a result of enormous differ-
ences between the rich and the poor.6 
According to Berganza (1997), on the 
other hand, considering the ‘indio’ as 
someone inferior is part of Ladino up-
bringing, and it is learned by assimilating 
the prevalent opinions in the Ladino 
social environment. Of the persons I inter-
viewed, only one argued that neither rac-
ism nor cultural prejudice are essential for 
understanding the exclusion of the indi-
genous from Guatemala’s political institu-
tions.  
Marta Casáus (1998), in her survey on 
the attitudes of the Guatemalan elite 
towards the indigenous, explains that the 
same family lines have ruled Guatemala 
for centuries by intermarrying. Casáus 
argues that the ‘perpetuation of lineage’, 
an ideology which has been fundamental 
to avoid procreating with persons of non-
European origin, has been an instrument 
whereby the elite in power has sought to 
achieve and maintain control over politi-
cal institutions and economic resources. 
Intermarriage with the indigenous has 
occurred frequently among the elite, but 
this is generally denied or has been con-
sidered undesirable. Negative stereotyp-
ing of the indigenous, such as labelling 
them ‘lazy’, ‘submissive’ and ‘confor-
mist’, is in her view part of the elite’s 
strategy to legitimise social inequality 
(op.cit.:65-74). Another such stereotype, 
popular among Marxists and ‘progressive 
liberals’ is that the indigenous are ‘tradi-
tional’, and thus an impediment to ‘pro-
gress’. Influential intellectuals of the ‘left’ 
have seen indigenous culture as a mere 
product of Spanish colonial oppression, or 
have qualified traditional indigenous 
beliefs as ‘false consciousness’ that 
impeded the formation of ‘class solidar-
ity’ and revolutionary struggle.7  
                                                     
6  Haroldo Quej, a member of the Guatemalan 
Congress and Maya, is quoted as saying this in 
Iximulew 13 October 1996. This is also an opi-
nion I frequently heard expressed among the 
non-indigenous. 
7  See discussion in Gálvez and Esquit (1997b). 
On the whole, age, gender, occupation, 
and education seem to be of little rele-
vance when it comes to explaining these 
attitudes. Several of my informants stres-
sed how continuation of the exclusion of 
the indigenous from political leadership 
was justified on the basis of indigenous 
‘lack of maturity’.8 Even among some 
researchers I spoke to in Guatemala, 
notions of indigenous ‘backwardness’ 
linger on, and Casáus (op.cit.:139,144) 
argues that social science in Guatemala 
generally has served to justify the exclu-
sion of the indigenous from the state. She 
(op.cit.:78) concludes that ‘racial’ prejudi-
ces, based on physical attributes, are 
clearly more prevalent than those based 
on ‘class’ or income and wealth.  
Non-indigenous conceptions of the 
indigenous have taken on various shapes 
throughout Guatemalan history, and ‘indi-
genous’ has been conflated with disease, 
alcoholism, and inferior intellectual capa-
city9 by the Guatemalan elite. According 
to Cojtí (1996b, 1996c), discrimination 
based on skin colour is reinforced by dis-
crimination based on culture in Guate-
mala: not only are the indigenous 
considered biologically inferior by many 
of the non-indigenous, they are also 
believed to posses a more primitive cul-
ture. The beliefs Guatemala’s ruling elite 
has concerning its relation to the indi-
genous and the poor may to some extent 
have been reflected in the perception the 
Maya have of the Ladino as ‘those with 
power, those who take the decisions, 
those who are above the Maya’ (Esquit 
97). This tendency is sometimes sought 
reversed by Mayan activists who argue 
about Ladino inferiority (Wilson 1995: 
279). A result from a recent study (ASIES 
et al. 1998), which gives some reason for 
optimism, is that Ladino tolerance to-
wards the Maya seems to be increasing. 
When it comes to the justice system, on 
                                                     
8  For example, one of the leaders of a left-wing 
party under formation, argued when asked why 
indigenous representation in the organisation’s 
leadership had been reduced, that the indigen-
ous lacked ‘maturity’ and ‘were not yet ready’ 
to assume leadership. 
9  Presentations by Greg Grandin, Virginia 
Garrard Burnett and John Watanabe at the Soci-
ety of Latin American Studies’ Annual Meeting 
and Conference,  9-11 April 1999, Cambridge, 
United Kingdom.   
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the other hand, less than 50% of both 
Maya and Ladino believed that the indi-
genous were treated equally with the 
Ladino in the court system and by the 
police. 
What is the status of indigenous cul-
ture and languages in the Guatemalan 
legal system? The Guatemalan Constitu-
tion of 1985 states that ‘the state recog-
nises, respects and promotes’ indigenous 
traditions, ways of life, types of social 
organisation, clothing and languages (Art. 
66). Communal and collectively owned 
lands are entitled to protection and finan-
cial assistance from the state, and the state 
shall provide land to indigenous commun-
ities depending on need (Art. 67-68). In 
areas with a mainly indigenous popula-
tion, education ‘should preferably’ be 
bilingual (Art. 76). Spanish is the 
country’s official language, and the ‘ver-
nacular languages are part of the cultural 
patrimony of the Nation’ (Art. 143). 
These articles ‘altered the monolithic tra-
dition begun in 1879 regarding a unitary 
nation and a centralist State’ (Gálvez and 
Esquit 1997b:24). However, the constitu-
tion clearly does not give indigenous 
language and culture equal footing with 
Spanish language and Ladino culture. 
According to many of my informants, the 
problem with today’s constitution is that 
‘it represents only some of the citizens. 
Formally or tacitly, it establishes that 
there is a dominant culture (the Ladino), a 
single language (Spanish), a single law 
(Roman law), and it gives the Catholic 
religion a privileged position’ (Ferrigno 
1997). As Marta Casáus (1998:35) argues, 
‘the Guatemalan indigenous is an ‘‘imag-
ined citizen’’, in being legally and for-
mally homogenous and equal, but pro-
foundly different in economic, cultural 
and political terms’. 
It was after considerable mobilisation 
and pressure from the indigenous organi-
sations that the ILO Convention no. 169 
(ILO 1989) was ratified in Guatemala, 
and it has formally been in operation since 
1997. This Convention is a significant 
step forward in the legal recognition of 
the differentiated group status of the indi-
genous. The Convention uses the term 
‘people’ for the indigenous, but explicitly 
states that this should not have the impli-
cations that it has under international law, 
e.g. the right to self-determination. How-
ever, it underlines the indigenous peoples’ 
right to be consulted, an important im-
provement for the indigenous compared to 
the constitution. The convention, in article 
7, recognises the right of the indigenous 
to decide their own priorities for the pro-
cess of development as it affects their 
lives, beliefs, institutions, spiritual well-
being, and the lands they occupy or other-
wise use. It also recognises the rights of 
the indigenous to exercise control, to the 
extent possible, over their economic and 
cultural development. In addition, they 
shall participate in the formulation, imple-
mentation, and evaluation of plans and 
programmes for national and regional 
development that may affect them 
directly.  
The convention also requires that the 
government identify the lands that the 
indigenous traditionally have occupied. 
Article 1 of the convention underlines that 
self-identification as an ‘indigenous 
people’ shall be an important criterion for 
defining which groups the convention 
should be valid for. Though potentially a 
legal base on which future indigenous 
claims can be made, it seems that the con-
vention has had few practical consequen-
ces so far. The same can be said of the 
International Convenant on Civic and 
Political Rights, which states in article 27 
that ethnic minorities shall not be denied 
the right to practice their culture, religion 
and language. 
The above characterisation of the 
Guatemalan state comes close to an ‘eth-
nocracy’ or ‘ethnocratic state’,10 which 
Nils Butenschøn defines as 
 
 Regimes that express the identity and aspi-
rations of one ethnic group in an ethnically 
divided society. It is a form of government 
based on the rule of one ethnic group over 
other ethnic groups (Butenschøn 1993:6).  
 
Smooha and Handf follow the same line 
of reasoning: 
 
                                                     
10 Adams (1996:76-7) also uses this term to char-
acterise the Guatemalan state, and attributes the 
term ‘ethnocratic state’ to Rodolfo Staven-
hagen. 
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 Ethnic democracy differs from other types 
of democracy in according a structured 
superior status to the dominant group, 
keeping the non-dominant groups out of 
the highest offices of the state and alienat-
ing them from the character of the state (its 
symbols, official language, religion, immi-
gration policy). 11 
 
Guatemala is, at least to a significant 
degree, an ‘ethnocracy’ when it comes to 
control over the state apparatus, except at 
the municipal level. It is also a state where 
cultural assimilation has been an explicit 
goal of the state, and where those who 
conformed to this policy may have achie-
ved some improvements in their enjoy-
ment of the rights of citizenship and 
possibilities for economic improvements. 
Nevertheless, the above cannot serve as 
‘evidence’ of the importance of racism in 
relation to other factors, such as education 
and income, in explaining the current situ-
ation of political exclusion for the vast 
majority of the indigenous in Guatemala. 
These factors are furthermore interrelated 
in complex ways. Since the Spanish con-
quest, the prevalent indigenous strategy 
towards their exclusion from and suppres-
sion by state power has been to seek mar-
gins of autonomy by appropriating those 
institutions and practices deemed useful, 
rather than confronting them directly. 
With the arrival of the Mayan movement, 
this strategy may be changing. 
The Mayan Movement: Its Aims and 
Organisation 
The Mayan movement grew out of the 
cultural and political transformations that 
Mayan communities went through in the 
1950s and 60s. Numerous indigenous 
community leaders were killed during the 
war, and the escalation of violence in the 
early 1980s forced many Mayan organis-
ers to ‘go under cover’. Activities soon 
picked up with the introduction of demo-
cratic elections and the reduction of politi-
cal repression from 1986 and onwards. 
Freedom of speech and organisation has 
enjoyed a high degree of respect since 
then. The campaigns of resistance gene-
rated in 1992 around the 500 anniversary 
                                                     
11 Quoted in Butenschøn (1993:5). 
of the arrival Columbus in the Americas 
gave the movement new impetus, and the 
growth of the Mayan movement finds its 
counterpart in increased indigenous orga-
nisation globally (Solares 1995). Another 
important event in 1992 was that the 
Mayan indigenous woman Rigoberta 
Menchú Tum was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize. This was widely perceived as 
recognition of the struggles of the indi-
genous peoples. Since the late 1980s, 
there has been a significant growth in 
indigenous organisations, and indigenous 
organisational participation today is gene-
rally the same as that of the non-indigen-
ous (ASIES et al. 1998:10). In a survey 
made at the beginning of the 1990s no 
less than 400 Mayan NGOs were regis-
tered (Ekern 1998:69).  
The Mayan movement, as this loose 
conglomeration of indigenous organisa-
tions is often called, is very heterogene-
ous. The size of the organisations varies 
enormously, as do their organisational 
structures, ideologies and strategies. Some 
operate within a very limited geographical 
scope, such as community-based ‘deve-
lopment committees’ aimed at solving 
particular practical needs at the commun-
ity level. Some emphasise socio-economic 
issues such as land reform and economic 
redistribution. These are usually referred 
to as ‘populares’. Others focus on acade-
mic activities, research and the revitalisa-
tion of Maya culture and languages. These 
are usually called ‘culturales’. According 
to Carol Smith (1991:39), ‘three types of 
people currently make up the movement, 
almost all of them literate, self-pro-
claimed Maya: students and intellectuals; 
community-based professionals (teachers, 
agronomists, health workers); and mem-
bers of local NGOs and co-operatives’. 
There have been attempts to coordinate 
the numerous Mayan organisations, and a 
number of umbrella organisations with 
this aim exist. However, the great diver-
sity of the Mayan movement has so far 
made such attempts complicated. The 
Mayan movement has been extensively 
studied over the last years, both by Guate-
malan and non-Guatemalan researchers, 
indigenous as well as non-indigenous 
(Bastos and Camus 1995 and 1996, Cojtí 
1997a, de Paz 1993, Ekern 1998, Gálvez 
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and Esquit 1997b, Gálvez et al. 1997c, 
Warren 1998, Watanabe 1994). 
What are the indigenous in Guatemala 
demanding? Broadly speaking, they wish 
to put an end to discrimination. However, 
ending discrimination may imply two 
quite different things. First, it can mean 
that individuals should be treated in an 
identical or similar manner. For example, 
both ‘social justice’ and ‘ending racial 
discrimination’ are usually seen as imply-
ing putting an end to differentiated treat-
ment. Secondly, ending discrimination 
can also imply that differences should be 
taken into account. For example, ‘cultural 
justice’ is achieved when people’s cultural 
differences are given equal consideration. 
Both of these perceptions of discrimina-
tion reflect a desire for justice in the sense 
of achieving equality, but they concern 
different issues. The indigenous in 
Guatemala are claiming both that unjusti-
fied differentiated treatment should end 
and that cultural difference should be 
taken into account. As Anne Phillips 
(1995:37) argues, ‘in some circumstances 
equality means differential treatment; in 
other circumstances it means treating 
people the same – there is no logical or 
political requirement to stand by just one 
of these options’. 
Claims for social justice have been 
high on the agenda of the Mayan move-
ment (Bastos and Camus 1995, Cojtí 
1997a, Gálvez et. al. 1997c). The vast 
majority of today’s indigenous in Guate-
mala live beneath the poverty line. 
Perhaps as many as 70% of the 
indigenous are illiterate, compared to 30% 
for the Ladino, and the average life 
expectancy of the indigenous is approxi-
mately 12 years less than that of the non-
indigenous (Cojtí 1997a:26-9). However, 
there is no total correspondence between 
being indigenous and being poor. The 
majority of the non-indigenous also live 
beneath the poverty line, and there is a 
substantial number of rather well-off 
Maya, even if the Guatemalan economic 
elite has never included a Maya. What 
should be emphasised is that ethnic iden-
tity does not justify economic positions. 
Issues of social justice are therefore con-
ceptually different from and should be 
distinguished from claims for cultural jus-
tice, which is my concern here. 
A salient issue in today’s political 
debates in Guatemala is land ownership. 
Guatemala has become infamous for its 
inequitable distribution of land, and land 
conflict is a widespread and recurring pro-
blem for many farmers (Black 1998). The 
land issue is often seen as entailing more 
than just ensuring an equitable access to 
the country’s resources, it is sometimes 
presented as an issue of Mayan cultural 
survival. Mayan identity and religion, it is 
often argued, are tied to the ancestral land 
and to the cultivation of the maize 
(Wilson 1995, Bastos and Camus 1995). 
If Mayan culture is to be given the same 
chance of survival as Ladino culture, then, 
the argument goes, the Maya must be 
ensured access to a sufficient amount of 
land to be able to maintain their cultural 
practices. This argument, however, essen-
tialises Mayan identity by tying it to 
particular economic practices.12 The im-
plication of this would be that persons 
who are not farmers cannot be Maya. 
Land distribution therefore, seems to con-
cern theories of distributive justice and 
not cultural justice (Kymlicka 1995a:110, 
n. 5). The main challenge is to sort out the 
current chaos of land titles, which is very 
slowly being dealt with, and find ways to 
solve conflicts that arise from different 
conceptions and practices of land owner-
ship. It should also be noted that land 
redistribution can only to a limited extent 
solve today’s problems of poverty and 
economic inequality, because the demo-
graphic growth is already making cultiv-
able land scarce in many communities 
with a Mayan majority (Stoll 1993, 1997). 
A great number of the issues on the 
agenda of the Mayan movement can be 
categorised as demands for ‘cultural jus-
tice’, by which I mean demands for diffe-
rentiated treatment on the basis of cultural 
difference. As Ekern argues: 
 
 The greatest challenge of the politics of the 
indigenous is exactly the strong presence 
and the implicit demand for assimilation 
coming from the national society that sur-
                                                     
12  See discussion in chapter 3 on ‘essentialist’ and 
other conceptions of ethnic identity.  
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rounds the indigenous community (Ekern 
1998:79). 
 
Indigenous demands for  ‘cultural justice’ 
can be placed in two groups. Some con-
cern the content of specific policies, such 
as education, language and religion. 
Others primarily concern giving the indi-
genous the means to influence particular 
policies, such as guaranteeing the indigen-
ous a fair representation in the country’s 
political institutions, and political auto-
nomy for the indigenous.  
Change in the public language policies 
is one of the principal demands of the 
Mayan movement. Not only is Spanish 
the only officially recognised language in 
Guatemala, but a significant proportion of 
the population is also monolingual Mayan 
speakers. Bilingual services in public 
institutions are still poorly developed. 
Language also concerns the country’s 
system of education, and the extension of 
bilingual schools is high on the agenda of 
the Mayan movement. The Mayan move-
ment seeks to revitalise Maya culture and 
improve its public and official appraisal. 
Projects aimed at preserving old religious 
beliefs and practices, and reconstructing 
old community practices for conflict-
resolution and decision-making are being 
carried out by different Mayan organisa-
tions, often with international support. 
The Mayan organisations demand easier 
access to and increased control over the 
numerous ancient Maya monuments and 
works of art. I discuss the issues of langu-
age and education briefly in relation to 
‘non-discrimination’ and ‘recognition’ in 
section 2.5. 
As for proposals that aim to increase 
Mayan political influence, some concern 
reforms in the Guatemalan electoral 
system, such as increasing the number of 
deputies that can be elected in areas with 
a predominantly indigenous population, 
and to make these areas correspond geo-
graphically with the indigenous linguistic 
groups. Another type of proposal (Gálvez 
and Esquit 1997b:66) is to give preferen-
tial access to public positions, or reserve a 
quota of seats in public institutions for the 
indigenous. Other claims concern indi-
genous political autonomy, which is to be 
achieved largely through decentralisation 
of power to the municipalities. Another 
important issue at hand is the official 
recognition of indigenous customary law, 
mentioned above. These proposals are 
analysed in chapter 4. 
1.5 The Relevance of a Discussion 
on Justice and Cultural Difference 
in Guatemala 
Is a liberal political approach to multicul-
tural justice applicable to Guatemala? 
Theories of justice that seek to reconcile 
the specific needs of minority cultures 
with the basic values of freedom and 
equality are, in my view, applicable to any 
democracy where the citizens are divided 
into different cultural identities. More-
over, Amartya Sen (1998) argues that the 
merits of democracy are universal, its 
legitimacy does not depend on the parti-
cular cultural, economic or social charac-
teristics of a country. Even though 
democracy has a short and troubled his-
tory in Guatemala, it stands uncontested 
as the right and legitimate model of 
government among the vast majority of 
Guatemalans. Even during Guatemala’s 
recent period of dictatorship, from 1954 to 
1985, elections were held and democratic 
institutions formally upheld. Though these 
elections were fraudulent and the political 
institutions were largely controlled by the 
military, this still shows how even a mili-
tary government needed a tie with ‘demo-
cracy’ to legitimise their rule. Democracy 
and the values inherent to it are further-
more entrenched in the numerous inter-
national human rights conventions signed 
and ratified by the Guatemalan state, as 
well as in the Guatemalan Constitution of 
1985 (Constitución 1996), as is reflected 
in article 4: ‘In Guatemala, all human 
beings are free and equal in dignity and 
rights.’ The values of freedom and equal-
ity have implications for how the state in 
a democracy can treat different ethnic 
groups, in Guatemala as well as else-
where. 
Some might object to this study, argu-
ing that a discussion of rights is futile in a 
country where attempts at reform, and in 
particular the demands of the indigenous 
people have often, if not always, been met 
with brutal military repression. Following 
this argument, it could be said that consid-
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erations of justice will do little good in a 
country where political and economic 
power is concentrated in the hands of a 
small elite, a small elite which is unwil-
ling to cede any power no matter how 
good the arguments for doing so are. 
One objection to this argument is that 
it gives an inadequate account of how 
power is distributed in Guatemala. No 
state is homogenous and integrated 
enough to give a single group total domi-
nance (Sieder 1996:33). Even though 
political and economic power in Guate-
mala is concentrated and centralised, there 
have always existed margins of action for 
those who have been excluded from 
government and the main political institu-
tions of the state. At the same time, the 
Guatemalan state has never fully deve-
loped the institutions necessary to extend 
the state apparatus and to exert a high 
degree of political and ideological control 
over its citizens. It is probably more accu-
rate to view the Guatemalan state as 
‘weak and coercive rather than strong and 
hegemonic’ (C. Smith 1991:31). Repres-
sion in Guatemala is a complex pattern of 
local power balances and patron-client 
relationships, which cannot be reduced to 
an emphasis on the will and shortsighted-
ness of the Guatemalan elites. Because the 
state has been weak, and because the indi-
genous peoples and the Ladino have been 
separated culturally and linguistically, and 
to some extent geographically, they have 
maintained a high degree of separate 
existence also politically. I return to this 
issue in chapter 4.  
Secondly, the peace process, the 
reintroduction of democracy, the streng-
thening of civil society, and the extensive 
international presence in Guatemala, have 
done much to reduce the possibility of 
using violence to thwart attempts at 
reforms. The most serious test of the 
Guatemalan democracy came in 1993, 
when President Serrano tried to usurp 
power by abolishing the Congress. He 
was prevented from doing so by massive 
general protesting as well as lack of sup-
port from the military and the country’s 
economic elites. This incident can be 
interpreted as evidence of the newly 
gained strength of civil society and the 
general acceptance of democracy in 
Guatemala (McCleary 1997). 
Thirdly, the implications of multicul-
turalism for the state are debated daily in 
Guatemalan media. Numerous indigenous 
organisations are particularly active in 
vocalising demands for the recognition of 
their cultures. Various commissions have 
been set up in accordance with the Peace 
Accords, whereby indigenous representa-
tives are for the first time in history nego-
tiating directly with the government. The 
purpose of these commissions is to pre-
sent proposals concerning issues of vital 
importance for the future of the indigen-
ous cultures, such as multicultural 
education, indigenous community law, the 
status of the indigenous languages, politi-
cal participation and more. Analysing 
these questions at this particular moment 
in Guatemalan history is specifically per-
tinent because, as Rachel Sieder (1996: 
13) argues, it is in this phase of democra-
tic transition that questions are raised 
about who should have which rights and 
obligations.  
The debate on multiculturalism in 
Guatemala raises complicated conceptual 
questions, but finding a model of ethnic 
coexistence that is fair and generally 
acceptable may be seen as a prerequisite 
for lasting peace and democratic stability. 
In this respect, the proposals that abound 
in Guatemala on how to reform and 
democratise the state and the society in 
order to make them more inclusive of dif-
ferent ethnic identities deserve careful 
examination and analysis. Moreover, as 
Raino Malnes (1997) argues, even if there 
are differences between ideals, such as 
those that follow from considerations of 
justice in multicultural democracies, and 
reality, normative analysis may never-
theless be of great value. Such analysis 
can serve to examine whether the reasons 
to be sceptic to normative conclusions are 
warranted.  

Chapter 2: 
Justice and Cultural Diversity 
2.1 ‘Recognition’ and ‘Non-Discri-
mination’ as Approaches to 
Justice 
The basic difference between ‘non-discri-
mination’ and ‘recognition’ is the ques-
tion of whether cultural identities should 
be of any concern for the state. The two 
approaches represent opposite views on 
whether the state should promote cultural 
diversity by protecting selected cultures or 
not. ‘Non-discrimination’ implies that cul-
tures are protected indirectly through 
guarantees for fundamental individual 
rights, such as freedom of organisation, 
freedom of speech and freedom of reli-
gion. Thus, individual citizens are free to 
express their cultural identity in private, 
but this expression does not concern the 
state directly, except in the sense that it is 
the responsibility of the state to protect 
the rights and freedoms that makes this 
expression possible. ‘Non-discrimination’ 
requires a commitment ‘in the strongest 
possible way to individual rights and, 
almost as a deduction from this, to a rigor-
ously neutral state, that is, a state without 
cultural or religious projects or, indeed, 
any sort of collective goals beyond perso-
nal freedom and physical security, wel-
fare, and safety of its citizens’ (Walzer 
1994:99). ‘Non-discrimination’ is an ap-
proach with ‘no legal-institutional distinc-
tions attached to ethnic (race, descent, 
nationality, language, religion) affiliation 
of the citizens’ (Butenschøn 1993:9). 
‘Recognition’, on the other hand, 
involves the state in a much more active 
way, by conferring an obligation on the 
state to promote and protect different cul-
tural identities. Groups are conceded 
rights that help guarantee their continued 
existence as separate cultural entities, 
such as for example guaranteed represen-
tation in public institutions and different 
types of political autonomy. This appro-
ach presupposes that it is possible to iden-
tify the relevant groups, and also identify 
who belongs to which group. Recognition 
‘allows for a state committed to the 
survival and flourishing of a parti 
cular nation, culture or religion, or of a 
(limited) set of nations, cultures, and reli-
gions – so long as the basic rights of citi-
zens who have different commitments or 
no such commitments at all are protected’ 
(Walzer 1994:99).  
In political systems based on ‘recogni-
tion’, group affiliation determines the 
legal power distribution to a large degree. 
In systems based on ‘non-discrimination’, 
on the other hand, ‘group affiliation is 
legally-politically irrelevant: Rights and 
obligations are attached to individual citi-
zens irrespective of group affiliation. Both 
systems are in principle non-discrimina-
tory, but in the latter case ‘‘one man, one 
vote’’ is a norm without legal qualificati-
ons’ (Butenschøn 1993:9). In the remain-
der of this chapter, I present Kymlicka’s 
and other authors’ defence for group-dif-
ferentiated rights before I go on to discuss 
whether there is a conflict between these 
and individual rights. I also look at the 
question whether a group’s size is of any 
relevance for its claim to group-differenti-
ated rights. I then discuss whether ‘non-
discrimination’ can be maintained despite 
Kymlicka’s objections against it. I illu-
strate some implications of ‘non-discrimi-
nation’ by discussing a number of multi-
cultural dilemmas in Guatemala.  
2.2 Justifying ‘Recognition’ 
‘Recognition’ and the various types of 
group-differentiated rights it may entail, is 
an established policy in many democra-
cies around the world, such as the USA, 
Canada, Norway, and Australia. This indi-
cates the viability of democracies that 
incorporate ‘recognition’. However, the 
existence of such rights is in itself insuffi-
cient to justify them; positive rights need 
convincing arguments to prove that they 
are morally justified (Oskal 1999:142). 
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Culture and Freedom 
Kymlicka (1995a) gives three basic justi-
fications of group-differentiated rights. 
The first is the argument that freedom is 
dependent on culture. Kymlicka argues a 
liberal theory of politics requires rights to 
protect cultures, because membership in a 
‘societal culture’ is a necessary precondi-
tion for individual freedom. A ‘societal 
culture’ is ‘a culture which provides its 
members with meaningful ways of life 
across the whole range of human activi-
ties, including social, educational, religi-
ous, recreational, and economic life, 
encompassing both public and private 
spheres. These cultures tend to be territor-
ially concentrated, and based on a shared 
language’ (op.cit.:76). Why is member-
ship in a societal culture necessary for 
freedom? Kymlicka considers access to a 
societal culture as essential for personal 
freedom because  
 
 freedom of choice is dependent on social 
practices, cultured meanings, and a shared 
language. Our capacity to form and revise 
a conception of the good is intimately tied 
to our membership in a societal culture, 
since the context of individual choice is 
the range of options made available to us 
by our culture. Deciding how to lead our 
lives is, in first instance, a matter of 
exploring the possibilities made available 
by our culture (Kymlicka 1995a:126).  
  
Not only are the options from which we 
choose how to lead our lives provided by 
our culture, according to Kymlicka, our 
culture also provides the measurements 
we use to identify something as valuable:  
 
 Whether or not a course of action has any 
significance for us depends on whether, 
and how, our language renders vivid to us 
the point of that activity. And the way in 
which our language renders vivid these 
activities is shaped by our history, our ‘tra-
ditions and conventions’. Understanding 
these cultural narratives is a precondition 
for making intelligent judgements about 
how to lead our lives. In this sense, our 
culture not only provides options, it also 
provides the spectacles through which we 
identify experiences as valuable 
(Kymlicka 1995a:83).  
  
Our choices always take place within a 
certain cultural context: therefore our 
freedom depends on belonging to a socie-
tal culture. Access to a societal culture 
should therefore be considered a ‘primary 
good’, it is ‘a good which people need, 
regardless of their particular chosen way 
of life’ (op.cit.:84, n. 11).  
Is membership in a societal culture so 
important that it requires special rights to 
protect it? Group-differentiated rights are, 
according to Kymlicka, needed to give 
people the same opportunities to work and 
live in their own culture. They are ‘...re-
quired by the view...that justice requires 
removing or compensating for undeserved 
or ‘‘morally arbitrary’’ disadvantages, pa-
rticularly if these are profound and perva-
sive and present from birth’ (op.cit.: 126). 
If a person suffers a disadvantage because 
of her culture, measures that compensate 
for this are required because the dis-
advantage is undeserved. It is undeserved 
because it is not a consequence of the 
person’s individual choices but is rather 
due to circumstances over which the indi-
vidual has little or no influence.  
Can people have their options pro-
vided by a culture different from the one 
they are born in? This question seems par-
ticularly relevant for the case of 
Guatemala, since it has been a goal of the 
ruling powers in Guatemala to assimilate 
the indigenous peoples into the Spanish-
speaking culture (Adams 1995, Guzman-
Böckler and Herbert 1970). It is up until 
recently a common belief in Guatemala, 
and also in social science studies (Adams 
1995) that the gradual disappearance of 
the indigenous cultures through the assi-
milation of the indigenous into Ladino 
culture is inevitable, and that attempting 
to preserve these culture is at best futile, 
at worst an impediment for economic and 
social development. Could the culture of 
the Spanish-speaking provide the indigen-
ous people of Guatemala with the ‘context 
of choice’ they need for personal free-
dom? Kymlicka argues that leaving one’s 
culture has very high costs for the indivi-
dual and it would therefore be an unrea-
sonable burden to require people to do 
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this. ‘Leaving one’s culture, while pos-
sible, is best seen as renouncing some-
thing to which one is reasonably entitled’ 
(1995a:86). Another problem with this 
argument for assimilation is that it is inde-
terminate as to which particular culture 
should be assimilated into another. Why, 
for instance, should the indigenous assi-
milate into ‘Ladino culture’ and not vice 
versa? 
Equality of rights requires that the 
indigenous peoples of Guatemala, as well 
as all other Guatemalans are free to leave, 
maintain or change their culture as they 
choose, but forcing someone to leave her 
culture is clearly unjust. Group-differenti-
ated rights are, in Kymlicka’s view, justi-
fied by the need to ensure this freedom for 
all, members of minority cultures in-
cluded. Group-differentiated rights are 
meant to ‘ensure that members of the min-
ority have the same opportunity to live 
and work in their own culture as members 
of the majority’ (op.cit.:109). Group-dif-
ferentiated rights can be seen as a means 
to improve the situation of disadvantaged 
minorities, thereby helping to rectify a 
situation in which individuals suffer unde-
served disadvantages because of their 
societal culture. 
Historic Rights 
Kymlicka’s second argument for ‘recog-
nition’ is that some groups have an 
historic right to define the terms of incor-
poration into a state. According to this 
argument, the incorporation of a particular 
group into a state provides a legitimate 
basis for certain claims to group-differen-
tiated rights because such incorporations 
imply a renunciation of a group’s sover-
eignty, either voluntarily or involuntarily. 
Kymlicka (1995a) argues that the question 
of which groups (or individuals) belong to 
which states is prior to the issue of which 
rights individuals and groups should have 
within a state. In some countries there are 
historical agreements defining the conditi-
ons under which a group is incorporated 
into a state, such as between the Indians 
and the government in the USA. These 
agreements may define which groups are 
members of which states and may specify 
or serve as a basis for group-differentiated 
rights. If the conditions laid out in such 
agreements are broken by a state, it can be 
argued that the other party to the agree-
ment is no longer legally bound to remain 
part of that state.  
If, on the other hand, a group did not 
join a state voluntarily and no agreement 
exists, then ‘...the national minority might 
have a claim of self-determination under 
international law which can be exercised 
by renegotiating the terms of federation so 
as to make it a voluntary federation’ (op. 
cit.:117). In Guatemala, there was never 
any agreement defining the incorporation 
of the indigenous into the Spanish colo-
nial regime, which later became today’s 
Ladino-dominated Guatemalan state. The 
Spaniards conquered the indigenous, and 
the colonisers settled in their territory and 
subjugated the indigenous to colonial rule. 
The independence of Guatemala from 
Spain changed little in this respect, and 
the indigenous continue to be subordi-
nated to the successor state of the former 
Spanish colony. According to the argu-
ment of voluntary incorporation, the 
Maya do have a claim to negotiate the 
terms under which the Maya as a group 
are to be part of the Guatemalan state, 
because ‘while they are part of a larger 
country, this is not a renunciation of their 
original right to self-government’ (op.cit.: 
181). Such a negotiation may serve as a 
justification for a number of group-diffe-
rentiated rights.  
It is less clear, however, what follows 
from the argument of involuntary incorpo-
ration when it comes to specific group-
differentiated rights, except the right to 
negotiate the group’s terms of incorpora-
tion. The right to negotiate also raises 
difficult issues about who is to represent 
the Mayans in such negotiations, what are 
to be the terms of negotiation, which are 
to be the issues on the agenda, and so 
forth. Kymlicka (op.cit.:118) argues that it 
is probable that arguments based on the 
value of equality and on the historic right 
to decide the terms of incorporation yield 
similar policies. One could therefore stick 
to arguments on the connection between 
cultural membership and freedom in the 
cases where there is no historic agreement 
that specifies the rights of particular 
groups, once having established the basis 
for group-differentiated rights in general 
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by affirming that the incorporation of a 
group into the state was involuntary. 
A difficulty with historical agreements 
is that they are often hard to interpret (op. 
cit.:119). There are also likely to be 
divergent interpretations on past occurren-
ces, such as to what degree the incorpora-
tion was voluntary. Another difficulty 
with giving history any moral weight is 
how such claims carry over from one 
generation to the next.  How is a person or 
a group to be held responsible for actions 
committed not by them, but by someone 
in the past, only linked together through 
bonds of identity or familiarity? In Guate-
mala, indigenous claims for economic 
redistribution sometimes take the form of 
historic claims to compensation between 
groups. The logic of this argument, which 
was also expressed by some of my infor-
mants, can be put as follows: the indigen-
ous were subject to economic exploitation 
under the Spanish colonists, and later the 
Ladino landowners. This exploitation 
must be compensated for today by des-
cendants of the exploiters to descendants 
of the exploited. However, normative 
theories of distributive justice validate 
historic claims only to the extent that they 
have consequences for people today. In 
Kymlicka’s opinion,  
 
 the idea of compensating historical 
wrongs, taken to its logical conclusion, 
implies that all the land which was wrong-
fully taken from the indigenous peoples... 
should be returned to them. This would 
create massive unfairness, given that the 
original European settlers and later immi-
grants have now produced hundreds and 
millions of descendants, and this land is 
the only home they know. Changing cir-
cumstances often make it impossible and 
undesirable to compensate for certain his-
torical wrongs (Kymlicka 1995a:110, n.5). 
 
In my view, compensation for wrong-
doings committed by one’s forefathers 
can only serve as an argument for restitu-
tion when an injustice committed in the 
past gives the descendants of the perpetra-
tors of that injustice some benefit in rela-
tion to the descendants of those the 
injustice was committed against. John 
Watanabe warns against the danger in 
reviling the injustices done to the Maya in 
the past because, he argues: ‘a preoccupa-
tion with the injustices of history provides 
little sense of the future beyond repudiat-
ing the present that the past has spawned’ 
(1994:3). Guatemalans today could, how-
ever, be held responsible for perpetuating 
an unjust situation today, which is prob-
ably to a significant extent a consequence 
of past crimes. Generally therefore, the 
indigenous demands for economic 
redistribution are universal, equal to such 
claims from members of other ethnic 
groups, and they are not culture specific. 
The Value of Cultural Diversity 
Kymlicka’s third justification for group-
differentiated rights is that cultural diver-
sity contributes to the richness of people’s 
lives (1995a:121-3). It should therefore be 
in everyone’s self-interest to promote and 
preserve cultural diversity. However, a 
culture different from one’s own is only 
valuable to the extent it can provide 
models into which one might realistically 
choose to integrate, or to the degree to 
which it can enrich the range of options 
available to one’s culture. Kymlicka 
therefore argues that it is not clear whe-
ther group-differentiated rights, aimed at 
maintaining distinct cultures, contribute 
more to diversity of choice for the indivi-
duals than cultural assimilation. Through 
assimilation, the assimilated people may 
bring with them cultural elements that 
enrich the culture into which they assimi-
late, though the degree to which this 
happens is likely to depend on the terms 
of assimilation. A culture, whose mem-
bers are not receptive to incorporated new 
cultural elements, is likely to benefit less 
from such mutual enrichment. Attempts at 
preserving cultures as distinct entities may 
not have this same effect. 
Another problem with this argument is 
that it seems not to be based on the free 
choice of individuals, but rather seems to 
confer an obligation on certain groups to 
preserve their culture for the sake of its 
value to others. To the extent that this is 
so, it is clearly illiberal, since it conflicts 
with the fundamental liberal value of indi-
vidual autonomy. Kymlicka therefore sug-
gests that one should consider cultural 
diversity as a positive by-product of giv-
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ing support and recognition to different 
cultures. Though the benefits of cultural 
diversity are perhaps something that fav-
our the protection of different cultural 
groups, they are not the basis for an obli-
gation to do so. 
The process of mutual enrichment and 
interchange between Ladino and Mayan 
culture in Guatemala is and has been sig-
nificant. Both Mayan and Ladino cultures 
could not be what they are today without 
the existence of the other. But it seems 
unlikely that the self-interest in main-
taining cultural diversity will be perceived 
as bringing more benefits than costs to the 
dominant Ladino culture. The intrinsic 
value of culture is, however, often alluded 
to in Guatemala. The way Mayan culture 
and folklore is presented with national 
pride in Guatemalan tourist commercials 
testifies the value Mayan culture has for 
Ladino identity and economy13 
(Hendrickson 1997). What characterises 
the attitudes of many non-indigenous to-
wards the indigenous is indigenismo, 
which John Watanabe (1994:35) defines 
as ‘the Ladino glorification and appropri-
ation of the pre-Hispanic Maya past com-
bined with denigration and assimilation of 
Maya in the present’.  
Identity and Self-Esteem 
‘Non-discrimination’ may be deemed 
insufficient for another reason. An unfair 
distribution of positions and goods is fre-
quently due to prevailing perceptual and 
psychological impediments to equality of 
rights, such as ideas about ‘racial’ or cul-
tural inferiority, which can be internalised 
in both the victims and the perpetrators of 
discrimination. Such perceptions, which 
as I documented in chapter 1 are not un-
common in Guatemala, are related to what 
can be labelled the ‘expressive and sym-
bolic’ aspect of politics. According to 
Robert Nozick,  
 
 democratic institutions and the liberties co-
ordinate with them are not simply effective 
means toward controlling the powers of 
                                                     
13 For an example, see the brochures of Inguat, the 
public Guatemalan tourist agency. At the 
World Expo in Lisbon 1998, Mayan culture 
dominated Guatemala’s pavilion. There were, 
however, only Ladino working the pavilion. 
government and directing these toward 
matters of joint concern; they themselves 
express and symbolise, in a pointed and 
official way, our equal human dignity, our 
autonomy and powers of self-direction ... 
Joint goals that the government ignores 
completely – it is different with private or 
family goals — tend to appear unworthy of 
our joint attention and receive little 
(Nozick 1989:286).  
 
It is on the basis of this ‘symbolic impor-
tance’ that Charles Taylor argues that 
 
 equal recognition is not just the appropri-
ate mode for a healthy democratic society. 
Its refusal can inflict damage on those who 
are denied it…The projection of an infer-
ior or demeaning image on another can 
actually distort and oppress, to the extent 
that the image is internalised (Taylor 1994: 
36). 
 
Elsewhere he affirms that ‘due recogni-
tion is not just a courtesy we owe people. 
It is a vital human need’ (op.cit.:30). 
Clifford Geertz (1994:30) has likewise 
argued that a central motive for ‘nations’ 
around the world is the public acknow-
ledgement of identity. According to this 
view, the very symbolism of a public re-
cognition of identity matters, whether or 
not this recognition has rights attached to 
it. To have the collective project which 
one sees oneself as being part of affirmed 
by the state, could be a psychological 
need, or the lack of it may inflict serious 
psychological damage, an argument that 
Kymlicka (1995a:89-90) also makes. The 
symbolic affirmation underlines the equal 
human dignity of all citizens by stating 
publicly the value of the collective identi-
ties of which they share. Culture shapes 
individual identity, and since it is based 
on belonging and not accomplishment, it 
is a source of secure identification. If a 
culture is discriminated against or is not 
respected, its members are likely to feel 
their self-esteem and dignity threatened. 
Recognition is in this sense a way to 
underline the equal dignity of all in plural-
istic societies.  
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Reducing the Risk of False Expectations 
Andreas Føllesdal (1996, 1999) argues 
that individuals may have a legitimate 
claim to control over social institutions 
when these affect their possibilities to 
pursue their life-plans. For considerations 
of justice and institutional arrangements, 
we must value not only existing desires 
and needs, but also future expectations. 
Føllesdal argues that 
 
 Our interest in forming correct expec-
tations requires that we are informed and 
able to participate, directly or indirectly, in 
the changes and adaptation of our culture 
in ways that reduce the risk of false expec-
tations…Given the threats of alternative 
allocations of such control, it seems plau-
sible for minorities to insist that they 
should have the means to influence, if not 
control, the development of their culture 
insofar as this is possible. Their interest in 
control over cultural change supports 
claims to hold institutional powers which 
influence the maintenance and develop-
ment of one’s culture (Føllesdal 1999:16). 
 
Føllesdal (1996:78-9) underlines how the 
group autonomy that the interest in con-
trolling cultural change could justify 
should be subordinated to basic human 
rights, and he emphasises how this inter-
est does not require that a culture remains 
unchanged. He (1996:67) suggests that 
the difficulties in controlling cultural 
change are what makes ‘cultural member-
ship’ unsuitable for being considered a 
‘social primary good’. Even though 
Kymlicka (1995a:104) also emphasises 
the need ‘for smaller nation to control the 
direction and rate of change’, Føllesdal 
(1996:65) underlines how this argument 
avoids what Kymlicka’s theory could be 
criticised for: Føllesdal’s argument is not 
based on the ‘sectarian doctrine’ of auto-
nomous choice. 
The Insufficiency of the Alternatives 
Even if the arguments above are found 
unconvincing, one may nevertheless con-
sider it necessary to give special status to 
particular groups with the purpose of 
rectifying a situation of pervasive discri-
mination and marginalisation. Group-
differentiated rights would, from this 
standpoint, be a temporary means to 
achieve equality and discrimination. Even 
a state committed to ‘non-discrimination’ 
could employ such mechanisms temporar-
ily. Many ‘affirmative action’ program-
mes could be interpreted in this sense. 
2.3 Group Rights Versus Indi-
vidual Rights? 
Many people are sceptical to the idea of 
giving rights to groups because they fear 
that such rights can be invoked to justify 
violations of fundamental individual 
rights and freedoms. Kymlicka under-
lines, however, that it is necessary to 
make a distinction between who exercises 
a right, and the justifications for having 
that right (Kymlicka 1995a:45-8). A right 
given to a group may be exercised by 
individual members of a group, the group 
as a whole, or some administrative or 
political unit of which that group is part. 
Who should exercise such a right is an 
issue of what is practical and makes sense 
for the specific right in question, and 
should be kept apart from the reasons why 
members of one group should have rights 
that are different from those of members 
of other groups. 
Accepting that group-differentiated 
rights are useful and perhaps necessary to 
maintain justice between individuals does 
not mean that such group-differentiated 
rights can be invoked as reasons to violate 
basic individual rights. Kymlicka suggests 
that group-differentiated rights may not be 
used to impose ‘internal restrictions’, 
which are ‘the right of a group to limit the 
liberty of its own individual members in 
the name of group solidarity or cultural 
purity’ (1995a:7). Group-differentiated 
rights are only permitted to protect a 
group from decisions of other groups 
when these decisions threaten the cultural 
survival of the group or violate the basic 
rights of its members. This contrasts with 
Chandran Kukhatas’s (1995) view that 
‘internal restrictions’ are permissible as 
long as the possibility of leaving one’s 
group is ensured for all members. 
Kymlicka calls the legitimate use of 
group-differentiated rights ‘external pro-
tections’. For example, giving minority 
groups guarantees for political participa-
tion makes it more likely that their voices 
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will be heeded. Polyethnic rights can help 
ensure certain cultural and religious prac-
tices are protected against discrimination. 
Self-government rights can protect a 
group from majority decisions. 
The purpose of external protections is 
essentially to put different groups on a 
more equal footing. When external pro-
tections are used to give a certain group 
unfair advantages over another, such as 
during apartheid in South Africa, they are 
no longer justified. External protections 
should not protect groups from internal 
dissent, but are meant as guarantees that 
enable different ethnic groups to maintain 
their identity, if they so choose, without 
any undue restrictions on the basic liber-
ties and rights of individual members of 
these groups. Group-differentiated rights 
are not justified if they are used to protect 
groups from internal dissent. Group-
differentiated rights should ‘ensure that 
there is equality between groups, and free-
dom and equality within groups’ 
(Kymlicka 1995a:194, emphasis in the 
original). The distinction between external 
protections and internal restrictions is 
important because, as Veena Das argues,  
 
 caution suggests that in the very process of 
investing a community with legal perso-
nality there may follow an insufficient 
recognition of the heterogeneous nature of 
communities…that alternative visions of a 
community may often be repressed by vio-
lence (Das 1995:14). 
 
In a liberal theory of justice individual 
liberties and rights take priority over 
group-differentiated rights. This order of 
priority rests on the fundamental moral 
assumption that it is impermissible to sac-
rifice the well-being of an individual for 
the benefit of a collectivity. The only ex-
ceptions are the kind of restrictions that 
are necessary to uphold and defend these 
very individual rights and liberties. Thus, 
for instance, paying taxes is necessary to 
uphold the institutions that guarantee the 
civil rights and liberties of individuals, 
whereas restrictions on the choice of 
one’s religion is not, even though both 
represent restrictions on the freedom of 
the individual in some sense. Group-dif-
ferentiated rights may never be invoked to 
violate basic human rights, because that 
would be to impose impermissible inter-
nal restrictions. To argue that the exclu-
sion of women from politics is a cultural 
practice, and therefore should be protec-
ted as a group-specific right, is according 
to a liberal theory of rights clearly wrong, 
since it would violate fundamental human 
rights. 
Female members of Mayan organisa-
tions I interviewed complained that there 
is a significant degree of gender inequal-
ity within the Mayan movement, as is the 
case for Guatemala generally. This was 
also confirmed by some of their male 
counterparts. In their view, attitudes of 
sexual discrimination sometimes prevent 
Mayan women from participating and in 
particular from assuming leadership. It is 
by reference to the value of equality that 
the current situation of discrimination the 
Maya are facing requires change, and 
liberal equality also has implications for 
the rights of women. Some members of 
the Maya movement argued that accord-
ing to Maya philosophy the roles of men 
and women were complementary. Each 
role has a predefined set of aims and 
responsibilities. However, according to a 
liberal view of politics, it is insufficient to 
argue that the traditional roles of men and 
women ‘complement’ each other because 
such fixed roles can be repressive on indi-
genous women (and men), and may 
violate their inalienable individual rights. 
As Rodolfo Stavenhagen argues, 
 
 group and collective rights are to be con-
sidered human rights to the extent that 
their recognition and exercise in turn 
sustain the individual rights of members of 
the group...those collective rights that in-
fringe on the individual rights of members 
of a community should not be considered 
human rights (Stavenhagen 1994:19). 
 
Indeed, the subordination of any collec-
tive or cultural rights to international 
human rights norms underlie international 
conventions such as the ILO Convention 
no. 169 (article 8), and this is a point fre-
quently emphasised in the proposals of 
the indigenous organisations in Guate-
mala. 
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2.4 Numerical and Sociological 
Minorities 
Is the size of a group of any relevance for 
the issue of group-differentiated rights? 
Most of the literature on Guatemala states 
that the majority of the population of 
approximately 11 million people are 
Maya. According to the official Guatema-
lan statistics (Tzian 1994), on the other 
hand, the Maya ceased to be a majority in 
the 1950s. However, these figures are 
controversial and often considered unreli-
able because the collection of data is con-
sidered inefficient and unreliable (Adams 
1996, Cojtí 1995, Tzian 1994). In a study 
on ethnic identity and demography in 
Guatemala, Richard Adams (1996) found 
some evidence that the ratio of Maya was 
stable or increasing in communities with 
more than 80% Mayan population. In 
areas close to the capital, or where the 
Maya were a minority, there was some 
evidence of a decrease in the Mayan share 
of the population. Migration caused by the 
war seems to have had little effect on how 
people perceive themselves in ethnic 
terms. A conclusion of Adam’s study is 
that there appears to be a tendency 
towards ethnic polarisation.  
It should be noted that the Maya can 
only be considered a majority if we accept 
the understanding that many Mayan orga-
nisations have of the diverse Mayan lin-
guistic groups and the numerous Mayan 
local communities as one group with a set 
of common interests with a potential for 
acting cohesively. 11 of the Mayan lin-
guistic groups, as well as the non-Mayan 
groups Garifuna and Xinca are believed to 
have less than 50,000 members each, less 
than 0.5% each of the total Guatemalan 
population of approximately 11 million 
people. The four largest Mayan linguistic 
groups, on the other hand, are each 
believed to have more than 0.3 million 
members each (Warren 1998). Assuming, 
however, that there is an indigenous 
majority, how can arguments in favour of 
minority rights be relevant for the indi-
genous in Guatemala?  
Kymlicka’s justification for group-dif-
ferentiated rights rests, in my reading, on 
the equal right of all to live and work in 
their culture, and the right to protect the 
survival of a culture when it is being 
threatened by political decisions taken by 
other groups. Kymlicka argues, 
 
 On my view, if a national group is large 
enough, it may have little need for group-
differentiated rights, since it can ensure its 
survival and development through the 
usual operation of the economic market-
place and democratic decision-making 
(Kymlicka 1995a:219). 
 
However, the degree to which an ethnic 
group suffers discrimination may have 
little to do with the proportion of the 
population it represents. A country’s dom-
inant ethnic group is not always the 
numerical majority.14 Framing the issue 
of group-differentiated rights exclusively 
in terms of numerical majorities and 
minorities is excessively formal, because 
it fails to address the actual situation a 
group is facing. Minorities can be con-
ceived of both as numerical and sociologi-
cal (Stavenhagen 94), the latter referring 
to a situation of marginalisation and dis-
crimination. Rights guaranteeing a group 
the possibility to maintain its culture 
should be granted depending on the 
degree to which a cultural group faces dis-
advantages, and the degree to which con-
ceding rights may serve to rectify an 
unjust situation. A majority group, or 
groups that reflect a very large proportion 
of a country’s population, are likely to be 
in less need of group-differentiated rights, 
but the justification for the rights rests on 
legitimate claims to protection, and num-
bers are irrelevant for this purpose. 
The indigenous peoples of Guatemala 
should be considered a ‘sociological’ min-
ority because they are largely excluded 
from democratic decision-making proces-
ses. The Maya in Guatemala still lack the 
level of internal organisation and coher-
ence to make them an effective electoral 
majority. It is the fundamental lack of re-
presentation for the indigenous in Guate-
mala’s political institutions, political 
parties and principal economic instituti-
ons, and the cultural, economic and social 
discrimination they suffer, that make a 
discussion on the justification of group-
                                                     
14 The Malay in Malaysia today and South 
Africa’s ‘white’ population during apartheid 
may serve as examples.  
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differentiated rights necessary in Guate-
mala. Nevertheless, the large proportion 
of the Maya population represents a 
political and economic potential that 
could in time be utilised to put the indi-
genous and the non-indigenous on a more 
equal footing in Guatemala. The size of 
the Maya population is also of great sym-
bolic importance, and it is often referred 
to by representatives of Mayan organisati-
ons as a sign of strength, and as indicative 
of the fact that it will be difficult for the 
Guatemalan political authorities to ignore 
the claims of the Mayan organisations.  
It seems less interesting to discuss 
group-differentiated rights for the Ladino 
to the extent that it is possible to talk of 
them as a group. Ladino polyethnic rights 
are not only guaranteed in the current 
Guatemalan legal system, it is moreover 
the only group that has its polyethnic 
rights to use of language, education and 
so forth protected. It is therefore a bit dif-
ficult to understand when individual 
Ladino newspaper columnists argue that 
the extension of such rights to other 
groups will make them the victims of dis-
crimination, nor are the Ladino in need of 
any special representation rights nor self-
government rights because they control 
practically all of Guatemala’s public insti-
tutions. However, if one focuses on other 
interests and identities that divide the 
Ladino, a discussion of group-differenti-
ated rights could be more pertinent. Self-
government rights could for example be 
considered in the sense of increasing regi-
onal autonomy to decrease central govern-
ment domination of politics. Special 
representation rights or quotas could be 
discussed for largely excluded groups 
among the Ladino, such as the poor and 
women.  
2.5 Justifying ‘Non-Discrimina-
tion’  
The core issue in Kymlicka’s theory is 
also a classical problem in political 
theory: how to avoid that the majority 
(numerical or sociological) dominates 
over the minorities. For the ‘Founding 
Fathers’ of the Constitution of the USA, 
the principal tension in society was 
between the wealthy minority and the less 
well-to-do majority. A great concern was 
thus to ensure that the majority did not 
abuse the powers they attained through 
the electoral mechanism to dispossess the 
wealthy. For the Assemblée constituante 
of the French Revolution in 1789-91, the 
possibility of a ‘dictatorship of the major-
ity’ was also a much discussed issue 
(Elster 1993). 
Kymlicka (1989, 1995a and b, 1997) 
focuses on one particular variety of the 
majority-minority problem in demo-
cracies: that of ethnic groups or ‘cultures’. 
He claims that ‘non-discrimination’, 
which has had and continues to exert con-
siderable influence on many real-life 
democracies, cannot provide a solution to 
the problem of cultural dominance of the 
majority group. Kymlicka argues that 
‘non-discrimination’ is often impossible 
to maintain, for instance when it comes to 
decisions about the official uses of langu-
ages. Decisions about where to draw poli-
tical boundaries is another example, since 
these will determine which groups form 
the majority within the administrative 
units of the state. Such majorities can be 
used to take decisions that have a great 
impact on the possibilities of survival of 
certain cultures, for instance regarding 
education and immigration. ‘Non-discri-
mination’ therefore, in Kymlicka’s view 
(1995b:10), maintains ‘neutrality’ only ‘in 
the sense that minority groups are not dis-
criminated against within the mainstream 
institutions of the majority culture, but it 
is not ‘‘neutral’’ in its relationship to cul-
tural identities’. ‘Non-discrimination’ is 
often associated with the USA, but since 
English language and culture there have a 
very privileged position, public instituti-
ons cannot be said to be neutral when it 
comes to culture.  
The idea of a culturally ‘neutral’ state 
is often misinterpreted, also in Guatemala. 
For example, I frequently heard different 
varieties of the following argument 
against giving rights to the indigenous: 
‘we are all Guatemalans and equal, giving 
rights to particular groups is the same as 
discrimination and treating people 
unequally.’ Pablo Duarte (1996:115) for 
example affirms that: ‘I believe that all of 
us have a little of indigenous and of 
Maya, all of us have a little of Spanish.’ 
Though probably true in a strict sense, 
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this leaves no room for the recognition of 
difference. The problem with this argu-
ment is that it is not specified what it is to 
be Guatemalan, so that with today’s situa-
tion in Guatemala ‘equality’ in fact 
amounts to conformity with non-indigen-
ous culture. Equality of rights is confused 
with cultural similarity, and Mayan claims 
to end discrimination are in this way 
sought silenced. But equality of rights is 
more than a right to conform to some pre-
defined cultural standard; equality must 
necessarily imply the equal rights to have 
one’s cultural difference respected. Equal-
ity is in this sense the opposite of simi-
larity. Justice, on a liberal view, requires 
the equal right of all to have one’s identity 
respected, and to freely choose to alter 
that identity as one sees fit. 
Kymlicka’s proposal for a fair solution 
to the problem of the majority culture’s 
domination over the minorities, is that the 
drawing of borders, official use of langu-
ages, and distribution of powers should be 
done in a way that assures all national 
groups the possibility of maintaining 
themselves as distinct cultures. It is a pro-
posal that can be said to follow from the 
principle of equality of rights, in the sense 
that the value of cultural membership is to 
be equally protected for members of dif-
ferent groups. In democratic societies, 
minority cultures should have the same 
opportunities to have their languages and 
societal cultures supported as the major-
ity. In Kymlicka’s (1995a:108) words: 
‘the accommodation of difference is the 
essence of true equality, and group-speci-
fic rights are needed to accommodate 
difference.’ ‘Non-discrimination’ fails to 
achieve ‘true equality’ in Kymlicka’s 
understanding, because it gives members 
of majority cultures privileged positions, 
and fails to protect the cultures of the 
minorities. In the cases where it is, 
according to Kymlicka, impossible to 
achieve ‘non-discrimination’, the failure 
to introduce minority protections implies 
that the majority culture can discriminate 
the minority.  
Is the ‘privileged position’ of the 
majority culture and the assimilationist 
policies it usually implies necessarily 
unfair? Mason (1999:265-1) argues that 
policies of assimilation can be legitimate 
when these are ‘non-coercive’. ‘Non-coer-
cive’ assimilationist policies are those that 
give the customs, language and symbols 
of the ‘dominant culture’ a privileged 
position. ‘Non-coercive’ measures may 
also include economic incentives for these 
policies. Mason (op.cit.:266) defines an 
assimilationist policy as one ‘that aims to 
produce an outcome in which members of 
some cultural community abandon at least 
some of their customs and practices’. A 
‘moderate assimilationist’ policy aims to 
make members of the non-dominant cul-
ture abandon unjust practices (the equiva-
lent of ‘internal restrictions’) and those 
practices that ‘are in conflict with some of 
the central public customs and practices 
of the dominant group’ (op.cit.:267). 
Mason mentions arranged (and not for-
ced) marriages as an example of a practice 
that would contradict ‘central public cus-
toms and practices’ in Western Europe, 
and it would therefore be legitimate to 
seek to change this through non-coercive 
means in those societies. Mason believes 
a ‘moderate assimilationist’ policy need 
not be oppressive, and that it can be justi-
fied on the need to create a shared natio-
nal identity, the latter which arguably is 
required for political stability and cohe-
siveness.15  
I believe Mason’s argument that non-
dominant cultural practices that are not at 
odds with basic liberal moral principles 
could be assimilated should be rejected. 
Mason’s argument can serve as a justifi-
cation for discriminatory and illegitimate 
practices, and could prevent minority 
groups from voicing their legitimate 
demands for inclusion, tolerance and 
equality. Mason’s argument makes the 
continuity of perceptions of racial and 
cultural inferiority not only likely, but 
also legitimate. Another problem with 
Mason’s argument is that it is not given 
which culture ought to be assimilated into 
which other in places where groups are of 
comparable size, such as Guatemala. It 
may also be that the respect for liberal 
values is greater within the minority cul-
ture than the majority. Assimilation could 
therefore reduce the overall compliance 
with liberal values. Mason’s suggestion, 
                                                     
15 I discuss this issue in chapter 4. 
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that the dominant culture should serve as 
a model into which minority cultures may 
integrate, makes power and the use of 
force determine the status of various cul-
tures within society. That is clearly at 
odds with liberal values of freedom and 
equality.  
I do share Kymlicka’s criticism of 
‘non-discrimination’ in the sense it is 
presented above. Clearly, real-life demo-
cracies often give unfair advantages to 
members of ‘majority cultures’ by priori-
tising certain languages or organising the 
state in a certain manner. Moreover, I 
believe with Kymlicka that liberal equal-
ity requires that cultural differences are 
accommodated, a conclusion that may 
presuppose accepting that freedom de-
pends on culture. However, is the solution 
to this problem necessarily group-differ-
entiated rights? It could be argued that the 
state in many countries has put members 
of minority groups at an unfair disadvan-
tage, not because they have failed to give 
particular groups ‘recognition’, but rather 
because they have not been true to ‘non-
discrimination’. As we recall, ‘non-dis-
crimination’ requires that the state should 
not privilege a particular culture. How-
ever, many states have been monocul-
tural, while their populations have been 
multicultural. As is the case in Guate-
mala, the state’s policies have therefore 
tended to represent the interest of only a 
part of the population, the part that identi-
fies with the culture that serves as the 
basis for the state’s policies.  
What is needed to accommodate dif-
ference need not be special statuses to 
particular groups, but rather measures 
ensuring that a state’s policies correspond 
with the cultural diversity of a country. 
This can be done by incorporating poly-
ethnic rights, not as group-differentiated 
rights, but as ‘universal’  individual 
rights. Polyethnic rights are then not 
given on the basis of group membership, 
but rather given equally to all citizens, 
ensuring thus that the use of different 
languages, dietary restrictions, religious 
practices, traditional clothing and so forth 
are fully respected in public life. Polyeth-
nic rights, perceived this way, are not 
only compatible with ‘non-discrimina-
tion’; they are required by that view to 
ensure state ‘neutrality’. The concern 
then is not so much the status of particular 
groups, but rather ensuring that the state 
remains impeccably liberal.16 
Thus, according to ‘non-discrimina-
tion’, individual members of minority 
cultures are protected against discrimina-
tion by being guaranteed the enjoyment of 
public services in accordance with their 
language and culture, in addition to prohi-
bitions against any type of discrimination 
generally. The enjoyment of services 
according to a set of languages and cultu-
ral characteristics corresponding with a 
country’s cultural diversity are then to be 
provided to all citizens generally as opti-
ons from which to choose. Moreover, this 
is likely to enhance individual freedom of 
choice, which is a fundamental value 
within liberal political theory. However, 
everyone may not see this expansion in 
the range of choice as very relevant. For 
example, it is unlikely that many Ladino 
would choose to have public services pro-
vided in the Mayan languages.  
Nevertheless, this approach has an 
advantage compared to ‘recognition’, 
namely that the enjoyment of particular 
languages or cultural practices is not tied 
to membership in particular groups. This 
opens for a greater diversity in the indivi-
dual attachments to the state, which is of 
great importance in places where group 
identities are not very clearly defined or 
tend to overlap. As I seek to illustrate in 
the next chapter, in Guatemala ethnic 
identities are both complex and fluctuat-
ing, and it therefore seems that an 
approach to multicultural justice needs to 
open up for diversity not only between, 
but also within the way particular identi-
ties are tied to or included in the larger 
political framework of the state. 
‘Non-discrimination’, in the sense 
described here with the necessary inclu-
sion of polyethnic rights, is unlikely to 
satisfy members of groups who wish to be 
considered as autonomous or apart from 
the wider society. Specialrepresentation 
rights (quotas in public institutions) and 
                                                     
16 Richard Wilson, in a lecture given at the Univer-
sity of Oslo, 1 Septembert, 1999, likewise 
argued strongly in favour of opting for non-
identity marked rights, both generally and for 
the indigenous in Guatemala in particular. 
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self-government rights are clearly incom-
patible with ‘non-discrimination’ (except 
perhaps as ‘temporary measures’ as men-
tioned above), because these types of 
rights do require the protection of (a lim-
ited number of) particular groups. How-
ever, ‘non-discrimination’ should (in 
theory at least) protect the groups’ mem-
bers from discrimination. The group 
member’s self-perception as distinctive, 
autonomous units remains, according to 
this approach, exclusively a private 
concern.17 
To sustain my argument that ‘non-dis-
crimination’ is compatible with liberal 
equality by incorporating polyethnic 
rights as individual rights, I need to show 
that Kymlicka’s objection to ‘non-discri-
mination’ does not hold true. In other 
words, I need to show how the examples 
where Kymlicka (1995a:108, 195) argues 
that ‘political life has an inescapable 
national dimension’ and that ‘non-discri-
mination’ therefore must lead to majority 
domination, in fact need not lead to 
majority domination at all.  
 
– National holidays. One possibility is to 
give each different culture (in particu-
lar each different religion) quota of 
holidays. Thus, all citizens would have 
holidays according to the country’s 
religions. Alternatively, the individual 
citizen could be free to choose when 
she wanted her holidays from a num-
ber of options in correspondence with 
the different religions or beliefs. 
 
– Language. Kymlicka (1995a:111) sug-
gests that ‘...one of the most important 
determinants of whether a culture sur-
vives is whether its language is the 
language of government – i.e. the lan-
guage of public schooling, courts, 
legislatures, welfare agencies, health 
services, etc.’ As should be clear by 
now, ‘non-discrimination’ requires not 
that the citizens are treated identically 
by having public services provided to 
them in the same language, but rather 
that the individual citizens are treated 
equally by having these services pro-
                                                     
17  This, of course, does not amount to say that 
individual rights have no bearing on the private 
sphere. 
vided to them in their own language. 
The enjoyment of having services pro-
vided in one language or the other 
should depend on choice; it is equal 
and not based on any group member-
ship. A proposal to make the indigen-
ous languages official in Guatemala 
was, as mentioned before, turned down 
in the 15 May 1999 referendum. 
According to the liberal approach to 
justice taken here, language policy 
should not have been decided by 
majority vote at all. Rather, to receive 
education and public services is an 
individual right that the majority can-
not strip away. The current language 
policy of the Guatemalan state remains 
a core impediment to the achievement 
of justice, as is confirmed by a recent 
UN report (1998:8): ‘One of the 
guarantees of due process is the right 
to be assisted by an interpreter if a 
defendant does not understand or 
speak the language of the court, a right 
which has special importance in a 
multilingual country like Guatemala. 
In that regard, the Mission has once 
again noted the absence of translators 
in the courts, which has seriously ham-
pered the right to defence in trials of 
indigenous persons.’ The right to an 
interpreter in the court system is en-
trenched both in the Convenant on 
Civic and Political Rights (article 14) 
and in ILO Convention no. 169 (article 
12). 
 
– Education. Education concerns both 
the contents of the education and the 
language in which it is provided. 
According to ‘non-discrimination’, the 
state or the market18 could provide dif-
ferent educational options with a lin-
guistic and cultural content correspon-
ding to the cultural diversity of the 
country. Either way, it could be up to 
the individual parents to choose the 
educational model for their children. 
ILO Convention no. 169, in its article 
28, states that the indigenous have a 
right to education in their original lan-
                                                     
18  Note that if education according to one’s cul-
ture is to be considered a right, financial means 
would have to be provided for the part of the 
population that cannot afford private education. 
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guage or the language most frequently 
used by the group, and moreover have 
a right to education in the ‘national 
languages of the country’. Article 27 
of the same convention underlines that 
education should be adapted to the cul-
tural and other characteristics of these 
groups, and that this adaptation should 
take place in consultation with these 
groups. There are a number of private 
Mayan schools in Guatemala, which 
receive funding from abroad. There are 
also plans to start a Mayan university. 
Some state bilingual education exists, 
and there are also privately funded 
Mayan schools. A survey (ASIES et al. 
1998) in 1997 registered positive atti-
tudes also among a majority of the 
Ladino to the prospect of learning an 
indigenous language in school. Mem-
bers of the Mayan movement fre-
quently denounce the difficulties a sig-
nificant proportion of the indigenous 
have in getting access to education. 
They also consider the public educa-
tion to be insensitive to Mayan 
cultures, and it is claimed that the cur-
riculum ‘perpetuates inequality and 
racism’ (Gálvez and Esquit 1997b:77). 
One proposal therefore is to involve 
the communities and the families more 
in the education, and some research-
oriented Mayan organisations are ela-
borating on a proposal for a curriculum 
more in accordance with Mayan cul-
ture. The content of education also 
concerns the non-indigenous, as a 
mechanism to end racist and discrimi-
natory attitudes (Cojtí 1997b:11, 
Solares 1995). 
 
– The drawing of boundaries and the 
distribution of powers. Clearly, 
Kymlicka is right in that ‘non-discri-
mination’ is problematic when it 
comes to ensuring fairness between 
members of different cultures, and the 
territorial and organisational structure 
of the state. Whichever way boun-
daries are drawn, majorities and min-
orities are created. Kymlicka empha-
sises the minorities that he calls ‘cul-
tures’ or ‘nations’. As I intend to show 
in the next chapter, it is not clear 
exactly what these ‘nations’ and ‘cul-
tures’ are in particular empirical con-
texts, such as Guatemala. Nor is it 
clear whether giving rights to these 
particular types of groups is most 
likely to fulfil the normative ideals of 
liberal equality. ‘Non-discrimination’ 
and ‘recognition’ have different conse-
quences for territorial organisation and 
the distribution of powers, discussed in 
chapter 4. However, none provide a 
full-fledged solution to the problem 
raised here, and the choice between 
these two approaches depends both on 
the characteristics of ethnic groups in 
particular places and on the importance 
of identities based on culture relative 
to other types of identities.  
 
A number of objections can be made 
against ‘non-discrimination’ in the inter-
pretation I have given to it here. First, it is 
likely that an expansion of the range of 
choice in the above policy areas and for 
all citizens will be costly. However, it can 
be argued that members of minority 
groups have a reasonable claim to a fair 
share of state expenditures, and that they 
are also likely to contribute to the public 
finances as tax payers. It is therefore 
doubtful whether such an expansion in the 
range of choice puts an unreasonable bur-
den on the members of majority cultures. 
In fact, without such citizens-wide poly-
ethnic provisions, it would be the mem-
bers of the minority cultures who sponsor 
the culture of the majority. 
Secondly, it could be objected that the 
number of options that the state must pro-
vide would be intolerably high if one were 
to follow ‘non-discrimination’. These 
options could not, therefore, be selected 
by demand alone; criteria are needed to 
distinguish illegitimate claims from legiti-
mate. For example, if I were to move to 
Guatemala and obtain citizenship, I could 
not reasonably expect to receive govern-
ment services in Norwegian. This is simi-
lar to Kymlicka’s (1995a:96) argument 
that voluntary immigration implies relin-
quishing ‘some rights that go along with 
their original citizenship’. Both appro-
aches need such criteria for restricting the 
number of claims, ‘recognition’ for 
restricting the number of groups entitled 
to group-differentiated rights and the 
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particular rights to which each group is 
entitled, and ‘non-discrimination’ for re-
stricting the number of polyethnic citizen-
wide options. As I intend to show in the 
next chapter, the elaboration of such 
criteria is problematic.  
Thirdly, there are likely to be policy 
areas other than the examples discussed 
above where ‘political life has an inescap-
able national dimension’ and where con-
sequently ‘non-discrimination’ can be 
problematic to maintain. Particular institu-
tional arrangements and decision-making 
practices need to be examined in order to 
ensure that particular individuals are not 
unfairly disadvantaged. In order to reach 
an agreement on what should count as 
relevant considerations for determining 
common standards of fairness and equal-
ity, inclusive and non-partisan institutio-
nal frameworks are needed (Oskal 1999: 
157). In Guatemala, this implies ending 
the cultural monopolisation of the state by 
the Ladino. What is needed is a way of 
actualising individual rights, a process 
whereby cultural changes can be incorpo-
rated so that the respect for individual 
rights is maintained. Jürgen Habermas 
emphasises the potential of a democratic 
process for solving the dilemmas raised 
by multiculturalism: 
 
 If a well-functioning public sphere with 
open communication structures that permit 
and promote discussions oriented to self-
understanding can develop in such multi-
cultural societies against the background 
of a liberal culture and on the basis of 
voluntary associations, then the democratic 
process of actualising equal individual 
rights will also extend to guaranteeing dif-
ferent ethnic groups and their cultural 
forms of life equal rights to coexistence 
(Habermas 1994:128-9). 
 
For this process of actualising rights to 
work there must be consensus on the insti-
tutional structure with its ‘rules of the 
game’ for decision-making. Such an insti-
tutional framework cannot be ethically 
neutral. However, it must allow for cul-
tural difference (op.cit.:134), for a coexi-
stence of ‘reasonably comprehensive 
doctrines’,19 doctrines that may differ on 
their view of the ‘good life’, but that are 
not opposed to or in direct conflict with 
the institutional rules of the game and the 
basic liberal principles on which these 
institutions find their justification. What is 
essential is that the institutional frame-
work of the state remains neutral in rela-
tion to the diversity of reasonably 
comprehensive doctrines that exist within 
the state (op.cit.:134-7). I will discuss dif-
ferent institutional arrangements and cul-
tural diversity in Guatemala in chapter 4. 
Habermas calls a consensus on or a feel-
ing of identification with a set of institu-
tional principles a ‘common political 
culture’ or ‘constitutional patriotism’. 
Whether a common political culture, a 
sense of identification with a set of politi-
cal institutions is sufficient to maintain a 
culturally diverse country united, is a 
question raised in section 4.6.   
Lastly, it can still be argued that cer-
tain groups have legitimate historic claims 
to ‘recognition’, and that ‘non-discrimina-
tion’ fails to provide an adequate answer 
to the challenge of multiculturalism be-
cause the demands of many ethnic groups 
around the world for ‘special statuses’ 
within their countries are rejected. The 
latter argument is in itself insufficient to 
reject non-discrimination (Räikkä 1996). I 
do believe that despite Kymlicka’s objec-
tion, ‘non-discrimination’ still stands as 
an alternative to ‘recognition’. Another 
reason for not rejecting ‘non-discrimina-
tion’ is that, as will be made clear in the 
following chapter, there are also reasons 
to be sceptical to ‘recognition’. 
                                                     
19 See Rawls (1993) for a discussion of this con-
cept. 
Chapter 3: 
Culture, Identity, and Rights in Guatemala
This chapter explores the questions of 
what ethnic groups are, what the relation-
ship is between a particular ethnic identity 
and culture, and which types of groups are 
entitled to which types of rights. The first 
section examines and criticises the criteria 
Kymlicka uses to distinguish between dif-
ferent types of groups, and section 3.2 
presents different theories of what ethnic 
groups are. The following three sections 
(3.3, 3.4, 3.5) examine the relation be-
tween ethnic identity and culture in 
Guatemala, and compares this with diffe-
rent theoretical conceptions of ethnic 
identity. The last section (3.6) summarises 
the discussion in this chapter through a 
critique of ‘recognition’. 
3.1 Ethnic groups: ‘Colonisers’, 
‘Immigrants’, or ‘Nations’? 
‘The Accord on the Identity and Rights of 
the Indigenous Peoples’ (hereafter the 
‘Accord on Identity’), one of the Guate-
malan Peace Accords, states that  
 
 the indigenous peoples include the Mayan 
people, the Garifuna people and the Xinca 
people, and that the Mayan people consist 
of various socio-cultural expressions hav-
ing a common origin (AIDPI 1995:1).  
 
The Ladinos are omitted because they are 
not considered indigenous, whereas the 
Garifuna are included among the indigen-
ous here as well as in a number of other 
documents.20 ‘Indigenous’ is therefore not 
used to indicate that these groups were 
original to, or were those who first inhabi-
ted the area, because the settlement of the 
Garifuna in today’s Guatemala took place 
after the arrival of the Spaniards. The 
Garifuna cannot therefore in any sense be 
said to be more original to the land than 
                                                     
20 The proposal for constitutional reforms, which 
was rejected in May 1999, likewise mentions 
three ‘peoples’; the Maya, Xinca, and Garifuna, 
and omits the Ladino. 
the Ladino. Rather, ‘indigenous’ is pro-
bably used here to indicate the marginal 
situation of these groups. David Maybury 
Lewis (1997:8) argues that ‘the salient 
characteristic of indigenous peoples, then 
is that they are marginal to or dominated 
by the states that claim jurisdiction over 
them’. This use of ‘indigenous’ could also 
be seen as an attempt to create or rein-
force a sense of common identity and pur-
pose among these groups. 
Rigoberto Quemé (1997) sees the 
omission of the Ladino from the Peace 
Accords as reproducing the relation of 
subordination between Maya and Ladino. 
The ‘parties’ in the Accords are the gov-
ernment and the guerrilla; both dominated 
by the Ladino. Perhaps the Ladino are in 
less need of recognition, but the juxtaposi-
tion of those in need of recognition (the 
three ‘peoples’) and those who give re-
cognition or respect (the ‘parties’), is ill 
fit to produce equality in Guatemala, 
according to Quemé. In the commissions 
that were set up as part of the Peace 
Accords there are no Ladino representa-
tives as such, only representatives of the 
government and of indigenous groups. 
The symbiotic relation between the state 
and the Ladino could explain this absence.  
It is noteworthy that the Accords state 
that the Xinca, Garifuna, and Maya are 
‘peoples’. Kymlicka (1995a:11) equates 
the term ‘people’ with ‘nation’ and 
‘cultural group’, and defines it as ‘an his-
torical community, more or less institutio-
nally complete, occupying a given 
territory or homeland, sharing a distinct 
language and culture’. He argues (1995a: 
99) that only ‘nations’ are entitled to self-
government rights and special repre-
sentation rights because he believes that 
only these groups possess the complete 
societal cultures necessary for freedom. 
Establishing which groups are ‘peoples’ is 
therefore of great importance. Are the 
Peace Accords right in stating that the 
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Xinca, Maya, and Garifuna (as well as the 
dominant ethnic group, the Ladino)21 are 
‘peoples’? Are there other groups in 
Guatemala that may have claim to call 
themselves a ‘people’? How can the eth-
nic groups22 that are ‘peoples’ be distin-
guished from the ones that are not? 
Kymlicka gives three criteria for deter-
mining whether a group is a ‘people’ with 
self-government rights. The first criterion, 
which is necessary but insufficient if the 
other criteria are not fulfilled, is that a 
‘people’ was self-governing and had a 
complete societal culture when it became 
part of the state. The involuntary incorpo-
ration of the Maya and the Xinca into the 
Guatemalan State could thus give an 
answer to why these groups should have 
the status of ‘people’. Are the Ladino and 
the Garifuna also ‘peoples’? 
Kymlicka introduces the concept of 
‘immigrants’, which he defines as indi-
viduals that have ‘voluntarily uprooted 
themselves’ in agreeing to come to a 
country, and therefore have accepted to 
become part of the culture of another 
‘people’. A voluntary incorporation into a 
new country equals a renunciation of the 
right to be a ‘people’ within that new 
homeland, and it seems that ‘immigrant 
groups’ are left with the option of assimi-
lation into one of the country’s ‘people’. 
Immigrants are not entitled to self-govern-
ment rights that follow from the status of 
being a people, because Kymlicka (op.cit: 
101) believes that immigrant groups in 
general lack a societal culture, and there-
fore have no need for rights that protect 
the survival of their culture. They are, 
however, entitled to maintain their cul-
tural distinctiveness through ‘polyethnic 
rights’, which are meant to ensure that 
they are not discriminated against. 
Are the Garifuna and the Ladino 
‘immigrant groups’ since the ancestors of 
the members of these groups voluntarily 
settled in an area already inhabited by 
                                                     
21 It is likely that the implicit assumption here is 
that the non-indigenous in Guatemala are also 
to be considered to have the same status as the 
three indigenous ‘peoples’. 
22 Kymlicka gives a different meaning to ‘ethnic 
group’ than what I do here. In chapter 1 I defin-
ed an ethnic group as one based on a perception 
of common ancestry, while Kymlicka uses eth-
nic group synonymously with ‘immigrant 
group’. 
other nations? The settlement of the ance-
stors of both the Garifuna and the Ladino 
dates centuries back in time, so it would 
not make much sense to talk of these 
groups as ‘immigrant’,23 in particular if 
the label ‘immigrant’ is to have any con-
sequences for the type of rights they are to 
enjoy. Kymlicka suggests a distinction 
between ‘immigrants’ and ‘colonisers’, 
the latter being distinct in that they ‘aimed 
to reproduce their original society in a 
new land’ (op.cit.:14). Just as the French-
speaking people came to Quebec with the 
idea of reproducing their original society 
in a new land, it is likely that the ances-
tors of both the Ladino and the Garifuna 
came to Guatemala with the same inten-
tion. In this sense they never renounced 
their right to be a self-governing ‘people’, 
and may be considered ‘colonisers’. 
‘Colonisers’, in Kymlicka’s view, posses 
complete societal cultures because they 
have reproduced their original societies in 
new places. The status as ‘colonisers’ give 
such groups legitimate claims to legal 
protections of their ‘societal culture’ not 
only in the form of polyethnic rights, but 
also in the form of self-government and 
special representation rights. 
However, the distinction between 
immigrants and colonisers is problematic, 
as Kymlicka (1997:33) is aware of. Many 
immigrant groups aim to ‘reproduce their 
original society in a new land’, even when 
they ‘voluntarily uproot themselves’. If, 
as was argued in the previous chapter, a 
societal culture is a primary good and thus 
a necessary precondition for the realisa-
tion of liberal justice, what is of relevance 
is whether or not a particular culture can 
provide its members with the context of 
choice necessary for freedom today. 
Whether a group did posses a complete 
societal culture in the past when it migra-
ted collectively or individually to a parti-
cular area should then be of less 
relevance. It is therefore difficult to accept 
that immigrant groups should never gain 
the same rights to protect their societal 
culture as other groups (Doppelt 1998: 
                                                     
23 A long history of settlement is sometimes insuf-
ficient, however. The Chinese in Malaysia for 
example, are denied rights on the basis that they 
are ‘immigrants’ even though they have a his-
tory of settlement in Malaysia that goes more 
than 400 years back in time. 
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223, Mason 1999:270-1). Furthermore, if 
the assumption underlying the distinction 
between ‘colonisers’ and ‘immigrants’ is 
the amount of time that has passed since a 
group first settled in a country, and not 
(only) the intention behind the settlement, 
it would be a rather arbitrary justification 
for rights because there seems to be no 
reasonable criteria for deciding how long 
a group must have resided in a country to 
be considered ‘colonisers’. Another pro-
blem with the distinction between ‘colo-
nisers’ and ‘immigrants’ is that it would 
not be reasonable if peaceful immigration 
would make a group less entitled to rights 
than violent colonisation (Doppelt 1998).  
Kymlicka’s second criterion for decid-
ing whether a particular group is a 
‘people’, is that a ‘people’ wishes to iden-
tify itself as a self-governing group. 
Kymlicka (1995a:67-8 and 95-8) suggests 
that only ‘nations’/‘people’ present 
demands for self-government. The ILO 
convention no. 169 likewise states that 
‘indigenous peoples’ are entitled to cer-
tain self-government rights. The conven-
tion defines ‘indigenous people’ as groups 
that wish to be considered as such, and 
which are socially, culturally, and eco-
nomically distinct groups, or groups that 
were ‘original’ to a country and subse-
quently conquered or colonised. Accord-
ing to this convention, claiming self-
government rights on this basis equals a 
renunciation of the right of the group to 
create its own, independent state. In gene-
ral, I believe Kymlicka is correct in 
assuming that groups that have a recent 
history of settlement in a country and that 
mostly migrated as individuals and not as 
groups, seldom consider themselves as a 
people with rights to self-government 
within their new homeland. Consequently, 
it could be argued that a group that pre-
sents such demands is likely to be a 
‘people’ (either ‘colonisers’ or those 
‘original to the land’). In Guatemala, the 
only groups arguing for some sort of 
political autonomy are the Maya, and to a 
much less extent the Garifuna and the 
Xinca. The issue of deciding which 
groups are entitled to which kinds of 
group-differentiated rights could be sol-
ved by limiting self-government rights to 
these groups, since no other groups have 
as yet, to my knowledge, vocalised any 
demands for such rights. 
However, there are also a number of 
other ethnic groups in Guatemala such as 
for example Arabs, Chinese, Jews, Ger-
mans, Indians, and English-speaking 
blacks.24 These other groups are very 
small in numbers, and most of their mem-
bers are to a large degree part of Ladino 
society. The reasons why a group is or is 
not asking for certain rights may depend 
on a number of factors. The high level of 
political repression that until recently 
existed in Guatemala has probably had a 
great impact on different groups’ willing-
ness to articulate demands, even though 
this alone cannot explain why some 
groups, and not all, organise and present 
demands. Moreover, economic prosperity 
in Guatemala has to a significant degree 
depended on being or trying to become 
Ladino. It is possible that members of 
smaller groups that are relatively well-
inserted into Ladino society have not yet 
seen it in their interest to claim rights to 
differentiated treatment, as long as they 
have not suffered discrimination within 
the Ladino society to the degree that their 
economic prosperity has been signifi-
cantly impeded. It is also possible that a 
group postpones demands for particular 
types of rights for a later stage, for ex-
ample if they consider that they are not 
yet ready to achieve self-government, or 
that it is fraught with too much risk to ask 
for such rights today. Moreover, a group 
may not be presenting demands because it 
has not had any opportunities to do so. 
The Peace Accords, for example, have 
given members of the Maya, Xinca, and 
Garifuna the opportunity to interact 
directly with the government as represen-
tatives of their groups. Could this oppor-
tunity have been extended to other groups, 
such as the Guatemalan Chinese? Would 
that in turn have made it likely that the 
Chinese community also started present-
ing demands for group-differentiated 
rights?  
If the discussion of ethnic identity in 
Guatemala gains impetus, and demands 
for group-differentiated rights are met, it 
is possible that other groups will begin to 
                                                     
24 Suggested by Alfonso Arrivillaga (private com-
munication, March 1998). 
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vocalise demands. Groups not mentioned 
in the Accords may start to demand that 
the state recognises their particularity, and 
other groups believed to have disap-
peared, such as the indigenous Pipil, may 
surface.25 The recognition of some types 
of group-differentiated rights may fuel a 
kind of ‘ethnic revival’ that will escalate 
the demands for such rights. This possibil-
ity makes it difficult to decide which 
groups are entitled to recognition, a diffi-
culty that remains somewhat unresolved 
in Kymlicka’s theory. Perhaps the distinc-
tion between colonisers/peoples and im-
migrants makes sense for cases like the 
Quebecois, but it is much more difficult to 
apply to less clear-cut cases. In a liberal 
approach to justice in multicultural demo-
cracies a group is certainly free to say no 
to group-differentiated rights, but whether 
demands are put forward or not cannot 
alone serve as a justification for such 
rights.  
Kymlicka’s third and last criterion for 
deciding which groups are ‘peoples’ is 
that a ‘people’ possesses a complete soci-
etal culture today. Perhaps this ought to 
be the only relevant criterion, not only 
because the other two criteria are proble-
matic, but also because what should be of 
relevance in Kymlicka’s theoretical 
framework is whether a group can provide 
its members with the necessary cultural 
preconditions for freedom today.26 Are 
the Maya, Ladino, Xinca, and Garifuna 
‘peoples’ according to Kymlicka’s defini-
tion given earlier, in the sense that they 
are ‘an historical community, more or less 
institutionally complete, occupying a 
given territory or homeland, sharing a dis-
tinct language and culture’? Do they pro-
vide their members with separate ‘societal 
cultures’ today, in the sense that they 
posses ‘a culture which provides its mem-
bers with meaningful ways of life across 
                                                     
25 This was suggested by A. Arrivillaga (private 
communication, March 1998), and is of course 
dependent on there being people in Guatemala 
for whom the notion ‘Pipil’ refers to a percep-
tion of common identity. The Pipil were a 
group that lived on the pacific coast of today’s 
Guatemala and El Salvador when the Spaniards 
arrived. They are now, as the Xinca were up 
until recently, believed to be extinct in Guate-
mala. 
26 Kymlicka also appears to favour this view 
(1995a:101). 
the whole range of human activities, 
including social, educational, religious, 
recreational, and economic life, encom-
passing both public and private spheres’?  
Kymlicka’s argument presupposes that 
there is a connection between existing 
identities (what individuals see them-
selves as and are perceived as by others) 
and culture (language, customs, values, 
etc.). It is the membership of individuals 
in particular groups, their ethnic identity 
(‘nation’, ‘immigrant group’), that in 
Kymlicka’s view provides the basis for 
dividing societies into a limited number of 
‘societal cultures’. However, both the idea 
that identity equals culture, and that a 
society can be divided into a limited num-
ber of separable ‘cultures’, are, as I intend 
to make clearer in the following pages, 
highly debatable points of view.  
3.2 ‘Primordialist’, ‘Construc-
tivist’, and ‘Instrumentalist’ 
Approaches to Ethnic Identity 
Current studies of ethnic identity provide 
a quite diverging set of answers to what 
the basic characteristics of ethnic identity 
are. A distinction that may bring some 
clarity, is that between ‘primordialism’ 
(or ‘essentialism’) and ‘constructivism’. 
‘Primordialism’ is the view that  
 
 ethnic identity, world-view or behaviour is 
actually driven or determined by some 
deep cultural, psychological or even bio-
logical human quality (Tilley 1997:499).  
 
For example, some members of the Maya 
movement espouse a rather primordialist 
understanding of Maya identity (Warren 
1998:77-8). For these, ‘Maya languages, 
calendrics, divination, and the ritual 
authority of community elders become not 
anachronisms but ‘living proof’ of a pri-
mordial, non-Hispanic Mayanness doubly 
authenticated by its long defiance of for-
eign religion and rule’ (Watanabe 1994: 
37). ‘Constructivism’, on the other hand, 
sees ethnic identity as  
 
 an idea or discourse rather than as an 
empirically observable social ‘unit’ defin-
ed by features such as dress, language or 
customs. In other words, the criteria for 
ethnic membership are developed by the 
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participants in the social system, and are 
not externally given; rather, ethnic ‘identi-
ties’ are ‘creatively imagined’ to explain a 
group identity in relation to some Other – 
whose identity is likewise ‘imagined’ and 
often ascribed value, whether to dignify or 
to debase (Tilley 1997:511) [emphasis in 
the original].  
 
According to a constructivist approach, 
particular cultural features do not deter-
mine group identities.27 Ethnic groups 
exist because of perceived differences 
between individuals, and it is around sel-
ections of such perceived differences 
group support is mobilised and the rules 
of inclusion in and exclusion from groups 
are made and maintained. Even when the 
categories that define group membership 
are collectively accepted, the interpreta-
tion of these categories might change as 
social contexts transform (Tilley 1998: 
97). ‘Instrumentalism’, which presuppo-
ses a constructivist understanding of eth-
nic identity, is the view that particular 
individuals often labelled ‘ethnic entre-
preneurs’28 may influence or manipulate 
group identities for specific political pur-
poses. Instrumentalism emphasises the 
element of choice or arbitrariness in the 
creation of borders between groups, by 
defining who belongs and who does not. 
Instrumentalist approaches  
 
 interpret ethnicity as a purely political phe-
nomenon. In this view, culture does not 
contribute directly to the formation of 
ethnic identities. Rather, ethnic platforms 
use selected customs as emblems to legiti-
mise ethnic claims in the public domain 
(Tilley 1997:502).  
 
Constructivism need not be instrumental-
ist, however, because it can be argued that 
ethnic identities are so intimately inter-
                                                     
27 Mason (1999:262-263) calls the proponents of 
‘primordialism’ and ‘constructivism’ ‘objecti-
vists’ and ‘subjectivists’ respectively.  
28 For an example of the use of the concept of 
‘ethnic entrepreneurs’, see Espen Barth Eide 
(1997): ‘‘Conflict Entrepreneurship’: on the Art 
of Waging Civil War’ in Anthony McDermott 
(ed.): Humanitarian Force. PRIO, Oslo, Nor-
way. Eric Hobsbawn (1994) likewise argues 
that ‘nation’ and nationalism rest on exercises 
in social engineering, which are often delibe-
rate and always innovative. 
woven into complex systems of cultural 
meaning (Tilley 1997:511-15) that it does 
not easily lend it self to manipulation by 
‘ethnic entrepreneurs’. For example, 
Thomas Hylland Eriksen tends towards 
this view when he argues  
 
 It is true that ethnicity is a social creation 
and not a fact of nature, and ethnic 
variation does not correspond to cultural 
variation. But ethnic identities must seem 
convincing to their members in order to 
function – and they must also be acknow-
ledged as legitimate by non-members of 
the group (Eriksen 1995:69). 
 
Most current studies on ethnic groups in 
Guatemala support a ‘constructivist’ 
understanding of ethnic identity (Ekern 
1998, Otzoy 1997, Warren 1997 and 
1999, Watanabe 1994, Wilson 1995). 
Kymlicka argues that the ‘character of a 
national identity can change dramatically’ 
(1995a:184), but he continues: ‘the iden-
tity itself – the sense of being a distinct 
national culture – is much more stable’ 
(op.cit.).29 Attempts at ‘eliminating a dis-
tinct sense of identity’ have failed and 
often backfired, he argues (1995a:185), as 
to have attempts to create ‘pan-identities’ 
supposed to replace the ‘national’ or ‘eth-
nic’. He admits, however, that to a limited 
extent it is possible for new groups to be 
created (op.cit.:101 n.26). Kymlicka ap-
parently admits that ethnic identiy should 
be seen as separate from ‘its underlying 
characteristics’, or, as I understand it, that 
culture and identity are distinct concepts 
(op.cit.:185). However, his view on ethnic 
identity tends towards primordialism. The 
following quote provides an illustration: 
 
 …given the coercive attempts to assimilate 
many national minorities — particularly 
                                                     
29 In an earlier book (1989:167) Kymlicka draws a 
distinction between ‘changes in the character of 
a culture’ and ‘cultural structures as context of 
choice’, a distinction I believe makes little 
sense, and that could have been avoided had 
Kymlicka separated identity (ethnic and other) 
from culture. He would thus be able to explain 
how there is continuity in the labels (ethnic 
identities) different individuals give to each 
other, while their culture undergoes great trans-
formations. Indeed, it is the latter which 
Kymlicka emphasises in his justification for 
group-differentiated rights. 
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indigenous peoples — it would not be sur-
prising if there is very little left of some 
cultures. Some indigenous peoples have 
been decimated in size, denied the right to 
maintain their own institutions, and pro-
gressively demoralised. Under these cir-
cumstances, would it not be better for the 
members of a minority nation to integrate 
into the mainstream, rather than struggle in 
vain to preserve something that is already 
lost?…the decision about whether to inte-
grate must be up to the members of the 
minority themselves. It is not for people 
outside the group to decide if and when the 
societal culture is too thin to warrant 
maintaining…weakened and oppressed 
cultures can regain and enhance their rich-
ness, given the appropriate conditions. It is 
the potentiality of societal cultures that 
matters, not just their current state, and it 
is even more difficult for outsiders to 
judge the potentiality of a culture than to 
judge its current state (Kymlicka 1995a: 
100-1) [my emphasis]. 
 
From a ‘constructivist’ point of view, 
‘cultures’ as such cannot disappear nor 
‘weaken’ as Kymlicka suggests; they 
simply change. ‘Cultures’ are constantly 
changing due to individual choices taken 
in interaction with others. Arguing that 
‘there is very little left of some cultures’, 
that cultures have ‘potential’, and that cul-
tures may be ‘too thin’ is meaningful only 
in one of two different senses, both mis-
taken on a constructivist view: 
 
a) culture is seen exclusively as ‘differ-
ence’ (Eriksen 1998:342). It is a pro-
cess whereby one culture becomes 
more similar to another (‘loss of au-
thenticity’) that explains how a culture 
can become thinner and lose its ‘poten-
tiality’. This, however, ignores that an 
individual’s culture is just as much 
what she shares with others of diffe-
rent cultural or ethnic identities, as it is 
what makes her different from these 
‘others’. The question of to which de-
gree one ‘culture’ is different from 
another, and the degree to which a 
‘culture’ possesses the characteristics 
of a ‘societal culture’, are separate 
issues. In other words, it is not cultural 
difference in itself which is of rele-
vance for Kymlicka’s view on the rela-
tion between culture and freedom, and 
hence for the justification of group-
differentiated rights. 
b) culture is compared to some kind of 
past or future idealised perception (an 
‘essence’) of what the ‘culture’ was or 
should be. This, however, not only in-
troduces a very difficult problem of 
defining when a culture has reached its 
‘full potential’, but can also be oppres-
sive by imposing criteria of cultural 
‘purity’, as Otzoy (1997) stresses. In 
Kymlicka’s theory, it is likely to be the 
characteristics of a ‘societal culture’ 
according to which a particular ‘cul-
ture’ can be compared to estimate its 
‘potential’.  
 
On a constructivist account, the problem 
with Kymlicka’s framework lies not in the 
argument that freedom is dependent on 
the cultural context in which we live and 
take part, but rather in the connection 
between ‘societal culture’ and ethnic 
(read: ‘national’, ‘immigrant’, etc.) identi-
ties. I will develop this point further, first 
by examining the attempt of the Mayan 
movement to build a more cohesive iden-
tity, thereafter exploring the following 
claims: that the correspondence between 
ethnic identities and culture is problema-
tic, that the issue of determining group 
membership is very complex, and that 
ethnic identities are in a constant process 
of change and construction. These are 
claims that put into question the assump-
tion made by Kymlicka (1995a:101) that 
‘there are such things as ‘‘separate cul-
tures’’, and that it makes sense to ask 
whether there is one or two or more of 
them in a particular country’. If construc-
tivism is right, and groups exist only in 
virtue of their present role in the imagina-
tions of individuals, and not due to some 
permanent or unchanging (primordial) 
characteristic, then Kymlicka’s argument 
concerning the connection between free-
dom and equality and the cultures of par-
ticular groups needs to be re-examined. 
3.3 The Pan-Mayan Identity 
Project 
In chapter 1 I described the Mayan move-
ment as a plurality of organisations whose 
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leadership and majority of members are 
Maya, and who share the overall purpose 
of improving the situation of the Maya in 
Guatemala today. Using the term ‘Maya’ 
to refer to all the indigenous in Guatemala 
who are not Xinca or Garifuna is rather 
new. Richard Adams traces its introduc-
tion to the 1960s. Historically, the indi-
genous were called ‘indio’ by the Spanish 
colonisers, and due to the racist percep-
tions that characterise much of inter-
ethnic relations in Guatemala, calling 
someone ‘indio’ came to mean roughly 
‘stupid’ or ‘brutish’ in Ladino vocabulary. 
The more neutral terms ‘indígena’ and 
‘natural’ are also commonly used, particu-
larly by the indigenous when they talk 
about themselves. ‘Maya’, on the other 
hand, has been taken into use by members 
of the Mayan movement, and it has spread 
rapidly during the 1990s. Historically, 
‘Maya’ referred to the Mayan languages 
or the pre-Hispanic cultures. 
A goal of many members of this 
movement is to create a more cohesive 
Mayan identity by unifying the Maya 
institutionally and culturally. Such a pan-
Mayan identity is today essentially an 
elite phenomenon, as the majority of my 
informants argued, but they believed in-
creased Mayan unity would help the 
Maya achieve political power and thus put 
them on a more equal footing with the 
Ladino. Pan-Mayanists go about their pro-
ject of identity-building in a number of 
ways. For example, one informant had 
projects searching for ‘common Mayan 
roots’ in the communities he considered 
to be most untouched by Ladino influ-
ence. Another informant argued for what 
may look like the opposite methodology; 
his organisation was ‘bringing identity 
back to the communities’, for instance by 
‘providing books about us’ to distant 
communities. 
The Mayan movement can be seen as a 
‘nationalist movement’ (Cojtí 1997a:60, 
Ekern 1998), because a central aim is to 
achieve a larger degree of autonomy from 
the Guatemalan state, and that ‘political 
boundaries should be coterminous with 
ethnic boundaries’ (Eriksen 1995:6). For 
this project to succeed, the Maya need to 
come to terms with what it actually means 
to be a Maya, and gain adherence to this 
definition among other Maya (Watanabe 
1994). 
On what can a common Mayan iden-
tity be based? Guatemala’s Mayan popu-
lation is culturally and linguistically very 
heterogeneous, individual Mayas have a 
diversity of ideological and religious affi-
liations and there are great socio-econo-
mic differences between different Maya. 
What do they all have in common that 
makes them Maya? One aim of my field-
work was to try to understand how mem-
bers of the Mayan movement see their 
common identity: what they believe unites 
them and what they have in common with 
other Maya that makes them different 
from non-Maya. Some Guatemalans 
(Porras 1996:32, Montejo 1997) argue 
that even though different Mayan groups 
were never politically united, they share a 
common origin and many cultural charac-
teristics that distinguish them from other 
ethnic groups in Guatemala. It is these 
common cultural elements that make it 
possible to talk of these groups as Maya. 
The Accord on Identity, for example, 
states that a number of elements are 
fundamental to Mayan identity: descent 
from the ancient Maya, languages of a 
common root, a common view of the 
world, common culture, and a sense of 
their own identity.30 
The Maya in Guatemala speak a great 
variety of languages that share a common 
linguistic root. The divergence and hence 
the degree of mutual intelligibility 
between these languages varies. A chal-
lenge to pan-Mayanism is that due to the 
linguistic differences, pan-Mayanists must 
often resort to Spanish to communicate 
between themselves. This makes it diffi-
cult to base a common Mayan identity on 
language. The Accord on Identity menti-
ons 23 different indigenous languages, 21 
of which are Mayan. The official proposal 
for constitutional reform (1998) added 
one additional Maya language to this list, 
for a total of 22 Mayan languages. Tzian 
                                                     
30 Estuardo Zapeta (1997) mentions the same ele-
ments, and also emphasises how Mayan iden-
tity is tied to their land, in particular the land 
where they grow maize. A number of my infor-
mants gave similar examples of elements they 
considered fundamental for Maya identity, or 
else simply referred to the Peace Accords for a 
‘description’ of Mayanness.  
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(1994) and Warren (1998), on the other 
hand, list only 20 Mayan languages.  
I will argue, with Benedict Anderson 
(1994:93), that even if language can be a 
determinant of nationalist or ethnic move-
ments, there is no necessary connection 
between a particular language and politi-
cal organisation. The diversity of spoken 
languages is immense, and Anderson 
accentuates how it historically was the 
assembling of this linguistic diversity into 
print-languages that created a community 
of fellow readers who subsequently con-
stituted the imagined community of the 
nation. Political decisions, such as those 
about the content of treaties, define whe-
ther a particular dialect serves as the basis 
for or is considered part of a language.31 
Such decisions are likely to depend on lin-
guistic criteria (such as degrees of mutual 
intelligibility), but the potential number of 
languages that could be politically defined 
in Guatemala is substantial. Warren 
argues that 
 
 it is…evident that community-specific lan-
guage loyalties within regions raise tricky 
issues for the selection of a single oral dia-
lect to be transformed into the standard 
written form for each language, a neces-
sary precursor in the view of Mayanists to 
a national language policy and the produc-
tion of administrative and educational 
materials in Maya languages (Warren 
1998:58).  
 
Kymlicka makes a similar point: 
 
 How do we distinguish different languages 
from different regional dialects of the 
same language? These judgements are 
somewhat arbitrary, and affected by politi-
cal considerations. (Linguists like to say 
that a language is a dialect with an army) 
(Kymlicka 1995a:218). 
 
 He then concludes (op.cit.) that ‘a com-
mon language is necessary for a shared 
culture, but not sufficient’. 
The Accord on Identity (AIDPI 
1995:I.3), however, goes one step further 
in stating that the Mayan languages men-
                                                     
31 An example is how Serbo-Croatian, which was 
formerly considered a single language, has now 
become two languages: Serbian and Croatian. 
tioned are also ‘socio-cultural groups’.32 
Group identities centred on a common 
language are important for many Maya, 
and identification with these groups is 
probably often stronger than with the 
Mayan ‘nation’ (Ekern 1998:4). If the 
Mayan languages also denominate ‘socio-
cultural groups’, it is possible that these 
are the groups that provide its members 
with the societal cultures necessary for 
freedom. Following Kymlicka’s argu-
ment, these groups would thus be the 
units according to which group-differenti-
ated rights can be justified. Official 
documents that list languages would con-
sequently also give recognition to particu-
lar socio-cultural groups. It then becomes 
necessary to ascertain whether the Peace 
Accords and other documents adequately 
describe the ‘reality’ of socio-cultural 
groups in Guatemala. 
Another element that, according to the 
pan-Mayanists, are fundamental to Mayan 
identity is a shared philosophy, or a 
‘world-view’.33 This ‘world-view’ is char-
acterised by a belief in respectful relation-
ships within Mayan communities and 
between the elements of the universe at 
large, and a belief in the sacredness of the 
maize and the importance of the cycles of 
time and the calendar. Some Maya argue 
that this philosophy transcends other ideo-
logical divisions present in Mayan com-
munities, and that it explains the persi-
stence of Maya culture during 3,000 
years. According to this view, it is first 
and foremost the ‘cosmovisión’ which 
makes it possible to talk of a Mayan iden-
tity today (de Paz 1996).  It is not clear, 
however, to which extent this ‘world-
view’ is shared by all who think of them-
selves as Maya in Guatemala today, nor is 
it certain which importance it has for indi-
vidual Maya (Warren 1998:58), especially 
if one takes into account today’s religious 
diversity within Mayan communities. For 
example, approximately 30% of Guate-
mala’s indigenous today are Protestants 
and the majority are Roman Catholics. 
The emphasis on ‘world-view’ or any 
other common historical characteristics 
                                                     
32 However, this was not repeated in the Proposal 
for Constitutional Reform (Siglo Veintiuno 
1998a). 
33 ‘Cosmovisión’ in Spanish. 
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furthermore tends towards an ‘archaeo-
logical’ view of identity, in the sense that 
it is only for present-day Maya to examine 
history to uncover a Maya ‘essence’ that 
defines who they are.  
Irma Otzoy (1997) underlines that 
there has been and is a tendency among 
Ladino and others to impose images of 
what it is to be a Maya. For example, for 
the Guatemalan guerrillas, the Maya were 
essentially oppressed workers. Maya cul-
ture, many of the revolutionaries argued, 
was little but the product of their oppres-
sed conditions, and would disappear as 
soon as the Maya were freed from their 
current conditions (Ekern 1998, Smith 
1991, Warren 1998). A similar view was 
presented by two of my informants, both 
well-known Ladino social scientists. They 
saw Maya culture as tied to traditional 
agricultural communities, and argued that 
for the Maya to ‘modernise’ and end their 
condition of poverty and marginalisation, 
they had to abandon their culture. This 
argument essentialises Maya culture by 
tying it to a particular productive practice, 
it reifies and reduces Maya culture, and 
ignores the  capacity of Mayan culture for 
change and adaptation. Seeing the Maya 
as reactionary, for example, is a way of 
refusing to see individual Maya as per-
sons who decide and create their own 
identity. Identity, Otzoy (1997) argues, is 
a process of constant change. Ethnic iden-
tity is in this view not a determinate con-
cept, and a culture cannot be lost, only 
changed and reinterpreted (Warren 1997). 
It is moreover likely that it is this indivi-
dual capacity of invention and reinterpre-
tation that explains the cultural diversity 
of the Maya today (Warren 1997:77). 
Is it possible to talk of a Maya ‘nation’ 
or ‘people’ today? According to John 
Watanabe,  
 
 never before, even in pre-Hispanic times, 
have the Maya existed as a single, self-
defined people or nation. Instead, Maya in 
Guatemala today speak some 20 mutually 
unintelligible languages and, at least since 
colonial times, have placed their allegi-
ances in hundreds of local communities, 
each with its owns style of dress, speech 
and custom – to say nothing of spiritual 
and practical ties to ancestral lands 
(Watanabe 1994:36).  
 
Maya identity has traditionally centred on 
local communities that have had little 
communication between them, and for a 
majority of the Maya this is probably still 
true (Ekern 1998, Smith 1991, Watanabe 
1994, Wilson 1995). Maya political action 
has focused on the municipality, because 
the central institutions of the Guatemalan 
state have been monopolised by the 
Ladino (Ekern 1998). Maya culture can in 
this sense be considered ‘plural and local-
ised, rather than generic and monolithic’ 
(Smith 1991:31). This is what pan-Maya-
nists seek to alter, but it is a process that is 
likely to induce changes in Mayan culture. 
For example, one well-known anthropo-
logist has argued that ‘the vigour of the 
supra-community of Mayanism suggests 
that culture is more pertinent to the com-
munity than is ethnicity: in other words, 
to achieve a more ample Mayanism, the 
culture can be sacrificed’ (Adams 1996: 
52).  
An example of this is how the traditio-
nal dress ceases to be a marker of local-
ised ethnic identity for the urbanised 
Mayan elite; instead, they often wear en-
sembles of Maya clothing from different 
towns (Watanabe 1994:37). One of my 
informants likewise told me when I asked 
him why he was wearing jeans from the 
USA and a Mayan shirt, that he wore the 
clothing he liked to wear but gradually 
aimed at adapting new elements of Maya 
clothes to his outfit. Perhaps this exempli-
fies how Mayan identity is to a significant 
degree the product of individual adaptati-
ons and choice. What makes a person 
Maya is self-identification as Maya; it is a 
sense of identification with a particular 
type of ‘others’ which is not predeter-
mined by any particular cultural charac-
teristics.  
However, individual choices and adap-
tations when it comes to identity are not 
taken in isolation from other Maya or the 
society at large. According to John 
Watanabe, ‘simply put, Maya is what 
Maya do, as long as other Maya acknow-
ledge it as such’ (1994:31). But, he con-
tinues  
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 Mayanness remains far from arbitrary pre-
cisely because it must be recognised and 
affirmed by others, not simply self-asser-
ted…In recognising Maya latitude to fash-
ion their own identity – if not always as 
they wanted, then neither entirely as others 
intended – this view also suggests that 
Maya must constantly demonstrate their 
Mayanness to one another or risk losing it 
(Watanabe 1994:31).  
 
It is, in other words, contact and not isola-
tion that engenders social identities, and 
increased institutionalisation is likely to 
lead to a growth in ethnic awareness 
(Eriksen 1993:147-50). Carlos Orantes 
(1996:93) thus argues that Ladino identi-
ties are more accentuated and cohesive in 
areas with a Maya majority, and likewise 
for Mayan groups in Ladino majority 
areas. Ethnic identities in Guatemala, he 
argues, are created in contrast, and in the 
absence of the ‘other’, these identities lose 
their cohesiveness. 
The degree of success of the Mayan 
movement in gaining adherents, is likely 
to influence how individual Maya think of 
themselves as members of groups. ‘As 
pan-Mayanists widen Maya spheres of 
self-determination, so too will Maya iden-
tity change and expand’ (Watanabe 1994: 
36). As one of my informants pointedly 
argued, for most Maya, particularly those 
in the rural areas, the issue of identity is 
irrelevant, it is given and unproblematic. 
Urbanised Pan-Mayanist intellectuals, on 
the other hand, question identity, and they 
need to come to terms with what it is to be 
Maya for their political projects to work. 
When they negotiate with other Maya on 
what it is to be Maya, they also seek 
inclusion by having their own perception 
of Mayanness accepted, but this accep-
tation may require changing and expand-
ing the perception other Maya have of 
what it is to be Maya. As Eriksen (1995: 
76) underlines, for a ‘more encompassing 
group to exist, it must be socially rele-
vant. It must have some goods to deliver – 
material, political or symbolic – and those 
goods must be perceived as valuable by 
the target group’ [emphasis in the origi-
nal]. The degree of success of the Mayan 
movement in gaining adherents in local 
Maya communities is indicative of the 
extent to which Maya identity lends itself 
to instrumentalist interpretations. 
3.4 Ethnicity, Culture, and the 
Indeterminacy of Group Member-
ship in Guatemala 
An assumption in Multicultural Citizen-
ship is that the identity which makes us 
part of a ‘nation’ and which provides us 
with a societal culture is of particular 
importance because only it provides us 
with the cultural framework necessary for 
freedom of choice. Michel Wievorka sees 
this assumption as problematic because  
 
 if multiculturalism implies sizeable, stable, 
viable communities which are already con-
stituted, one might object that this only 
takes into consideration a small number of 
the challenges posed by the existence of 
different communities in our societies. As 
we have seen, not all cultural identities are 
of the type which seek to maintain distinct 
identity, and, on examination, those which 
would appear to be are constantly chang-
ing  (Wievorka 1998:902-903). 
 
Perhaps the most puzzling issue of my 
fieldwork was that of the Xinca. This 
group is mentioned several places in the 
Peace Accords and in the proposals for 
constitutional reform as one of Guate-
mala’s four ‘peoples’, but three of the 
Guatemalan researchers I spoke to insis-
ted that there are no Xinca left in 
Guatemala.34 However, there is a group of 
perhaps 30-40 individuals who actively 
vindicate their rights to be Xinca, some of 
whom were members of the commissions 
set up by the Peace Accords. 
The principle argument of those saying 
the Xinca are extinct is that the Xinca lan-
guage exists only in fragments. A repre-
sentative of the Xinca group I spoke to 
confirmed this. This, he claimed, is 
largely a result of the discrimination the 
Xinca have suffered, which has caused 
them to shun public use of their language. 
Cojtí (1997a) estimates that there are per-
haps 2,000 Xinca in Guatemala. My infor-
mant argued that this number may be 
much higher, but that many Xinca refuse 
to confirm their identity publicly due to a 
                                                     
34 Tzian (1994) also makes this point. 
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tradition of discretion. According to my 
informant, there is a process of ongoing 
change in the way these people see them-
selves. For the first time, people like my 
informant are manifesting their Xinca 
identity in public, thus signalling that they 
no longer wish to be considered part of 
Ladino society. My informant underlined, 
like many of the Maya with whom I 
spoke, that this process of growing ‘ethnic 
consciousness’ is partly a reaction against 
what they considered to be morally infe-
rior values of the Ladino society. 
The Xinca illustrate the difficulty of 
deciding when a group is a ‘people’ 
because some but not all of the character-
istics Kymlicka gives of a ‘people’ may 
be in place. One informant argued that 
Xinca identity cannot be reduced to lan-
guage, what is important is self-identifica-
tion. ‘When there is someone saying 
‘‘they exist, I am one of them’’, then they 
exist’ he argued. If self-identification 
should be the only relevant criterion of 
group membership, we would have to dis-
card Kymlicka’s definitions of ‘people’ 
and ‘societal culture’ as criteria for the 
entitlement to group-differentiated rights. 
Particular characteristics of a group, such 
as culture, language, and institutions 
could perhaps help explain the occurrence 
and continuity of self-identification but 
would not in themselves be criteria for 
determining the entitlement to group-dif-
ferentiated rights. 
Perhaps the discrimination the indigen-
ous have suffered in Guatemala is to 
blame for the state of the Xinca culture 
today. But if there is so little left, why 
give recognition to it? Which rights are 
the Xinca entitled to according to 
Kymlicka’s theory? Rights to protect the 
Xinca language, for instance, cannot be 
justified by referring to the value of equal-
ity, because it hardly makes sense to 
argue that someone is discriminated by 
not including it in school curricula, using 
it in public institutions, and so forth as it 
exists only in fragments. The Xinca 
language is, however, valuable for other 
reasons, such as for understanding Guate-
malan history, or for its contribution to 
Guatemala’s cultural richness. Through 
the ILO Convention no. 169 (article 28), 
the Guatemalan state commits itself to 
take measures to preserve and promote 
the indigenous languages of Guatemala. 
The state and other entities should there-
fore try to recover and rescue what 
remains of it, even though neither ‘non-
discrimination’ nor ‘recognition’ confers 
an obligation on them to do so. 
For the Maya, it is difficult to decide 
which type of group should be the subject 
of group-differentiated rights. Should it be 
linguistic groups, the Mayan people at 
large, or another type of group? Accor-
ding to Kymlicka’s theoretical frame-
work, the answer hinges on making clear 
which of these identities provides its 
member with a societal culture. It seems 
clear that the way societal culture is 
linked to identity varies for different indi-
viduals. Much has been written about how 
Maya have ‘ladinised’; by adopting the 
language, values and other aspects of 
Ladino culture they have sought to be 
assimilated into and accepted among the 
Ladino (Adams 1995). However, ‘despite 
constant blurring, the presumed opposi-
tion between Indian and Ladino persists’ 
(Watanabe 1994:31), even though the 
content of, and emphasis given to these 
labels may vary through time and between 
different places (Warren 1997).  
For the majority of the rural Maya the 
cultural background that serves as a basis 
for individual choice is probably first and 
foremost provided by their local commun-
ity. For the leadership of the Mayan 
movement, on the other hand, societal 
culture is strongly linked to the Ladino-
dominated urban environment in which 
they live, while their identity is attached 
to the pan-Mayan identity project. It is for 
many of these members of the Mayan 
movement that the possibility to choose 
between a Ladino and a Maya identity is 
really an option (Warren 1998:11,176). 
Different Maya share a strong sense of 
distinctiveness and of common destiny as 
victims of oppression, but it is not clear in 
many individual cases why Ladino and 
Maya should be seen as separate cultural 
entities. On the overall, the Mayan 
‘people’ is today ‘little more than a col-
lection of communities, with similar 
experiences and values, but with little 
communication between them, so it is dif-
ficult to talk of a shared culture. The 
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Mayan people, understood…as an inte-
grated collectivity, specialised and cultur-
ally homogenised, is only an embryo’ 
(Ekern 1998:68). 
Ethnic identities, of which national 
identities is one type, are but one of many 
identities individuals possess (Doppelt 
1997:236). A Guatemalan, for instance, 
may feel both as a Latin American, 
Guatemalan, Maya, and a Kachiquel and 
from the town of Comalapa. In addition to 
this she is likely to have a number of other 
identities, for example as a woman, 
middle-aged, mother, middle-class, wife, 
atheist, member of a Conservative Party 
etc. None of these identities need to be 
mutually exclusive, we may say that they 
are segmentary in character (Eriksen 
1995:76) and it is likely that a person will 
invoke different identities in different 
situations. For example, when leaving 
Comalapa for the neighbouring town of 
Chimaltenango, that person is likely to 
think of herself as a ‘Comalapense’, but 
when meeting Ladinos in the capital she 
may think of herself as a Kachiquel or 
Maya. Other identities are mutually exclu-
sive, it would for instance be impossible 
for a person to be both K’ichee Maya and 
Kachiquel Maya. Ethnic identity is in this 
sense contextual, it is invoked or becomes 
meaningful depending on the situation 
one finds oneself in, and there are situati-
ons in which it is rather unimportant 
(Eriksen 1995:62). As is the case of the 
Maya in Guatemala, the importance of a 
particular group identity for ‘culture’ and 
consequently freedom, varies greatly 
between individuals.  
The justification for group-differenti-
ated rights is that there is a ‘subject’, a 
group, that rights can be connected to, 
either directly to individual members of 
the group or the group as such, or indi-
rectly to a territorial administrative unit of 
which the group is part.35 Primordialist 
approaches to ethnic identity can be pro-
blematic in this sense since ‘a search for 
racial and cultural essences inevitably 
defines its subject matter out of existence 
because all peoples and cultures change’ 
(Watanabe 1994:39). Ethnic groups are 
                                                     
35 Recall Kymlicka’s distinction between the justi-
fication for a right, and who exercises it (sec-
tion 2.3). 
perhaps often too multifaceted and hetero-
geneous, too difficult to define and deline-
ate, and may transform too quickly for 
any necessary connection to be made 
between these and legal categories. The 
connection between ethnic identities and 
culture is often tenuous (Eriksen 1993). 
The lack of clarity in the distinction 
between Ladino and Maya can be used to 
offset Mayan claims to rights, as in the 
opinion of Pablo Duarte (1996:114): ‘Let 
us hope that not many Ladino are going to 
say that they are Maya when there are 
land-ownership reforms.’ Even if Duarte 
here greatly underestimates the difficul-
ties involved in changing one’s ethnic 
identity in Guatemala, the example never-
theless underlines the necessity of any 
theory on the rights of groups to come to 
terms with how groups change and are 
created.  
‘Ladino’ is the third of the four 
‘peoples’ mentioned in the beginning of 
this chapter. ‘Ladino’ refers to a very 
heterogeneous group of individuals, hav-
ing in common that they speak Spanish as 
their first language. Claudia Dary (1994, 
1997) argues that in colonial times the 
term ‘Ladino’ referred to those indigenous 
that had learned Spanish. It later came to 
be confused with ‘Mestizo’, which means 
literally mixed-blood, and then came to 
include also poor and primarily rural 
people of European descent. Rich Guate-
malans of European descent usually called 
themselves ‘criollo’ or simply ‘white’ 
(‘blanco’) to signal difference from the 
poorer Ladino. In the public censuses of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
Ladino referred to all the non-indigenous. 
Who is Ladino in Guatemala today? 
Guatemalan social scientist Mario 
Roberto Morales wrote an article titled 
‘Everyone who does not want to be 
‘‘indio’’ is a Ladino’.36 But many Guate-
malans find it difficult to think of them-
selves as either Ladino or Maya (Duarte 
96). Some feel more comfortable with the 
terms ‘criollo’, ‘mestizo’, or ‘blanco’ 
(Casáus 1998), while many others prefer 
to think of themselves as simply Guate-
malans. 
                                                     
36 The article, which appeared in the Guatemalan 
newspaper Siglo Veintiuno, is referred to by 
Adams (1997). 
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Marta Casáus37 argues that the Ladino 
are indeed an ethnic group because they 
share a culture with particular traditions 
and habits, a religion, a territory, a com-
mon history, and a self-identification as 
Ladino when they are confronted with the 
‘other’, principally the Maya. The charac-
teristics Casáus attribute to the Ladino 
come close to Kymlicka’s definition of a 
‘people’. Víctor Gálvez (1997a), on the 
other hand, points out that the Ladino lack 
the symbols or markers of identity, such 
as ancestry, community, history and 
language that the Maya have. Ladino 
identity is therefore, he argues, defined 
and understood as in opposition to the 
Maya, it reflects a wish to distance one-
self from everything ‘indigenous’. 
According to this view, being ‘Ladino’ 
essentially becomes what the indigenous 
are not. Richard Adams (1997) suggests 
that the Ladino are not an ethnic group, 
because there is no perception of common 
ancestry shared by all the non-indigenous. 
The Ladino moreover have a number of 
identities: of place, ideology and politics, 
religion, occupation, and so forth, which, 
in Adams’s opinion, also play an impor-
tant role in a democracy. Adams sees the 
attempts to create a more cohesive Ladino 
identity as a reaction to the proliferation 
of Mayan demands for a state that recog-
nises cultural difference. Claudia Dary 
(1997) also underlines the cultural diver-
sity of the Ladino, and argues that identi-
fication with particular regions or geogra-
phical locations are of particular import-
ance. Though frequently used, there is 
little or no agreement on who is, or what 
it is to be Ladino, except that being 
Ladino means not being indigenous.  
The Peace Accords mention the 
Garifuna as the fourth of Guatemala’s 
‘peoples’. Although a small group, the 
Garifuna possess a strong self-identifica-
tion, a language, a history, and institutions 
and traditions of their own (Arrivillaga 
1998, Córdova 1995). The ancestors of 
the Garifuna are mainly African slaves 
brought to the Caribbean and Amerindi-
ans. However, it is unclear whether notion 
of the Garifuna people is also meant to 
include black Guatemalans who are not 
                                                     
37 Quoted in Asturias, Iximulew 1996. 
Garifuna, mainly English-speaking 
blacks. Most Guatemalans seldom distin-
guish between these two groups. The 
Garifuna have led an existence marginal 
to Guatemala’s political life, while they 
have maintained close contacts with other 
Garifuna in neighbouring countries and 
the Caribbean area in general. Thus, Gari-
funa identity extends beyond state bord-
ers. Likewise, Cojtí (1997a) argues that 
the ‘Mayan nation’ also includes those 
living in Guatemala’s neighbouring coun-
tries who speak a Mayan language. A 
challenge for the Mayan movement, as it 
may be for proponents of group-differ-
entiated rights, is that the borders between 
groups are blurred and indeterminate in 
the case of the Xinca, Maya, Ladino, and 
Garifuna, and may extend beyond the 
limits of the state in the case of the Maya 
and the Garifuna. 
It is possible that the Mayan ‘nation’ 
as it is presented by the pan-Mayanists 
and the Mayan linguistic groups lack both 
the institutional resources and the general 
legitimacy among the Mayan population 
to serve as the subject of group-differenti-
ated rights. It should be kept in mind, 
however, that the Guatemalan state enjoys 
even less support from the indigenous 
than any of the above-mentioned groups. 
Even if it is difficult to determine which 
type of groups are entitled to which types 
of rights in Guatemala, it should be under-
lined that individual Guatemalans are stig-
matised and discriminated against when 
they express their non-Ladino identity, 
and that a liberal theory of justice requires 
a remedy, be it through ‘recognition’ or 
‘non-discrimination’. 
3.5 Transforming and Construct-
ing Ethnic Groups in Guatemala 
Bulmer and Solomos take a constructivist 
approach to ethnic identity when they 
argue that  
 
 race and ethnicity are not ‘natural’ cate-
gories, even though both concepts are 
often represented as if they were. Their 
boundaries are not fixed, nor is their mem-
bership uncontested. Race and ethnic 
groups, like nations, are imagined commu-
nities. People are socially defined as 
belonging to particular ethnic or racial 
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groups, either in terms of definitions 
employed by others, or definitions which 
members of particular ethnic groups 
employ themselves. They are ideological 
entities, made and changed in struggle. 
They are discursive formations, signalling 
a language through which differences 
[that] are accorded social significance may 
be named and explained. But what is of 
importance for us as social researchers 
studying race and ethnicity is that such 
ideas also carry with them material conse-
quences for those who are included within, 
or excluded from, them (Bulmer and 
Solomos 1998:822).  
 
Group-differentiated rights are often 
about such material consequences because 
they are frequently meant to remedy an 
unjust distribution of benefits that result 
from membership in distinct groups. 
However, conceding such rights not only 
requires assigning members to different 
groups, it can also affect the processes 
whereby groups are created and changed. 
Feelings of group identity can be streng-
thened through political decisions, such as 
decisions about giving rights to groups, or 
opening up spaces for political participa-
tion on a group basis. When rights are 
connected to group membership, the 
option of identifying with a group is not 
only made more attractive, it is also made 
more vivid to the individual, and therefore 
more real. It is possible that the more 
rights members of a group have, the more 
members it will get (Räikkä 1996:10). 
According to this view, the perception of 
who constitutes ‘we’ and the ‘other’ may 
change as a consequence of how instituti-
ons, legal documents or group leaders talk 
about and define groups.  
The Xinca in Guatemala indicate how 
the political significance given to ethnic 
identity changes when there is a shift in 
focus towards ethnic groups and cultural 
difference in public debates or when the 
status of groups changes in law or politi-
cal practice. It seems that the opportuni-
ties for participation that were opened up 
by the Peace Process and the inclusion of 
the Xinca in public discourse on rights 
and identities have given incentives for 
the Xinca to organise. It is likely that poli-
tical processes, such as those where rights 
are conceded to groups, do more than dis-
tribute benefits or cause misfortune to 
groups; group identities may also be cre-
ated or recreated through such processes 
precisely by offering opportunities and 
constraints. Fredrik Barth argues: 
 
 Valued resources are arbitrarily allocated, 
or denied, by bureaucratic action, thereby 
creating communities of fate – which will 
next tend to emerge as social, self-aware 
groups – from formal legal categories. In 
this way, modern states often generate 
categorical distinctions within the field of 
continuous cultural variation, and thus the 
very kind of groups which according to 
narrower theory are supposed to be inimi-
cal to such state structures (Barth 1994: 
19). 
 
Several persons with whom I spoke 
argued that the Xinca are an example of 
opportunism created by the Peace 
Accords. This argument seems largely 
unwarranted, as there are risks attached to 
the public expression of identity, and few 
or no benefits from doing so. The practice 
of group formation to which the peace 
process has given impetus is perhaps best 
seen as helping a disintegrated group to 
integrate. The situation of the Xinca 
furthermore indicates how many Guate-
malans feel excluded from Ladino soci-
ety, or find the Ladino society and culture 
inadequate for their needs of cultural 
expression and identification. 
Giving recognition to ethnic identities 
is thus not only about deciding which 
groups are entitled to rights; recognition 
may in itself define what groups are and 
which groups exist. For example, self-
government rights presuppose a set of 
institutions necessary for the exercise of 
these rights. Few, if any, of Guatemala’s 
linguistic groups possess such institutions, 
and self-government rights would there-
fore imply or require creating such institu-
tions. Self-government rights could 
therefore make these groups more like 
‘nations’ in the sense of being more ‘insti-
tutionally complete’. In this sense, self-
government rights are not only given to a 
pre-defined set of groups; the very con-
cession of these rights helps ‘create’ 
groups, and the more comprehensive 
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these concessions are, the more it is likely 
that group identities will be consolidated 
and strengthened. A liberal theory of 
minority rights should not only need to 
take this into account, it moreover has to 
emphasise individual choice when it 
comes to ethnic identity due to its com-
mitment to individual autonomy. A liberal 
theory of justice has to ensure that conces-
sion of rights maintains freedom of choice 
also when it comes to ethnic identity 
(Eriksen 1995), just as a liberal approach 
must be committed to the individual’s 
right to change or maintain her culture as 
she chooses (Habermas 1994:131-2). A 
liberal approach to justice should not only 
reinforce a selection of existing identities, 
but also emphasise the possibility for an 
individual to choose freely between diffe-
rent identities, and how and when particu-
lar identities are to be important. The 
remaining question is which of the two 
models of cultural accommodation, ‘non-
discrimination’ and ‘recognition’, best 
maintains this freedom. 
3.6 Some Arguments against 
‘Recognition’  
The above analysis suggests a number of 
reasons for scepticism to group-differenti-
ated rights, and hence reasons to recon-
sider ‘recognition’ as an approach to 
justice in multicultural democracies. One 
argument against ‘recognition’ is that it 
interferes in processes of group creation 
and change, an issue I believe is not prop-
erly dealt with in Kymlicka’s theory. He 
(1995a:186) believes that national identi-
ties and the claims to self-government that 
come with these are here to stay, and must 
therefore be accommodated. But 
Kymlicka does not sufficiently take into 
account the possibility that group-diffe-
rentiated rights can change and even help 
‘produce’ group identities. Nathan Glazer 
argues that 
 
 it is inconceivable to me that benefits 
given in law on the basis of group mem-
bership will not strengthen groups, will not 
make necessary the policing of their boun-
daries, and will not become permanent in a 
democratic society, where benefits once 
given cannot be withdrawn (Glazer 1995: 
137).  
Decisions about group-differentiated 
rights not only define which rights each 
group is entitled to; they also influence 
which groups will exist in a society and 
the priority given to them by individual 
members. Thus, one of  my informants 
was completely opposed to the idea of 
giving legal recognition to particular eth-
nic or linguistic groups. The state should, 
he argued ‘recognise plurality as such 
without mentioning particular groups, 
because other groups could be born’. The 
complex and dynamic nature of identity 
furthermore makes it difficult to categor-
ise and structure into law. Wievorka 
pointedly states this: 
 
 cultural identities…are in a constant state 
of flux, which means that any attempt to 
represent them all in statistical or admini-
strative categories is problematic and even 
absurd (Wievorka 1998:903).  
 
This creates a serious problem for group-
differentiated rights, namely that there 
seems to be no precise general criteria for 
determining which groups are entitled to 
group-differentiated rights, nor are there 
any precise criteria for limiting the num-
ber of claims groups may present for such 
rights. The distinction between permis-
sible external protections and impermis-
sible internal restrictions is in itself 
insufficient to separate all legitimate and 
illegitimate claims to group-differentiated 
rights. Moreover, the other criteria sug-
gested by Kymlicka for distinguishing 
between legitimate and illegitimate claims 
to group-differentiated rights are inadeq-
uate if applied generally. As the examples 
from Guatemala indicate, the empirical 
complexity of group identities is difficult 
to fit into mutually exclusive categories 
such as ‘immigrant’, ‘nation’ and ‘colo-
niser’. The criteria themselves rest on 
socially invented categories that are mal-
leable and open to interpretation, such as 
common history, cultural and linguistic 
distinctiveness, etc., and therefore yield 
few precise answers to the problem of 
defining groups. Imposing such criteria 
are likely to create an unfair distribution 
of ‘goods’ (rights, position, etc.) and 
make non-favoured groups feel that they 
are being discriminated against, and there-
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fore do not correspond with basic liberal 
ideals. In the next chapter I will discuss an 
alternative method for determining which 
groups are entitled to group-differentiated 
rights based on individual choice, but 
which nevertheless does not give a fully 
satisfactory answer to the criticism raised 
above.  
A related argument against recognition 
is that it may restrict individual freedom. 
Recognition may furthermore impede 
integration and lead to a polarisation of 
society. Framing a political discourse in 
the language of groups has the conse-
quence of excluding and omitting indivi-
dual variation. Many individuals will 
often find fitting into the formally deter-
mined categories difficult, and not every-
one wishes to ascertain a group identity. 
This is seen in the Peace Accords where 
the ethnic groups mentioned hardly en-
compass everyone living in Guatemala. It 
is also shown in the difficulty many 
Guatemalans have in defining themselves 
in ethnic terms, and many find it difficult 
to fit into the categories most similar to 
Kymlicka’s concept of ‘nation’. Different 
individuals are likely to diverge in their 
perceptions of the group(s) with which 
they identify (Vermuelen and Govers 
1994:5-7).  
The attachment of rights to ethnic cate-
gories is perhaps particularly problematic 
for the so-called ethnic anomalies, which 
are those individuals who do not fit into 
these categories (Eriksen 1995:62-5). 
Moreover, some groups may prefer inte-
gration instead of differentiated treatment, 
and for a number of individuals, ethnic 
identity may be of little or no importance. 
The implementation of Kymlicka’s frame-
work is likely to make it difficult to main-
tain that ethnic identity is of little or no 
relevance, because benefits and disadvan-
tages will then become attached to mem-
bership in ethnic groups, and the issue of 
ethnic identity is likely to become more 
politicised. The issue of exclusion 
becomes an issue of fairness when ethnic 
identity is tied to political rights, because 
individuals who fall outside of the cate-
gories may be discriminated against to the 
extent that the concession of rights on a 
group-differentiated basis will be per-
ceived as conceding privileges to the 
members of a particular group. By struc-
turing group membership into law, the 
possibility each individual has to redefine 
and reinterpret his or her culture is likely 
to become restricted (Eriksen 1997). 
Glazer argues that  
 
 groups that are ordered in a hierarchy, that 
are considered ‘higher’ or ‘lower’, reflec-
ting real and substantial economic and 
political inferiority, may nevertheless set 
as their ideal and ultimately expect inte-
gration into the common society (Glazer 
1995: 135-5). 
 
Recognition may have the consequence of 
foreclosing this possibility because it 
implies a structuring of a country’s popu-
lation into groups and easily leads to a 
‘logic of the other’ (Young 1995), 
whereby individuals are seen as belonging 
to mutually exclusive categories, barriers 
are created between ethnic groups, and 
minority groups are relegated to an 
inferior status. There is a tension between 
cultural homogenisation that leads to 
similarity on the one hand, and the recog-
nition of difference on the other. Zapeta 
(1997) underlines the danger in arguing 
that what identifies the Ladino is what 
makes them different from the indigen-
ous. A likely consequence of this is 
polarisation of society and decreased 
political stability.38 Butenschøn (1993:8) 
likewise argues that political systems 
based on group identities or ‘cleavages’ 
are likely to be unstable, since they are 
‘extremely vulnerable to changes in the 
character of the cleavage system, as 
exemplified in the case of Lebanon. Chan-
ges in relative strength of the groups 
(demographically or economically) might 
easily create demands for changes in the 
power-sharing system agreed upon’. 
Recognition can also be counter-pro-
ductive. Cojtí (1996b) emphasises that the 
injustices that result from racial, cultural 
and socio-economic discrimination are 
solved in different manners. Assimilation 
                                                     
38 Against this it can be argued that the failure to 
give recognition can also increase tension and 
escalate into conflict (Kymlicka 1995a:185). In 
section 4.6 I discuss whether ‘recognition’ is 
likely to increase integration and stability in 
Guatemala or lead to increased social tension 
and conflict. 
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and integration is the remedy for both 
socio-economic and racial discrimination 
because the aim is the removal of differ-
ence. When it comes to discrimination on 
the basis of culture, on the other hand, he 
argues that autonomy is the answer 
because what is desired is maintenance 
and respect for difference, not its disap-
pearance. In Guatemala, these three types 
of discriminations often overlap, and self-
government rights and special representa-
tion rights could therefore cement and 
perpetuate a situation of segregation based 
on ‘racial’ and cultural stereotypes and 
economic injustice.  
The purpose of recognition is to put 
groups on more equal footing and end the 
injustices that individuals suffer due to the 
situation their culture is facing in a soci-
ety. But instead of helping members of 
minority cultures to achieve equality, it 
may ‘ghettoise’ them by restricting the 
possibility of leaving their own culture 
and become part of the majority culture, 
in situations when ‘the dominant culture 
racialises, marginalises, and excludes 
them – effectively coercing minorities 
into enclaves of separateness on the peri-
phery of society’ (Doppelt 1998:240). 
This separateness may not only be forced 
upon groups from the outside, but can 
also be maintained from within, thus cur-
tailing creativity, change, and freedom. 
As is the case for the indigenous in Guate-
mala, ‘they confront a dominant culture 
which stigmatises them as racial or ethnic 
inferiors, alien ‘‘others’’ who are inher-
ently unfit to belong to the mainstream 
culture, except in marginal and subordi-
nate positions’ (Doppelt 1998:241). In 
this situation, group rights may serve to 
‘mask and rationalise their unfreedom and 
inequality as individuals in the society as 
a whole’ (Doppelt 1998:241). Cultural 
difference, which may require recogni-
tion, is only part of the reason for their 
marginalised situation and lack of equal-
ity. Thus, Kymlicka (1995a:109-10) right-
ly emphasises that ‘special rights for 
national minorities’ should only be 
endorsed ‘if there actually is a disadvan-
tage with respect to cultural membership, 
and if the rights actually serve to rectify 
the disadvantage’. 
Lastly, it can be argued that recogni-
tion can protect illiberal minorities. The 
prohibition of any internal restrictions 
effectively excludes any illiberal group-
differentiated rights, but, as Gerald 
Doppelt (1998:234) argues, ‘Kymlicka’s 
group rights may protect groups whose 
established cultures and identities have 
powerful illiberal characteristics’. For 
example,  
 
 in some cases ethnic identity is gendered 
and inseparable from harsh relations of 
domination between the sexes. In these 
cases polyethnic rights which strengthen 
ethnic identity also strengthen patriarchy 
and the terrible inequalities of options, 
freedom, and dignity such domination 
implies (Doppelt 1998:237).  
 
It seems paradoxical ‘how any appeal to 
liberal values can justify special protecti-
ons for national or ethnic minorities 
which violate or weaken these very 
values’ (Doppelt 1998:234). Kymlicka 
(1995a:163-72) argues against coercive 
intervention by the state to ensure that an 
ethnic group respects liberal values. 
According to Doppelt, Kymlicka’s unwil-
lingness to use force to protect liberal 
values questions the compatibility of 
group-differentiated rights with the pro-
tection of fundamental individual rights.39 
Moreover, Doppelt (1998:235-9) 
argues that it is unlikely that an illiberal 
culture, a culture that imposes restrictions 
on its members’ free enjoyment of their 
basic rights, can provide its members with 
the cultural framework necessary for free-
dom of choice. According to Doppelt, for  
 
 disadvantaged or oppressed sub-groups 
within a national or ethnic minority, the 
path to freedom and equality is not through 
group rights; rather it is through policies 
                                                     
39 The issue of such interventions is too complex to 
be discussed within the scope of this thesis. It 
should be noted, however, that within the 
framework of Multicultural Citizenship, one 
reason to be sceptical about such interventions 
is that the incorporation of groups into a state is 
considered prior to the legitimacy of the state’s 
jurisdictions over these groups, and such inter-
ventions could therefore be considered an 
illegitimate violation of a group's right to self-
government. See also Kymlicka’s discussion in 
that book (1995a:chapter 8). 
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which enhance their rights and opportuni-
ties as individuals in the majority culture 
and thus increase their freedom – both 
their freedom to abandon a defective, 
restrictive cultural identity, and their free-
dom within the majority culture (Doppelt 
1998:236).  
 
In addition to restricting certain types of 
group-differentiated rights (internal 
restrictions), Doppelt’s suggestion is to 
 
 not provide any such rights to minority 
cultures which practice and rationalise 
serious violations of the freedom and 
equality of sub-groups within them 
(Doppelt 1998:235).  
 
He further suggests that such rights 
should be given according to need, not 
just depending on a group’s historic origin 
and present aspirations (1998:244). A pro-
blem with Doppelt’s suggestion, however, 
is that it is not clear who should define 
and how to define ‘serious violations of 
freedom and equality’. These uncertain-
ties are likely to cause controversy, and 
even though ‘serious violations of free-
dom and equality’ can be defined accord-
ing to international law and human rights 
conventions, there still remains the issue 
of interpretation and application of these 
standards. Such uncertainties could 
become an arm of the majority in the face 
of minorities. Another problem with 
Doppelt’s suggestion is that it tends 
towards essentialising groups as either 
‘oppressive’ or ‘non-oppressive’. 
The arguments above can generally be 
read as favouring an approach to justice in 
multicultural democracies that does not 
focus on particular types of ‘groups’, thus 
favouring ‘non-discrimination’. However, 
before attempting to answer which of 
these two approaches or policies is the 
most adequate approach to justice in 
Guatemala, I will examine a topic which 
is a central concern in both the works of 
Kymlicka, and debates in Guatemala on 
multiculturalism: what are the implica-
tions for the state of cultural diversity 
when it comes to the distribution and 
organisation of political power? 
Chapter 4:  
Participation and Indigenous Self-Government 
in Guatemala
As previously argued, a central concern 
for considerations of justice in multi-
cultural democracies is that members of 
minority groups often lack the means to 
influence decisions that have an impact on 
their culture. The organisation and distri-
bution of the formal political powers and 
competencies of the state is therefore of 
great importance. Section 4.1 examines 
what  implications ‘recognition’ and ‘non-
discrimination’ have for the distribution 
of formal political power, and section 4.2 
discusses a mechanism for determining 
which of the two is most adequate for 
Guatemala. In Multicultural Citizenship, 
Kymlicka presents two ways in which 
formal political power can be conceded to 
groups: either through a common set of 
institutions where some (or all) groups are 
guaranteed a certain degree of partici-
pation, or by giving each group degrees of 
autonomy. The three following sections 
therefore discuss participation (4.3) and 
autonomy (4.4 and 4.5) in relation to 
Guatemala. The last section analyses the 
implication of multiculturalism for politi-
cal unity in Guatemala. 
4.1 ‘Recognition’ and ‘Non-discri-
mination’ as Approaches to 
Power-Sharing 
The two approaches to cultural accommo-
dation have different implications for the 
territorial and administrative organisation 
of the state. According to ‘recognition’, a 
basic organisational principle of the state 
is ethnic identity of the type that provides 
its members with the ‘societal culture’ 
necessary for freedom. ‘Recognition’ 
means ‘power-sharing without socio-cul-
tural integration; a principle that not only 
preserves existing cleavages, but which 
takes these cleavages as the basic norm 
for legal-institutional power-distribution 
in the society’ (Butenschøn 1993:8, 
emphasis in the original).40 According to 
‘non-discrimination’ on the other hand, 
these ‘cleavages’ are irrelevant for the 
organisation of the state.  
Let us now compare these two appro-
aches with another central issue in demo-
cratic theory, that of sovereignty.41 In a 
unitary state there is one single sovereign 
power. A unitary state can be centralised, 
which means that all formal power is ves-
ted in one set of institutions, or it can 
decentralise by transferring some of its 
formal competence to smaller organisatio-
nal units. The autonomy the smaller com-
ponent units gain through decentralisation 
is not permanent because the sovereign 
can withdraw it. By autonomy I under-
stand that an organisational unit (a group, 
a territory, an organisation) possesses a 
certain degree of formal decision-making 
powers. In a federal state, on the other 
hand, the formal power of the smaller 
component units is permanent and usually 
reflected in and protected by the constitu-
tion. The federation is often a result of the 
transfer of power from a number of sover-
eign units to the central government, 
whereas in the unitary decentralised state 
it is the other way around: power is trans-
ferred from the central sovereign power to 
smaller component units. In a state orga-
nised according to ‘recognition’, the com-
ponent units of the federation or of a 
decentralised unitary state are ethnic 
groups. These component units will be 
strictly territorial  in a state organised 
according to ‘non-discrimination’. In the 
latter case, the different group identities of 
the citizens are irrelevant.  
It should be marked that according to 
‘recognition’ the autonomy of the compo-
nent units in a federation or in a decentral-
                                                     
40 ‘Cleavage’ refers to the fundamental ways in 
which a society is divided, into ethnic groups, 
for example. 
41 The discussion above owes much to Butenschøn 
(1993) and a lecture given by Juan Linz at the 
University of Oslo 8 April 1999. 
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ised state does not need to be territorial. 
Members of the groups that compose the 
autonomous component units need not 
share the same territory. This is in fact 
implied by Arend Lijphart’s (1995) well-
known concept of ‘consociationalism’. In 
the Netherlands, which is one of 
Lijphart’s real-life examples of ‘consoci-
ationalism’, members of each ‘cleavage’ 
do not necessarily live geographically 
concentrated, but they belong to separate 
institutional structures. Likewise, one 
could imagine the Guatemalan state orga-
nised according to ‘ethnic groups’, each 
with its own institutions, but the members 
of these living intermingled with members 
of other groups (as they do to some extent 
today). For example, one of my infor-
mants suggested that there should be two 
ministries of education in Guatemala, one 
for the indigenous and one for the non-
indigenous. Each ministry should run its 
own system of education for separate 
groups of citizens, but the territorial com-
petencies of these two ministries should 
overlap. Non-territorial forms of auto-
nomy are useful because, as Lijphart 
argues (1995:285-6), ‘even when ethnic 
groups are geographically concentrated, 
the boundaries between different ethnic 
groups never perfectly divide these groups 
from each other. This means that terri-
torial federalism can never be a perfect 
answer to the requirements of ethnic and 
cultural autonomy’. 
In a unitary centralised state, ‘recogni-
tion’ implies that formal power within the 
single set of institutions would be divided 
according to groups on the basis of quo-
tas. This could either be done proportio-
nally, or particular groups could be over-
represented. A common argument for 
non-proportionality is that particularly 
small groups need overrepresentation to 
ensure that they have a say in issues that 
greatly affect these groups. ‘Non-discri-
mination’ in a unitary centralised state 
generally implies simple majority rule. On 
the basis of the above discussion, we get 
the following six types of multicultural 
democratic regimes: 
 
              Unitary Centralised    Unitary Decentralised  Federal 
‘Recognition’ special representation 
rights 
self-government/ 
special representation 
self-government/ 
special 
representation 
‘Non-discrimination’ majoritarianism majoritarianism federalism 
          
Figure 1
 
Above I have indicated with which type 
of group-differentiated rights the different 
models correspond.42 Self-government 
rights and special representation rights 
can be combined in the case of a unitary 
decentralised state: the relevant ethnic 
groups could have quotas within the 
shared institutions while maintaining 
degrees of self-government. For example, 
Lijphart's (1995) consociationalism com-
bines both quotas and degrees of self-
government, in addition to proportional 
representation and elite co-operation 
between the cleavages. Generally, the 
greater the formal powers of the autono-
mous units are, the less power the shared 
institutions have. It is therefore likely that 
                                                     
42 These rights were presented in chapters 1 and 3.  
the greater the formal powers of self-gov-
ernment become, the less relevant is the 
issue of quotas, and vice versa. ‘Recog-
nition’ also opens up for the possibility of 
asymmetric distributions of power, where-
by the particular types of self-government 
rights vary between different groups. For 
example, in Spain, the Autonomous 
Regions of Catalonia and the Basque 
Country have more extensive rights of 
self-government than La Rioja or Extre-
madura. ‘Non-discrimination’ precludes a 
justification for such asymmetries based 
on cultural differences between groups. 
Lastly, it should be noted that in a federal 
state, ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘recogni-
tion’ could be combined at different lev-
els. For example, the federal component 
units could be organised internally accor-
ding to ‘non-discrimination’, whereas the 
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shared institutions could be organised 
according to ‘recognition’. 
4.2 To What Extent is Guatemala 
an Ethnically Divided  Society? 
Is ‘recognition’ or ‘non-discrimination’ 
the right approach for Guatemala? A 
possible way to answer this question is to 
examine one of the central premises of 
‘recognition’. Kymlicka argues that  
 
 on the individualistic view, all that matters 
is that individuals have an equal vote 
within equal constituencies. This is all that 
is required to meet the principle that each 
individual has an equal right to vote, and it 
should be a matter of indifference how 
these boundaries are drawn, as long as 
constituencies are of equal size. But this 
ignores the reality that people vote as 
members of communities of interest, and 
wish to be represented on this basis 
(Kymlicka 1995a:136).  
 
Kymlicka's defence for group-differenti-
ated rights actually implies more than that 
people vote as members of ‘communities 
of interest’. Kymlicka’s argument in fact 
implies that people vote fundamentally as 
members of a single community of inter-
est of a particular type, namely ethnic 
communities (‘nations’ or ‘immigrant 
groups’). Kymlicka’s theory presupposes 
that these groups can be identified and 
suggests that we must distinguish between 
different groups (‘nations’ versus ‘immi-
grants’) because these are also entitled to 
different types of rights. Thus, whether 
‘recognition’ or ‘non-discrimination’ is 
the most adequate approach for a particu-
lar country depends on whether people in 
that country vote and wish to be represen-
ted as members of such communities. If 
the answer is affirmative, then it is likely 
that assigning rights to particular groups 
is possible, and consequently ‘recogni-
tion’ may be the adequate approach.  
However, it is also possible that citi-
zens give priority to other factors when 
they define their interests, vote, and wish 
to be represented, such as their level of 
income, the region they live in, religion, 
and so forth. The more other such ‘fac-
tors’ coincide with ethnicity, the more it 
seems likely that citizens will vote as 
members of ethnic groups. In Guatemala, 
the diverse linguistic groups live rather 
concentrated geographically and the 
majority of the Maya are poor rural farm-
ers. On the other hand, some Maya are 
well off, and many are urbanised. The 
indigenous communities are furthermore 
ideologically and religiously diverse 
(Ekern 1998, Mydske 1998, Stoll 1993), 
and the differences between different 
generations in terms of values and life 
styles are sometimes very significant 
(Warren 1998), so it is not obvious that 
ethnicity would be the primary com-
munity of interest for the Maya. Rather, as 
argued in chapter 3, it is likely that differ-
ent types of identities will become rele-
vant depending on the issues concerned. 
Kymlicka is right in underlining that 
various forms of group-differentiated 
rights are common in western democra-
cies, but as was pointed out in the last 
chapter, the criteria Kymlicka suggests for 
distinguishing between ‘nations’ and ‘im-
migrant groups’ are problematic. Arend 
Lijphart (1995) argues that instead of pre-
determining the groups entitled to recog-
nition according to some criterion or 
other, groups should be ‘self-determined’. 
Under conditions of free association and 
competition, he argues, ‘proportional 
representation is the optimal electoral 
system for allowing the segments to mani-
fest themselves in the form of political 
parties’ (op.cit.:281). If a number of indi-
viduals wish for their particular cultural 
identity to be given public recognition, 
they can simply organise a political party. 
In a system of proportional representation, 
any such group could potentially have its 
representatives elected. This approach 
seems furthermore to correspond with the 
desires of many indigenous representa-
tives, who in the United Nations have 
insisted that self-definition should be the 
only criterion for being indigenous, thus 
resisting attempts by others to define them 
(Plant 1997). ‘Self-determination’ is 
moreover a test whether a society is genu-
inely plural, because ‘the proof of seg-
mental identity is electoral success’ 
(Lijphart 1995:281). Individuals who pre-
fer not to identify with a particular ethnic 
segment or group can choose to vote for a 
party that is not ethnically aligned (or they 
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can organise one). Among the advantages 
of ‘self-determination’ is that it gives all 
types of associations the same chance to 
elect representatives, and thereby avoids 
‘fixing the shares of representation and 
other privileges’ (op.cit.:285). 
An argument against ‘self-determina-
tion’ is that if it is seen as a test of 
whether a group is entitled to particular 
rights or privileges, it could create expec-
tations that parties should organise 
according to ethnic identities. According 
to a constructivist approach to ethnic 
identity, such expectations may in fact 
shape and determine these very identities. 
‘Self-determination’ may thus not only be 
a mechanism whereby the basic structure 
of the society is identified; it may also 
create or at least reinforce a particular 
type of structure. 
Another objection to ‘self-determina-
tion’ is that not all groups are likely to 
possess sufficient resources to organise in 
a political party. A group may lack these 
resources because of injustices committed 
against it in the past, injustices that re-
quire some form of compensation. ‘Self-
determination’ alone cannot deal with the 
‘corrosive consequences of marginalisa-
tion or powerlessness, and the way these 
can inhibit the self-organisation of 
groups’ (Phillips 1995:15). If the state 
seeks to remedy this by giving marginal-
ised or excluded groups financial support 
to organise, the issue of predetermination 
could be reintroduced because it may be 
necessary to define who should be given 
this support and on which criteria. Many 
of the Mayan linguistic groups are very 
insular; they lack the economic resources 
needed to organise a political party and 
are too small to have much of a chance of 
electing any representatives at the national 
level. Moreover, Guatemala’s electoral 
system is based on proportional represen-
tation, so it would seem that according to 
Lijphart’s argument Guatemala cannot be 
a truly segmented country because no 
ethnic identity-based political parties have 
had any great success so far.43 However, 
                                                     
43 However, it could also be argued that the pre-
sent political parties are ‘ethnic’, because they 
are dominated by the Ladino. On the other 
hand, there have been indigenous political par-
ties, but these have not received many votes. I 
return to this issue below. 
such a conclusion is unwarranted because 
it ignores the conditions under which poli-
tical organisation has taken place in 
Guatemala.  
A third problem with ‘self-determina-
tion’ is that though it may determine how 
the society is structured, it cannot answer 
the question of which types of group-dif-
ferentiated rights particular groups should 
have. It should also be noted that self-
definition precludes overrepresentation 
(op.cit.:286), which may be required by 
Kymlicka’s argument that certain groups 
have a right to protect the survival of their 
cultures. Even if these objections are 
taken into account, self-determination is 
perhaps better than any other approach to 
the selection of groups. 
Future elections may be indicative of 
the social structure of Guatemala to the 
extent that ethnically based parties appear 
and gain adherents, or fail to do so. How-
ever, given that ‘self-determination’ in 
itself is insufficient to answer the question 
of which of the two approaches to cultural 
accommodation is the most adequate for 
Guatemala, the choice between ‘non-dis-
crimination’ and ‘recognition’ for Guate-
mala needs further examination; we need 
to look at the actual situation in Guate-
mala today, and see whether the existing 
arrangements favour particular groups 
(Phillips 1995:38). What is the current 
level of indigenous participation and self-
government and how do the indigenous 
perceive these issues? What characterises 
indigenous experiences with participation 
and self-government? Answering these 
questions may give indications as to 
whether ‘non-discrimination’ or ‘recog-
nition’ is most adequate for Guatemala, 
and I will discuss these throughout this 
chapter. 
4.3 Participation, ‘Presence’, and 
the Indigenous in Guatemala 
Kymlicka’s (1995a:141) concept of spe-
cial representation rights includes both 
‘public funds for advocacy groups, guar-
anteed representation in political bodies, 
and veto rights over specific policies that 
affect a group directly’. Both the ILO 
Convention no. 169 (article 6) and the 
Peace Accords commit the Guatemalan 
government to promote the participation 
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of the indigenous in policy-making. The 
ILO convention furthermore underlines 
that the indigenous have a right to be con-
sulted on issues that affect them directly. 
The Mayan intellectual Demetrio Cojtí 
(1997a:70) argues in favour of proportion-
ality between different ethnic groups in 
the distribution of the Guatemalan state’s 
finances, and in the contracting of persons 
in the state’s institutions. He also suggests 
that minority groups should have veto 
rights. I will return to the issue of public 
funding for such groups in the next chap-
ter, while guaranteed representation and 
veto rights will be discussed below.  
Cojtí (1996c:86) stresses that because 
there is no participation at the regional, 
departmental and central level, it is ‘prob-
able that the indigenous ignore the exi-
stence of these intermediary governments 
and the central government, except those 
that see it as the …cause of their pro-
blems, as the place where decisions are 
taken against the indigenous’. Sieder 
(1996:14) probably expresses a common-
ly held opinion when she argues that the 
Guatemalan political system (the state) 
has been irrelevant for most Maya.  
What is the current level of participa-
tion of the indigenous in Guatemala? I 
will return to the local level of politics in 
the next section, and concentrate on the 
central levels of the state’s institutions 
here. Many Guatemalans, among them 
several of my informants, argue that the 
Accord on Identity was created without 
due consultations with the indigenous 
people (Castro 1996, Cojtí 1996a). How-
ever, it seems clear that some indigenous 
did give substantial input to this part of 
the negotiations through their participa-
tion in the Assembly of the Civil Society 
(Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil), a con-
sultative body set up as part of the Peace 
Process. In the joint commissions set up 
as part of the Peace Accords, on the other 
hand, it was the first time in this century 
that indigenous representatives interacted 
and negotiated directly with the govern-
ment. Among these were a commission on 
the political participation of the indigen-
ous, a commission on the official status of 
the indigenous languages and a commis-
sion on land rights. The indigenous parti-
cipation was co-ordinated through the um-
brella organisation COPMAGUA, though 
some critics argued that this organisation 
was not representative of the indigenous 
at large (Vásquez 1996). 
The 8044 members of the Guatemalan 
Congress are elected in proportional elec-
tions every four years. 64 of the represen-
tatives were elected on the basis of the 22 
departments, the remaining 16 on the 
basis of the country as a whole. The presi-
dent is elected directly by simple majority 
for a four-year term, cannot be re-elected, 
and appoints the government. If no single 
candidate obtains the simple majority dur-
ing the first round, a second round is held 
between the two candidates who obtained 
most votes during the first round. There 
are presently six Mayan Congress mem-
bers who openly manifest their Mayan 
identity,45 half of whom are women, in 
addition to a few deputy members. All 
other members of the Congress are 
Ladino. This results in a Mayan presence 
in Congress of less than 8%, which makes 
it hard to argue that the Congress is repre-
sentative of the Guatemalan population.  
Noticeably, this underrepresentation 
exists despite both an electoral system 
based on proportionality and the Maya 
being (most likely) the majority; although 
these are frequently mentioned as factors 
that prevent under-representation in other 
countries (Kymlicka 1995a:141). 
Kymlicka (1995a:150) argues that ‘...leg-
islatures have a special symbolic role in 
representing the citizens of the country. 
Citizens who do not see themselves re-
flected in the legislature may become 
alienated from the political process and 
question its legitimacy’. Since the reintro-
duction of democracy in 1986, there has 
only been one Mayan minister: Celestino 
Tay Coyoy was Minister of education in 
the government of Ramiro de León 
                                                     
44 For the 7 November, 1999 elections these num-
bers changed: 91 members were elected on the 
basis of the departments, and 22 were elected 
on the nation-wide list. It should also be noted 
that for electoral purposes the municipality of 
the capital counts as a separate electoral dis-
trict, for a total of 23. I do not have at present 
the data on the number of indigenous elected to 
the Congress. 
45 My informants told me that there are perhaps 
six more members of Congress from largely 
Maya background who prefer to pass for 
Ladino. 
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Carpio (1993-95). There are no indigen-
ous Supreme Court judges, and at the 
lower levels of the justice system very 
few Maya are employed. 
There are no statistics on the number 
of indigenous in the public administration, 
but my informants and the written sources 
(Cojtí 1997a, 1997b:12) agree that the 
indigenous are largely underrepresented. 
Moreover, the higher up in the administra-
tive hierarchy, the fewer indigenous bu-
reaucrats. The right to compete on fair 
conditions for public positions is a pri-
mary concern in liberal theories of justice 
(Rawls 1971, 1993), and can moreover be 
considered a means to combat corruption 
and unfair preferential treatment. It may 
also be argued that the quality and acces-
sibility of public services is to some de-
gree dependent on the extent to which the 
public and the civil servants share the cul-
ture and language. Public administrations 
often possess significant discretionary 
powers, and with the presence of different 
societal groups there is also a way to en-
sure that the interests of these different 
groups are taken into account when admi-
nistrative decisions are taken. Thus, Roger 
Plant (1997:12) argues that ending discri-
mination in Guatemala in addition to 
changes in law also require ‘commitment 
by the Government and clear directives to 
both state and private-sector organisations 
regarding their employment policies and 
attitudes’. 
The first step to get more indigenous 
into the Congress and the government is 
to increase the number of indigenous on 
the electoral lists of the political parties. 
Most Guatemalan parties include Maya on 
their electoral lists. One of the parties, the 
left-wing Frente Democrático Nueva 
Guatemala had a Maya as candidate for 
vice-president during the last elections, 
and so did the left-wing alliance Alianza 
Nueva Nación for the November 1999 
elections. Non-party aligned Mayan lead-
ers were approached before the last electi-
ons by different parties who wished to 
have their support, and the Mayan leaders 
use this as a negotiating tool to pressure 
the parties for commitments on indigen-
ous issues.46 However, on the overall, the 
                                                     
46 Personal communication with Otilia Lux de 
Cotí, July 1999. 
number of Maya in the parties is low, par-
ticularly considering the relative size of 
the indigenous population in Guatemala. 
Some of my informants related that when 
a party wins the elections and the organi-
sation of government takes place, the 
issue of indigenous presence is ignored. A 
common opinion was that the Maya are 
included on the party lists exclusively for 
the purpose of winning votes among the 
Mayan electorate, and that their points of 
view on issues of particular interest for 
the indigenous are not taken into account 
(Cojtí 1997a:30). Some therefore conclu-
ded that it is better to keep away from par-
ty politics. René Poitevin,47 director of the 
Guatemalan research institute FLACSO, 
characterises the processes for electing 
candidates within the parties as very un-
democratic. The candidates are usually 
appointed by the leadership rather than 
being elected. Poitevin argues that this 
lack of democratic processes within the 
parties is again reflected in the attitudes of 
party members when they are in govern-
ment positions.  
In the 1970s, the indigenous party 
‘Frente Indígena Nacional’ was created, 
but quickly lost electoral support because 
it jumped from one party alliance to 
another (Arias 1990, de Paz 1993). In the 
1990s, new indigenous organisations with 
political ambitions have appeared, such as 
the ‘K’amal B’e’ and ‘Nukuj Ajpop’ 
(Cojtí 1997a, Ekern 1998). Nukuj Ajpop 
was allied with the FDNG during the leg-
islative elections in 1995. Both of these 
organisations are active in courting the so-
called Civic Committees (‘Comités 
Cívicos’), which are non-party aligned 
municipal electoral platforms. The Civic 
Committees are usually created on initia-
tive from local non-governmental organi-
sations, and their growth since 1985 has 
paralleled that of the Mayan Movement 
(Gálvez et al. 1997c:31-32). Today, these 
committees run numerous municipalities, 
but because they lack the legal status as 
political parties, they cannot participate in 
presidential or legislative elections. An-
other initiative worth mentioning in this 
context is the organisation of forums with 
the candidates for presidency by members 
                                                     
47 Interview in Prensa Libre, 12 October, 1997 
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of the Mayan Movement. On these occasi-
ons, the candidates have presented and 
discussed their policies towards the indi-
genous with a dominantly Mayan 
audience (CEDIM 1992, Comité para el 
Decenio 1996). 
Should the lack of Maya presence be 
taken as ‘evidence’ of the necessity for 
special representation rights? As Anne 
Phillips (1995:39) argues: ‘establishing an 
empirical underrepresentation of certain 
groups does not in itself add up to a nor-
mative case for their equal or proportio-
nate presence’. For example, according to 
Edmund Burke’s theory of ‘virtual’ politi-
cal representation (Pitkin 1967), a per-
son’s or a group’s interests are given 
objectively and are easily identifiable. 
These interests are given independently of 
the opinions these persons may express, 
and are best represented by those who 
possess knowledge and reason who in 
rational deliberation determine what is 
best for their constituencies and the nation 
at large. In contrast, contemporary politi-
cal theory usually focuses on accountabil-
ity; it is the correspondence between the 
expressed will of the electorate and the 
representative that determines the degree 
of representation. However, for both the 
Burkean and the contemporary theory 
what matters is that the actual interests of 
the indigenous in Guatemala, for example, 
are taken into consideration, not who is 
present in the institutions which represent 
these groups. Anne Phillips (1995) labels 
this a ‘politics of ideas’ and contrasts it 
with a ‘politics of presence’, the latter 
according to which the characteristics and 
the identity of the representatives matter. 
Phillips underlines the following dilemma 
with a ‘politics of presence’: 
 
 The legitimacy of group representation 
depends on some mechanism for establish-
ing what the group in question wants or 
thinks or needs, and there are only two 
serious candidates for this. One is the im-
plausible essentialism that sees shared 
experience as enough of a guarantee of 
shared belief; the other is the organisation 
of some sufficiently representative seg-
ment to establish group opinions and goals 
(Phillips 1995:55). 
 
Essentialism, or the idea of ‘mirror repre-
sentation’ (Kymlicka 1995a), in fact 
undermines the whole idea of group re-
presentation. The idea that a people must 
share the same experiences in order to re-
present each other is problematic because 
excluded groups can be divided further 
into subgroups, which may be marginal-
ised within the excluded group. It is there-
fore difficult to determine exactly which 
group should be guaranteed ‘presence’. 
Moreover, common experience is never a 
guarantee for shared beliefs (Phillips op. 
cit.:171), and taken to its logical conclu-
sion, ‘mirror representation’ implies that 
no person can speak for another. There is 
also a danger that if the idea is accepted 
that a person from one group cannot speak 
for the member of another, that a Ladino 
cannot speak for a Maya, for example, it 
would liberate the members of one group 
from even trying to speak for or under-
stand the interests of another. However, 
according to Kymlicka:  
 
 Group representation rights are often 
defended as a response to some systemic 
disadvantage or barrier on the political 
process which makes it impossible for a 
group’s views and interests to be effec-
tively represented...The point here is not 
that the legislature should mirror society, 
but rather that the historical domination of 
some groups by others has left a trail of 
barriers and prejudices that makes it diffi-
cult for historically disadvantaged groups 
to participate effectively in the political 
process (Kymlicka 1995a:141). 
 
The second mechanism for determining a 
group’s interest suggested by Phillips, is 
to strengthen group organisations, through 
funding for advocacy groups, for example 
(Kymlicka 1995a:141), or otherwise ‘help 
provide means of communication, places 
to get together, opportunities for meeting 
and deciding group goals’ (Phillips 1995: 
54). In other words, the claim to represent 
a group and the degree of accountability 
to the group depends on the degree of 
self-organisation of the group. The larger 
the group, the less conceivable it is to 
organise a process for determining the 
interest of the group (op.cit.:55). Phillips 
is therefore cautious in basing the justifi-
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cation for presence on an idea of group 
representation. She (op.cit.:171) argues 
that guaranteed representation, in addition 
‘a mismatch between voters and those 
who represent them’, must be based on 
analysing the existing structures of exclu-
sion, such as (op.cit.:171) ‘the historical 
foundation of particular nations, which 
built themselves on denying racial equal-
ity’. Guatemala seems to fit this latter 
case rather well.  
A way to deal with the exclusion or 
underrepresentation of particular groups 
in elected bodies is ‘redistricting’, which 
is usually associated with the USA. This 
means that borders of electoral districts 
are redrawn so that there will be a major-
ity of members from the excluded group 
in a number of districts. Some of my 
informants argued that the borders of the 
departments should be redrawn so that 
they correspond with the Mayan linguistic 
groups. However, 7 of the 22 Depart-
ments have a Mayan majority, and 7 more 
have approximately equal numbers of 
Maya and Ladino (Cojtí 1997a:29), and 
these are all multi-member electoral dis-
tricts, so it is uncertain whether this 
redrawing would actually change the pos-
sibilities to any significant extent. More-
over, this proposal can only be a limited 
solution, because many of the Mayan 
groups are too small in numbers to have a 
reasonable claim to their own electoral 
district, at least considering the size of the 
Congress today. For these, a possibility 
could be to establish alternative mechan-
isms of consultation. Another problem is 
to determine the number of seats that 
should be reserved for the Maya. Propor-
tionality is problematic because it seems 
to presuppose the idea of ‘mirror repre-
sentation’ or ‘essentialism’. Kymlicka 
(1995a:146) suggests giving the relevant 
groups a ‘threshold number of representa-
tives’, which means that each of the rele-
vant groups is given the number of seats 
needed to reflect its interests effectively. 
Generally, the more deliberative and con-
sensus-based the decision-making proce-
dure, the fewer seats needed. It is difficult 
to determine what this would imply in the 
Guatemalan case, but the members of 
Congress I spoke with underlined that the 
decision-making practices there were not 
very consensus-based. 
Phillips (1995) provides four argu-
ments why presence and not just the re-
presentation of interest matters. The first 
is the argument of the necessity of recog-
nition for individual self-esteem, which I 
presented in chapter 2. In Guatemala, the 
state’s policy towards the indigenous has 
been paternalistic, and the exclusion of 
the indigenous has been legitimised by re-
ferring to them as intellectually inferior 
and incapable of knowing their own best. 
‘Presence’ may therefore be necessary to 
‘reverse previous histories of exclusion 
and the way these constituted certain 
kinds of people as less suited to govern 
than the rest’ (op.cit.:40), even if the 
inclusion of previously excluded groups 
does not change the actual content of 
policy.  
The second reason why presence mat-
ters is that elected representatives only 
‘represent their constituents on the issues 
that were explicitly debated in the course 
of the election campaign. On everything 
else, the representatives have to fall back 
on their own judgement or their own pre-
judice’ (op.cit.:43). Since the electorate 
cannot possibly know the opinions of 
their candidates on all issues the electo-
rate needs a more ‘general notion of the 
way they are being represented’ (op.cit.: 
43). Many issues of interest for excluded 
groups are almost never included in the 
party electoral programmes or on the leg-
islative agenda. If the representatives 
share some important characteristics with 
their constituency, such as ethnic identity, 
then it is more likely that the opinions of 
the representatives will cohere with that 
of their constituency. Shared identity then 
serves as a kind of safeguard.  
The third reason is that excluded or 
disadvantaged groups need more efficient 
advocates in the political arena. Many 
issues only arise after elections, and are 
weighted against others in the deliberati-
ons and negotiations of policy-making in 
the legislative assemblies and the govern-
ment. The discretionary powers of judici-
aries and political administrations also 
affect outcomes. In these cases, it ‘matters 
immensely who the representatives are’ 
(op.cit.:44). 
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Lastly, people tend to adapt their 
expectations to the opportunities they per-
ceive. Such perceptions are often the pro-
duct of unjust conditions. Phillips (op.cit.: 
44-45) therefore argues that ‘if we take 
the preferences that are expressed through 
the mechanism of the vote as the final 
word on what governments should or 
should not do, we may be just condemn-
ing large sections of the community to 
persistently unjust conditions…It is only 
when people are more consistently present 
in the process of working out alternatives 
that they have much chance of challeng-
ing the dominant conventions’. There is a 
significant element of social construction 
in political options, and presence may 
help ensure that other options than those 
already dominant emerge. In short, 
Phillips (op.cit.:182) underlines that the 
main argument for presence is that ‘exist-
ing structures of power and representation 
have denied the pertinence of excluded 
perspectives and concerns’. Several of my 
informants justified quotas of representa-
tion for the Maya by underlining how 
Mayan culture represents ethical values 
different from Ladino culture. Presence, 
according to this argument, may trans-
form current policies and political agen-
das by bringing in new perspectives.  
As argued in chapter 3, it can be diffi-
cult to determine which groups are exclu-
ded, in other words which groups are 
entitled to guaranteed ‘presence’ or quo-
tas. Iris Marion Young (1989:265) lists a 
number of excluded groups that leaves out 
only able-bodied white men (Kymlicka 
1995a). However, as Phillips (1995:46) 
notes, ‘equality does not require propor-
tionality according to each and every 
characteristic’. Phillips (op.cit.:167-8) 
emphasises that policy recommendations 
should depend on the nature of the exclu-
ded group. Concerning ethnic groups, she 
is particularly sceptic to quotas, because 
she argues that no society can be clearly 
divided into a finite number of ethnic 
groups, and new groups are ‘continually 
being created’. Ethnic groups can always 
be divided into new subgroups, thus creat-
ing new minorities and majorities, so that 
‘ethnic quotas will always fail to capture 
the diversity of ethnic identities’ (op.cit.: 
168). Her suggestion is therefore to focus 
on targets and proportionality in stead of 
quotas, though she underlines that this 
may be insufficient to deal with current 
situations of exclusion. Applied to Guate-
mala, this would imply maintaining 
today’s electoral system, while establish-
ing voluntary targets of indigenous pre-
sence for the parties, the government, and 
the administration.  
Three frequently used arguments 
against presence (Phillips op.cit.) are first 
that the focus on presence may politicise 
group difference and disrupt political 
cohesion and stability, second, that it may 
weaken accountability, and third, that the 
focus on group interest may undermine 
the common good. The first of these will 
be discussed in section 4.6. The second 
depends on how group interest is deter-
mined. If groups are organised in such a 
way that a reasonable consensus on what 
the interests of the group are can be 
reached, then presence may in fact in-
crease accountability. As to the last argu-
ment, it is possible, as Phillips underlines 
that as long as the perspectives of margi-
nalised groups remain excluded, public 
discussion of the ‘common good’ are 
likely to represent the interests and per-
ceptions of only a limited part of the 
population. 
What then about veto rights? Veto 
clearly presupposes that a group’s inter-
ests can be defined, and the two ways to 
define it were mentioned above: the rejec-
ted ‘essentialist subject’, or a reasonable 
way to organise the determination of a 
group’s interest. Another problem with 
veto is that of determining its scope. The 
ILO Convention no. 169 states that the 
indigenous have a right to be consulted on 
all issues that affect them. This could 
hardly be the basis for veto, because, as 
one of my informants argued, the size and 
diversity of the Mayan population make it 
difficult to find any issue which does not 
affect them. What seems to follow from 
Kymlicka’s framework is that veto should 
be limited to those issues that directly 
affect the survival of Maya culture. 
Phillips’s main argument for presence, 
that of including previously excluded per-
spectives, is irrelevant in this case, unless 
veto also includes the right to decide 
which issues are to be included on the 
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political agenda (and not just veto on the 
issues already included). 
Where does the above discussion leave 
us in the choice between ‘presence’ and 
‘non-discrimination’ in Guatemala? The 
arguments for special representation 
rights in the form of quotas of ‘presence’ 
or vetoes are problematic. On the other 
hand, is ‘non-discrimination’ sufficient to 
remedy the current racism and exclusion 
of the indigenous in Guatemala? Discri-
mination is not the only explanation for 
the indigenous people’s political margi-
nalisation. Another cause lies in Guate-
mala’s general political problems such as 
the complexity of the voter registration 
process,48 inaccessibility or geographical 
distance from the voting localities 
(IRELA 1995), and an illiteracy rate of 
perhaps 70% among the indigenous (Cojtí 
1997a). Unrepresentative candidates, au-
thoritarian and poorly organised political 
parties, corruption and broken electoral 
promises, authoritarianism and abuse of 
power in the public institutions contribute 
to creating distrust in the political system. 
Fear of participation that lingers on from 
the war, cultural and linguistic differences 
that hinder communication, and the exi-
stence of a parallel system of political 
authority in many communities, are other 
factors that are likely to contribute to one 
of the lowest electoral turnouts in the 
Americas.49 It is possible, indeed likely, 
that the effective implementation of laws 
against discrimination, as well as effective 
measures against the above problems will 
increase Mayan presence in the insti-
tutions of the Guatemalan state. Measures 
that are required by or in correspondence 
with ‘non-discrimination’ thus in them-
selves imply great changes in Guatemala, 
though it is uncertain whether these will 
be sufficient in themselves. 
                                                     
48 I had the privilege of being an observer at the 7 
November, 1999 elections with the Organisa-
tion of American States and could observe and 
discuss some of the difficulties mentioned 
above. 
49 The proportion of registered voters participating 
in the most recent electoral events was: referen-
dum 1994: 15.9%, general elections 1995: 
46.8%, presidential round-up 1995: 36.9%, 
municipal election 1998: 39.1%, referendum 
1999: 18.6%, general elections 1999: 53.3% 
(TSE 1999).  
4.4 Local Government, 
Community Law, and Local 
Autonomy in Guatemala 
We are generating little by little 
the spaces that correspond  to us, 
but that they never have given us. 
Mayan mayor, 2 December 1997. 
 
The municipality is a central concern 
when discussing multicultural democracy 
in Guatemala today. Mayan identity is 
probably first and foremost linked to the 
municipality (Ekern 1998:69), and it is 
also believed that public trust, among both 
indigenous and non-indigenous is greater 
in local government than in central gov-
ernment and the political parties (ASIES 
et al. 1998). The Guatemalan state is divi-
ded into 22 departments and 330 munici-
palities. The President appoints the 
governors of the departments, whereas the 
municipal mayors are elected in propor-
tional majoritarian elections on four-year 
terms. About 70 municipalities, or 
approximately half the municipalities with 
a large proportion of Maya, have Mayan 
mayors (de Paz 1993). When making 
recommendations on the design of institu-
tions, we need to consider local condi-
tions, historic background, and possible 
future consequences (Dahl 1989:192, 
Phillips 1995:170). I will therefore exa-
mine the relevance of cultural difference 
for local institutions and local participa-
tion in mainly Mayan areas in Guatemala. 
The indigenous ‘customary law’, 
which is a whole system of traditional and 
consensus-based norms and mechanisms 
for conflict resolution, continues to regu-
late many Mayan communities despite 
centuries of existence of the official 
system of justice. These customary norms 
are generally not codified or written 
down, and they may vary between and 
within particular communities. Most 
Mayan communities have had institutions 
that have been linked indirectly to the 
Ladino-dominated state, such as the 
‘Cofradía’50 or the ‘Consejo de los Princi-
                                                     
50 The ‘Cofradías’ were religious brotherhoods 
which centred on the worship of a particular 
saint. Though primarily a religious institution, 
the ‘Cofradías’ had great political and cultural 
impact on many Mayan communities (Rojas 
Lima 1988). The ‘Councils of the Elders’ were 
institutions composed of older male dignitaries, 
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pales’ (Council of the Elders). These have 
exercised authority within the Mayan 
communities according to Mayan traditio-
nal norms and values. The indigenous 
institutions have channelled information 
and contact between the local indigenous 
communities and the official authorities, 
and may be seen both as a form of indirect 
rule of the indigenous communities by the 
state, and as a way for these communities 
to amplify their margins of autonomy. 
The legal status of the ‘Consejos de los 
Principales’ ended in 1944 in all munici-
palities with more than 10,000 inhabi-
tants, but they continued as ‘Alcaldías 
Auxiliares’, i.e. municipal authorities 
regulating the indigenous communities 
internally. In 1980, during the counter-
insurgency, they were converted into 
‘Development Committees’ (Comités de 
desarrollo), and many of them were usur-
ped by military commissioners and by 
local military patrols: i.e. the ‘Patrullas de 
Autodefensa Civil’ of the army and to a 
smaller extent by the ‘Fuerzas Irregulares 
Locales’ of the guerrillas. These instituti-
ons continue in existence in many Mayan 
communities despite being officially abol-
ished, and in some communities they are 
the principal institution for conflict-reso-
lution (Sieder 1996:82-4). 
The Guatemalan state’s policy from 
the nineteenth century of introducing a 
uniform system of law and authority has 
only to a limited degree succeeded. The 
inability of the state to exercise significant 
influence over many Mayan communities 
is largely due to the inefficiency of the 
state, cultural difference and distrust in 
the public institutions, geographical dis-
tance, and of 400 years of existence of a 
system of parallel government. Sieder 
(1996:45-7) argues that the relation 
between customary law and the national 
justice system is dynamic, and the two sy-
stems influence each other. The national 
system limits the autonomy of the local 
legal practice, and individuals utilise and 
internalise both types of law. Though 
customary law is subordinated to the offi-
cial legal system, it can be understood as 
an attempt by the local communities to 
                                                                     
appointed because of the services they had pro-
vided for the community. A main function of 
these was to resolve local conflicts. 
adapt the legal norms of the state to their 
own needs, values, and structures. How-
ever, the state ‘generally defines the limits 
of what the communities may or may not 
define as local practice’ (op.cit.:104).  
The recognition of customary law is 
salient among the demands of the indigen-
ous organisations in Guatemala today. It 
entails that formal law should reflect local 
customs of conflict resolution and deci-
sion-making that are in vigour in the indi-
genous communities. Official recognition 
of customary law implies self-government 
rights because it implies that the com-
munities in question would be ruled 
according to their own decision-making 
procedures. The incorporation of custo-
mary law into the legal system of the state 
was included in the proposals for constitu-
tional reforms that were rejected in the 
May 1999 Referendum. The proposal 
stated that the state should ‘recognise, re-
spect and protect the traditional authori-
ties of the indigenous communities’, and 
that customary law should apply only for 
internal matters of the indigenous com-
munities. Its application should be volun-
tary and restricted by ‘fundamental rights 
as they are defined in national law and 
international human rights conventions 
ratified in Guatemala’ and by effects on 
‘third party interests’. This proposal was 
controversial, and critics argued that it 
implied the introduction of a dual legal 
system in Guatemala and hence legal 
chaos. However, as one of my informants 
argued, the official institutionalisation of 
community law does not necessarily 
imply change, but rather recognition of 
what is already there. The United Nations 
are clear about the requirements concern-
ing community law in Guatemala: 
 
 The agreement on Indigenous Rights, 
convention No. 169 and article 58 of the 
Constitution are the foundations for insti-
tutional recognition of the law practised by 
the indigenous peoples. The procedure and 
mechanisms for this recognition were ana-
lysed and discussed in the framework of 
the peace process, and it is for the Con-
gress to issue the rules for co-ordination to 
ensure that indigenous communities are 
recognised as being entitled to manage 
their internal affairs in accordance with 
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customary law. The indigenous peoples 
must participate in this process. Indigen-
ous law will continue to be an effective 
tool for conflict resolution, especially 
when the authorities and procedures are 
clearly identified (United Nations 1998:8). 
 
One of the difficulties in incorporating 
customary law into formal law is that cus-
tomary law might vary throughout the 
Guatemalan territory. Given the great 
diversity of local norms and practices, the 
task of harmonising different varieties of 
customary law may prove impossible. A 
solution to this is to decentralise so that 
law can vary regionally according to local 
customs. This is common in federal 
systems, such as the USA, were both state 
and federal powers have the right to 
legislate, but in different areas. 
A second problem with customary law 
is that, at least theoretically, it may not 
conform to the Guatemalan Constitution 
or to international human rights. Custo-
mary law could theoretically in certain 
cases be invoked to defend illiberal practi-
ces.51 Examples here are the expulsion of 
groups or individuals from the community 
or imposing sanctions on someone accus-
ed of performing witchcraft (Sieder 1996: 
113). An issue that is sometimes connec-
ted to customary law in Guatemala is the 
lynchings (extrajudicial executions) of 
presumed criminals throughout the Guate-
malan countryside. This phenomenon has 
increased rapidly since the signing of the 
Peace Accords, and a Guatemalan news-
paper (Siglo Veintiuno 1998b) reported a 
total of 123 lynchings in 1997 and 1998 
together. Many of my informants denied 
that the lynchings had anything to do with 
customary law, and this view is corrobo-
rated by the United Nations (1995:5). 
They argued that the lynchings in general 
were due to the current climate of insecur-
ity; the corruption and inefficiency of the 
                                                     
51 Kymlicka (1995a:38-40) discusses the tension 
between Indian self-government and the respect 
for federal Bill/Charter of Rights in the USA 
and Canada. Bordewitch (1997) likewise dis-
cusses examples where it has been impossible 
to pursue cases of homicide because of the 
complexities in the relationship between indi-
genous self-government rights and state/federal 
legislation in the USA. 
justice system were mentioned as another 
cause.  
Nevertheless, community law is more 
than what members of these communities 
argue it ought to be; it includes the actual 
practices in these communities. Opinions 
on what constitutes community law may 
also vary between different members of a 
community. Thus, in a male-dominated 
society, relations between the sexes may 
be seen as harmonious by men, while 
women in the same society may experi-
ence them as unequal and exploitative. 
Sieder (1996:52) underlines that ‘within 
as well as outside the indigenous com-
munities the laws and costumes, as well 
as the rights and traditions, are constitu-
tive aspects of the relations of power and 
the negotiation of justice’.52 Compliance 
with international human rights norms is 
therefore explicitly asked for in the ILO 
Convention no. 169 and is also supported 
by members of the Mayan movement. 
Bhikhu Parekh (1993:171) likewise 
underlines the need for a common norma-
tive framework in states which have 
plural legal systems when he suggests that 
any state ‘should be free to allow its con-
stituent communities to retain their differ-
ent laws and practices, so long as these 
conform to clearly laid down and natio-
nally accepted principles of justice and 
fairness’. 
It could also be difficult to draw the 
line between community law and law that 
is to be valid in the country as a whole. 
For example, which crimes are to be pun-
ished according to community law and 
which are to be punished according to 
country-wide law? Institutions that are 
given powers to mediate between the two 
systems of law, and make decisions on 
contentious issues would have to be cre-
ated. Such institutions would need equit-
able representation of both the indigenous 
and the non-indigenous. Sieder (1996: 
116-7) underlines the flexibility of com-
munity law, a flexibility that can be lost if 
community norms are formalised and 
institutionalised through incorporation 
                                                     
52 Thus, Richard Wilson (1999) in a lecture at the 
University of Oslo associated community law 
with ‘armed middle-aged men’, i.e. that armed 
groups which originated during the war consti-
tute the de facto authorities within many com-
munities. 
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into the official legal system. Community 
customs and norms, she argues, change 
constantly, and it is therefore better to 
emphasise the procedural norms (the 
mechanisms for decision-making and con-
flict resolution) than the substantive 
norms (for example, what constitutes a 
criminal offence).  
Another complexity in incorporating 
community law into the official legal 
system derives from the traditional Maya 
conception of authority (Ekern 1998, 
Sieder 1996). Authority is gained by pro-
viding service to the community, by con-
forming to the norms of a morally correct 
behaviour, and by possessing an accumu-
lated experience in life (which explains 
the high regard for the elderly in many 
Mayan communities). This notion of 
authority thus differs from democratic 
concepts, where authority is intrinsic to 
and equal for each individual, and is 
vested in individual persons through elec-
tions where the right to run for office is 
equal for all. How can these be com-
bined? Some of my informants suggested 
the phenomenon of ‘double elections’, 
which occurs in the province of 
Totonicapán, for example. In these com-
munities, which are completely indigen-
ous, local authorities are first elected 
according to traditional Mayan consensus-
based norms and depending on the ser-
vices they have provided to the commun-
ity. The elected individuals are then voted 
into municipal office through official 
elections. The same individuals are thus 
elected twice, the second time only to 
conform to the formal requirements of the 
official democratic procedure.  
Community-based forms of decision-
making are often consensus-based, or they 
have at least consensus as a goal. Public 
discussion is one frequently used mechan-
ism to reach decisions and can be both a 
‘corrective space, a form of mediation, 
and sometimes a moral sanction in them-
selves’ (Sieder op.cit.:91). Women are 
often excluded from participating in these 
discussion (Mydske 1998, Sieder op.cit.: 
92-3). Mayan rituals and religious beliefs, 
which have experienced a process of revi-
talisation in the 1990s, are based on and 
reaffirm notions of mutual obligation and 
reciprocity (Ekern 1998, Sieder 1996, 
Wilson 1995). Whereas Mayan commun-
ity law focuses on the cause of an offence 
or conflict and seeks restoration through 
the participation of the conflicting parties, 
official Guatemalan law leaves decisions 
to the judge or the jury and classifies 
offences strictly according to a predeter-
mined set of criteria. In the Guatemalan 
national legal system, a confession is an 
indication of culpability, whereas for the 
Maya the acceptance of blame or respon-
sibility is a first step towards restitution 
and reconciliation (Sieder 1996:113-6). 
When procedural mechanisms are consen-
sus-based and non-excluding they may be 
compatible with a democratic processes. 
The municipalities I studied53 suggest 
the perceptual roles assigned to indigen-
ous and non-indigenous in Guatemalan 
politics. For many Ladino it seems that 
achieving political positions of power and 
being indigenous is incompatible (Cojtí 
1997b:10). In their perception, politics at 
the national level, and locally in the areas 
with a large proportion of Ladino, is the 
exclusive domain of the non-indigenous. 
When this boundary is challenged and the 
indigenous fail to conform to these per-
ceptions, resistance is generated. In 1995, 
for the first time ever, a Maya won the 
elections in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala’s 
second largest city. The victory of the 
civil committee Xel-Jú had great symbolic 
importance in a town with approximately 
50% Ladino population. Soon after taking 
power, the Mayor Rigoberto Quemé, a 
K’ichee Maya, was confronted with an 
anonymous campaign aimed at destabilis-
ing his city council. The campaign was 
explicitly racist, and soon reached such 
proportions that both international and 
Guatemalan organisations intervened in 
support of Quemé. For example, a Guate-
malan general publicly demanded that the 
local Ladino that were believed to be 
behind the campaign should stop it, or a 
war between ethnic groups could be 
provoked.54 It seems clear that for many 
Ladino in Quetzaltenango the idea of 
being ruled by an indigenous was unac-
                                                     
53 I conducted various interviews and revised 
documents in the municipalities of 
Totonicapán, Sololá and Quezaltenango in 
Guatemala, during November and December of 
1997. 
54 Various informants. 
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ceptable, despite the fact that Quemé’s 
city council and the Xel-Jú committee had 
various Ladino members.  
In Sololá, the victory of the civil com-
mittee in the elections in 1995 was not 
well received among Sololá’s Ladino 
population. Even if Ladino rejection was 
not organised in the way it had been in 
Quetzaltenango, distrust and antipathy 
were widely expressed, also in conversa-
tion with local Maya. Clearly racist ex-
pressions like ‘how is it possible that ‘‘a 
child’’ (a Maya) won the election’, were 
frequent. Another frequently used state-
ment was that ‘now the guerrilla has 
won’,55 signalling how the guerrilla insur-
rection is perceived in ethnic terms among 
the local Ladino. The idea of being ruled 
by Mayans was as hard to accept as in 
Quetzaltenango. Another example is the 
Guatemalan winner of the Nobel’s Peace 
Prize Rigoberta Menchú Tum. As an indi-
genous woman from a rural background, 
she was (and still is) not acceptable as a 
prize-winner  according to many Ladino 
because she challenges the established 
concepts of what an indigenous (and a 
woman) ought to be and do. Thus, when 
Menchú was launched as a candidate for 
the prize a group of Ladino proposed a 
Ladino woman as an alternative candi-
date. Menchú is also the subject of much 
mockery with a racist content. The only 
Mayan minister since the reintroduction 
of democracy, Celestino Tay Coyoy, was 
also confronted with a campaign against 
him with a clear racist content (Bastos and 
Camus 1995:139-3).56 
There are, however, other ways to 
achieve power for the indigenous which 
do not generate the same amount of resi-
stance. CDRO (La Cooperación para el 
Desarrollo Integral Rural del Occidente) 
is a large indigenous organisation in the 
department of Totonicapán. By building 
on traditional Mayan community practices 
and by maintaining distance from the 
municipal administration, CDRO is aim-
ing to ‘substitute the state’.57 The idea is 
                                                     
55 Various informants, Sololá, December 1997. 
56 Based on the revision of various newspaper 
articles from Prensa Libre, Siglo Veintiuno, El 
Periódico and La Prensa Gráfica, 1993-95. 
57 In addition to the interviews, this position was 
also explained by CDRO’s former Director 
Benjamín Son Turnil during his intervention at 
to provide the citizens with basic services 
such as education and health, particularly 
in the rural areas where the state has 
largely failed to provide them. This ‘sub-
stitution of the state’ is already taking 
place with funds both from the Guate-
malan state and from international donors, 
but according to an organisational model 
which diverges from that of the state by 
including traditional Mayan forms of 
authority and decision-making (Ekern 
1998). Carol Smith (1991:33) may there-
fore be mistaken when she expresses 
scepticism as to whether a focus on local 
politics as a potential for ‘transforming 
the oppressive conditions suffered by the 
vast majority of the Maya’. 
Summarising, the municipality is the 
main reference for indigenous participa-
tion in and interaction with the Guate-
malan state; it also serves to give many 
Mayan communities a certain margin of 
autonomy. It should be noted that when 
the indigenous gain power locally, new 
excluded minorities could be created, 
such as what happened to the Ladino in 
Sololá when the civil committee gained 
the election in 1995. Throughout the last 
years there have been numerous reports in 
Guatemalan newspapers of inter- and 
intra-municipal conflicts that have led to 
violence. This indicates that the current 
mechanisms for deliberation and the reso-
lution of conflicts sometimes are insuffi-
cient. The challenges facing municipal 
governments in Guatemala today are 
great. Municipal finances are limited, and 
though decentralisation has been a priority 
of the current government (Gálvez et al. 
1999), this process has yielded few 
results.58  
‘Recognition’ is coherent with the 
introduction of parallel legal systems for 
members of different ethnic groups, and 
this can be seen as a type of self-govern-
ment right. Legal pluralism is much more 
problematic when it comes to ‘non-discri-
mination’. According to the latter, if legal 
pluralism is introduced, the application of 
these norms must be at the very least 
based on individual choice. Thus, whether 
                                                                     
the ‘Guatemala – Dilemmas in Democrati-
sation’ seminar held in Oslo, 7-8 May 1999. 
58 Conversation with Víctor Gálvez Borrell at the 
research institute FLACSO, November 1999. 
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a particular individual wishes to be judged 
according to Maya tradition or the current 
legal norms of the Guatemalan state, must 
be for that person to decide. Individual 
choice avoids essentialising identity, 
thereby reducing the chance that commu-
nity-based norms can be used locally to 
exclude particular individuals who do not 
conform to the established criteria for 
group membership.  
4.5  Indigenous Self-Government 
in Guatemala  
The leading Mayan intellectual Demetrio 
Cojtí (1997a:67-72) argues that the Maya 
and Ladino are two distinct peoples, both 
of which have the right to self-govern-
ment. Cojtí (1997a) characterises today’s 
situation in Guatemala as one of ‘internal 
colonialism’, which means that one self-
governing people is annexed and oppres-
sed by another. The relationship between 
these two peoples should instead be based 
on voluntary contract. Cojtí (op.cit. and 
1996c:89) concludes on the basis of these 
assumptions that the current territorial 
organisation of the Guatemalan state is 
oppressive; the organisation of political-
administrative borders of the state accord-
ing to ethnic and linguistic groups is a 
right that follows from the status of the 
Maya as a self-governing people. The 
Accord on Identity similarly proposes that 
education, health services and cultural-
policies should be decentralised according 
to linguistic criteria. Plant (1997), on the 
other hand, argues that the geographical 
distinctions of the linguistic communities 
are breaking down due to rural colonisa-
tion initiatives and postwar resettlement, 
and hence such a redrawing of the borders 
would be difficult or impossible. More-
over, more than 15% of all Maya live in 
multi-lingual areas in Guatemala City.59 
What support for these claims to self-
government for the Maya can be found in 
the discussion in this and the previous 
chapters? My discussion of the implica-
tion  of the two approaches has so far 
been inconclusive. Robert Dahl (1989) 
proposes that the optimal equilibrium of 
two conditions should be the justification 
of a democratic process. These two condi-
                                                     
59 Richard Wilson, lecture given at the University 
of Oslo, 1 September 1999. 
tions are: the greatest possible weight of 
each citizen in the decision-making 
together with the greatest possible influ-
ence of each citizen over issues that are of 
particular importance to him or her. ‘The 
result may well be a complex system with 
several or many layers of democratic gov-
ernment’ (op.cit.:205). Dahl (op.cit:207-9) 
suggests seven criteria for deciding when 
a democratic process is justified in the 
sense of approximating the equilibrium of 
the two conditions above. These criteria 
may help determine whether a certain 
group is entitled to its own democratic 
autonomous organisation or unit. Can the 
Mayan claims to autonomy be said to 
satisfy these criteria? 
 
1. The domain and scope can be clearly 
identified. The domain refers to who a 
democratic process includes, whereas the 
scope refers to the number or comprehen-
siveness of the issues concerned by a par-
ticular process. There seems to me to be 
no single preferable answer to the ques-
tion of which type of units should possess 
self-government: the Mayan and Ladino 
‘people’, the linguistic groups, the depart-
ments, or the municipalities. The domain 
could be limited to those Guatemalans 
who voluntarily define themselves as 
Maya, which is feasible if self-govern-
ment is organised on a non-territorial 
basis (separate institutions for each group 
within the same geographic area). That 
would still leave out the question of what 
the ideal distribution of power and com-
petencies between different levels of 
government would be. The identification 
of the scope is also problematic. For 
example, the argument that it should be 
limited to issues that have an implication 
on the survival of particular cultures is 
rather vague. It could for instance be 
argued that most or all social and econo-
mic issues have implications for the sur-
vival of cultures. It therefore seems that 
for the case of the indigenous in Guate-
mala, the satisfaction of this criterion is 
problematic. 
 
2. The people in the proposed domain 
strongly desire political autonomy with 
respect to matters falling within the pro-
posed scope. If self-government was orga-
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nised on a territorial basis, the Ladino 
residing within these territories would 
most certainly object to being part of an 
indigenous self-governing unit. On the 
other hand, if self-government is non-ter-
ritorial (separate institutions for each 
group), and voluntary (individuals may 
choose which set of institutions they 
belong to), then the issue of Ladino min-
orities is less relevant. There exist no opi-
nion polls indicating the strength of the 
wish for autonomy among the Maya, and 
the demands for autonomy are being 
articulated by a small fraction of the 
Mayan population that does not resemble 
the majority of the Maya very much. The 
Mayan organisations’ popular base is 
often weak, as the very leaders of these 
organisations often willingly admit, even 
if this does not mean that the Mayan orga-
nisational leadership is incapable of 
expressing the interests of the Mayan 
majorities. Moreover, there has yet to 
emerge an indigenous political alternative 
at the national level which could, if it 
reached a significant amount of indigen-
ous support, express some claim to repre-
sent an indigenous point of view. 
However, given the current situation of 
exclusion, Guatemala’s long history of 
oppressive dictatorship, and Mayan auto-
nomous traditions at the local level, it 
could be assumed that increased self-
government would correspond with the 
wishes of at least a significant proportion 
of the indigenous in Guatemala today. 
 
3. The people in the proposed domain 
strongly desire to govern themselves 
according to the democratic process and 
4. The proposed scope is within justifiable 
limits, in the sense that it does not violate 
primary political rights (a restatement of 
the third criterion) or other fundamental 
rights and values. Both the Peace Accords 
and the leaders of the Mayan movement 
strongly emphasise that Mayan self-
government should be subject to inter-
national human rights doctrines. This 
would of course not guarantee that the 
power of self-government would never be 
abused, particularly taking into account 
Guatemala’s weak democratic traditions. 
The practices of ‘community law’ may 
also in certain cases be in conflict with 
liberal democratic ideals. However, rein-
forcing the accountability of government 
through decentralisation and increased 
possibilities for participation may im-
prove the actual situation. 
 
5. Within the proposed scope, the interests 
of the persons in the proposed unit are 
strongly affected by decisions over which 
they have no significant control. Dahl 
(1989:208) argues that ‘...claims to the 
right to participate in important decisions 
might best be satisfied in some cases by 
including those who are now excluded 
from an existing unit...’ One of the strong-
est bases for Mayan claims for political 
reform is the Mayan de facto exclusion 
from political influence over decisions 
that significantly affect them, and there 
can be little doubt that the Maya are 
affected by the decisions in those areas 
which the Mayan organisations argue 
should fall under the scope of local auto-
nomy. 
 
6. Consensus among the persons whose 
interests are significantly affected will be 
higher than it would be with any other 
feasible boundaries. Dahl (op.cit.) argues 
that consensus enhances freedom because 
it permits more persons to do what they 
want to do. A condition for reaching con-
sensus is communication. Communication 
and mutual understanding are enhanced 
by sharing a language and cultural ele-
ments, which may favour the organisation 
of the territory according to linguistic 
group and decentralisation. However, as 
noted earlier, many Mayan communities 
today are characterised both by conflict 
and consensus. Moreover, the divergence 
of interest between an urbanised, intellec-
tual elite and the poor highland peasants is 
arguably as great as between the rural 
poor Ladino and Maya. 
 
7. Measured by all the relevant criteria, 
the gains must outweigh the cost. This cri-
terion is largely the product of the six pre-
vious ones in addition to considerations of 
economic efficiency and the cost and 
gains for communication, negotiation, and 
administration. For example, it can be 
argued that establishing separate instituti-
ons for different groups is economically 
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costly and inefficient. In federal systems, 
the co-ordination between the different 
levels of government is often problema-
tic.60 Of the above criteria, that of identi-
fying the scope and the domain of self-
government seems the most problematic 
to fulfil. Evidently, many of the costs and 
gains are difficult to quantify, such as 
gains in a person’s self-esteem and 
changes in racist attitudes. Dahl (op. cit.: 
209) underlines that ‘for the most part the 
criteria will require qualitative judge-
ments...it will rarely if ever be possible to 
demonstrate conclusively that one solu-
tion is definitely the best...Every specific, 
concrete and feasible alternative solution 
to the problem of the best unit will 
…almost certainly, on balance benefit the 
interests of some citizens more than 
others’. The choice between ‘recognition’ 
and ‘non-discrimination’ is thus no more 
conclusive on the basis of Dahl’s criteria, 
and I will seek to strike a balance between 
the two in the conclusion. Before that, 
however, I will examine a common con-
cern in debates about multiculturalism and 
justice: how Mayan claims and the two 
approaches to justice in multicultural 
democracies affect political cohesion and 
unity in Guatemala. 
4.6 Multiculturalism, Justice, and 
Unity in Guatemala 
The unity of the state is something 
that is achieved if the members of the 
state see that the state respects their 
particularities. Guatemala today is 
not a state. 
Mayan leader, 16 October 1997. 
 
A prominent concern among those who 
theorise about coexistence and justice in 
multicultural states is that the particularist 
claims of ethnic groups will have negative 
repercussions on political and social unity 
and stability. The realisation of liberal 
values, it is sometimes argued, requires 
that the citizens share a strong sense of 
belonging together, preferably or neces-
sarily a shared ‘national identity’. Andrew 
Mason (1999:263-4) summarises this con-
cern in the four following arguments: 
First, the citizens of a country need a 
                                                     
60 Juan Linz, lecture given at the University of 
Oslo, 8 April 1999. 
shared national identity to avoid aliena-
tion from their political institutions. Only 
if there is a shared identity will the citi-
zens appreciate being part of the same 
political framework. Second, these institu-
tions will be unstable unless the citizens 
share a national identity. Third, it will be 
impossible or at least difficult to reach a 
compromise in the face of existing inter-
ests without the kind of trust between citi-
zens that can only be achieved with the 
existence of a shared national identity. 
Fourth, a shared identity is a precondition 
for widespread support for redistributive 
politics on the grounds of social justice 
and a politics of the common good. These 
arguments are interrelated in various 
ways, and can reinforce each other. For 
example, redistribution and a politics of 
the common good requires a certain 
amount of trust and willingness to com-
promise, while the achievement of the 
common good and redistributive policies 
may again strengthen trust. 
It is sometimes argued in Guatemala 
that the claims of the indigenous will split 
and divide the country.61 A common 
Guatemalan identity, centred on loyalty to 
the Guatemalan state, will never be cre-
ated: on the contrary, whatever exists of a 
feeling of Guatemalanness will be de-
storyed, it is argued. The Guatemalan 
state is fragile, and the realisation of the 
claims of the Maya will be its deathblow. 
Some even believe that the Mayan de-
mands are but a first step in a strategy to 
split Guatemala in half according to eth-
nic identity, creating two separate coun-
tries. Certainly this will lead to resumed 
conflict and bloodshed. The focus on eth-
nic groups and group autonomy will lead 
to increased tensions and a polarisation of 
the society, and perhaps even war. This 
fear is spurred by what is perceived to be 
a proliferation of ethnic conflicts around 
the world. 
Are these fears well founded? Will the 
creation of a multicultural Guatemalan 
state make it impossible to achieve social 
unity? I will argue that these concerns are 
not only largely unjustified in the case of 
Guatemala; the realisation of the indigen-
                                                     
61 See discussion on the critics of the Mayan move-
ment in Warren (1998:chapter 2), and Zapeta 
(1998). 
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ous claims may in fact lead to increased 
unity and solidarity. Even some degree of 
indigenous self-government may streng-
then unity and integration, for reasons 
returned to below.  
First, it should be kept in mind that a 
very substantial part (probably the vast 
majority) of the indigenous demands is 
for increased participation and respect for 
difference within the state’s institutions. 
For example, the issues that concern poly-
ethnic rights clearly reflect a wish to be-
come included in the state, and not the 
opposite (Kymlicka 1995a, 1997). More-
over, the concept of indigenous rights 
within the unity of the Guatemalan state 
underlies both the Peace Accords and the 
current proposal for constitutional re-
forms. Cojtí (1997b:1) argues that there 
exists a certain degree of consensus be-
tween Maya and Ladino that they should 
remain united within the state. A growth 
in the number of indigenous in public 
institutions, both elected and non-elected 
positions, at regional and local as well as 
national level, is likely to increase indi-
genous identification with these instituti-
ons. The indigenous will then get a visual 
manifestation that their faces, clothing, 
language, and so forth are respected by 
and are part of the public institutions. 
Moreover, when the indigenous experi-
ence that their identity and culture do not 
prevent them from competing for public 
positions, it is very likely that their loyalty 
to these institutions will grow. Another 
possible consequence of increased indi-
genous presence in public institutions is 
that the responsiveness of these instituti-
ons to indigenous demands will increase, 
thereby strengthening national unity and 
solidarity. 
Second, satisfying the indigenous de-
mands is a step towards ending the discri-
mination the indigenous are facing. Iris 
Young (1990:164-5) argues that members 
of assimilated groups are unfairly disad-
vantaged because they are forced to learn 
the rules of a game which they had no part 
in devising. Moreover, the members of 
the dominant culture are likely to see their 
culture as universally valid or objectively 
superior, and devalue minority cultures as 
less valuable. Members of minority cul-
tures may also internalise a sense of 
inferiority. Young’s arguments recapture 
the argument of the ‘symbolic’ impor-
tance of politics that I discussed in chapter 
2. In Guatemala, public recognition of the 
equal status of indigenous and non-indi-
genous identities, of the equal value of the 
cultures of these groups, and of the value 
of cultural diversity in general may help 
foster a climate of mutual respect and 
tolerance. Particularly relevant are at-
tempts to reform the education system by 
introducing a more multicultural curricu-
lum and rewriting official versions of his-
tory so as to include the visions of the 
indigenous. Educational reform is not 
only about providing services that corre-
spond with the interests, languages, and 
cultures of individual citizens. It is also a 
tool whereby attitudes and mentalities are 
sought changed, although this is a process 
that is likely to take a long time and 
require a huge educational effort. In this 
context, it should be noted that the Guate-
malan state, through the ratification of the 
ILO Convention no. 169, has committed 
itself to the following: 
 
 Educational measures shall be taken 
among all sections of the national com-
munity, and particularly among those that 
are in most direct contact with the peoples 
concerned, with the object of eliminating 
prejudices that they may harbour in respect 
of these peoples. To this end, efforts shall 
be made to ensure that history textbooks 
and other educational materials provide a 
fair, accurate and informative portrayal of 
the societies and cultures of these peoples 
(ILO Convetion no. 169, article 31). 
 
The maintenance of current patterns of 
political as well as other types of inter-
action between Maya and Ladino is likely 
to maintain current inter-ethnic attitudes 
of racism and discrimination. Political 
change may in this sense be a step 
towards cultural change. 
Third, it can be argued that the questi-
ons need reformulation. Unity and soli-
darity are very limited in Guatemala today 
and are perhaps better seen as something 
to be achieved through future political and 
social reforms. Loyalty to a political order 
can be expected when that order is per-
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ceived as corresponding with the moral 
perceptions of the citizens and when 
policy outcomes are perceived to be in the 
self-interest of the citizens through a fair 
distribution of burdens and benefits. 
Moreover, the continuation of today’s ex-
clusion of and discrimination against the 
indigenous is likely to increase the aliena-
tion of the Maya from the Guatemalan 
political system. In 1991, Carol Smith 
(1991:31) argued that ‘the political pro-
gram promoted by the Maya nationalists 
has grown more radical’. This tendency 
does not seem to have continued, but 
some of the Mayan leaders I interviewed 
expressed considerable impatience with 
the lack of progress in ending exclusion 
and discrimination. A continued failure on 
the part of the Guatemalan state and the 
Guatemalan society in general to meet the 
legitimate and reasonable demands of the 
Mayan movement is, if anything likely to 
radicalise the movement and decrease 
unity. 
Lastly, even the issue that seems to be 
directly at odds with social unity, increas-
ed autonomy for the indigenous, may pro-
duce integration. Kymlicka (1995a: 176-
86) draws a distinction between poly-
ethnic and special representation rights on 
the one hand, and self-government rights 
on the other. While the former generally 
reflects a wish to be integrated into the 
state’s institutions, it is less clear if self-
government will serve that purpose. 
Kymlicka (op.cit.:181-186) argues that 
self-government rights for national min-
orities are unlikely serve an integrative 
function, and he (op.cit.:186) underlines 
how ‘...accepting self-government rights 
is likely to lead to a desire for ever-
increasing autonomy, even independ-
ence’. Glazer (1995:66) likewise 
underlines how the satisfaction of some 
minority demands can lead to an escala-
tion of demands. Moreover, on the 
constructivist account, autonomy may 
serve a disintegrative function to the 
extent that it contributes to the creation or 
reinforcement of group identities, or the 
manipulation of these by ‘ethnic entrepre-
neurs’. 
How can it be that despite these argu-
ments, increased autonomy for the indi-
genous may strengthen unity in Guate-
mala? The Guatemalan state is not only 
frequently criticised for being excessively 
centralised, many Guatemalans also con-
sider it to be inefficient and weak, demon-
strated by its incapacity to provide even 
basic education and health services to all 
its citizens. Self-government therefore not 
only implies formal transfers of power 
from the central government to the muni-
cipalities and regional authorities, it also 
requires building institutions where there 
previously have been none.62 In other 
words, decentralisation, even a federalisa-
tion of the Guatemalan state requires an 
extension of the state apparatus. This buil-
ding up of institutions will draw indigen-
ous communities more closely into 
nation-wide political processes and may 
open up for new possibilities for partici-
pation for the indigenous population in 
general, and for indigenous politicians 
and administrative personnel in particular. 
Participation is likely to increase know-
ledge about political rights, and may force 
individuals to think about politics in a 
larger context by increasing the awareness 
of the consequences of personal and local 
actions for the welfare of the members of 
the larger political unit. Participation can 
thus induce people to transcend traditional 
and localist based ethics, and replace it 
with a more universalist way of seeing 
things.63 
Another consequence is that assuming 
new political responsibilities through de-
centralisation requires building up new 
indigenous organisational capacity. Trans-
fers of new powers and competencies to 
municipalities, local communities or dif-
ferent types of ethnic groups are moreover 
likely to require the adoption of organisa-
tional models and administrative practices 
that in many ways are similar to those of 
the state. Increased participation is also 
likely to draw official decision-making 
mechanisms and administrative practices 
                                                     
62 This was suggested by Stener Ekern. 
63 However, Mydske’s (1998) study of political 
socialisation in different types of non-govern-
mental organisations in Patzún, Guatemala, 
indicates that organisational participation need 
not lead to a socialisation of liberal democratic 
values and practices. Participation may also 
lead to a reproduction of clientelistic and autho-
ritarian political practices, or to the strengthen-
ing of ‘community law’ practices which some-
times are at odds with basic liberal principles. 
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and values more tightly into indigenous 
culture. Autonomy, particularly through 
decentralisation or the creation of a fede-
ration, is likely to imply at least some de-
gree of cultural homogenisation. In short, 
self-government may imply institutional 
integration, greater satisfaction and identi-
fication with the public institutions, 
increased participation, and socialisation 
into a certain mode of doing and thinking 
politics. 
Demands for an independent Mayan 
state are extremely rare, and are often a 
consequence of feelings of frustration 
over the current lack of progress to im-
prove the actual situation.64 Secession is 
neither a viable nor a realistic alternative 
in Guatemala, and it is no solution to the 
challenge of multiculturalism because ‘se-
cession rarely if ever creates homogenous 
nation-states, it simply rearranges the pat-
tern and size of groups’ (Kymlicka 1995a: 
19). Cojtí (1997a:41) nevertheless under-
lines that the reason for a secession of the 
Maya from Guatemala would be that the 
‘Ladino state does not adapt or respond to 
the need of existence and development of 
the Mayan nationalities’. Even if peaceful 
secession may cohere with liberal political 
theory, as long as the rights and liberties 
of individuals are protected, it seems clear 
that many ethnic groups would be unable 
to form viable independent states, and 
competing claims for resources will 
frequently make peaceful secessions 
impossible (Kymlicka 1995a:186). 
Kymlicka’s ‘historic argument’ for 
group-differentiated rights indicated how 
certain groups might have claims to be a 
sovereign ‘people’. The adherence of 
these groups to the state’s institutions is 
conditional on the group’s willingness to 
do so. Juan Linz65 underlines that for a 
federation to work and maintain unity, 
                                                     
64 Donald Horowitz (1994) suggests that the 
groups most likely to secede are those that live 
in an economically backward region within 
their country, and are ‘backward groups’ (in 
terms of possessing relatively fewer university 
graduates, professionals, bureaucrats, salaried 
employment generally and per capita income 
than other groups). Though the Maya are back-
ward in both senses, they seem to disconfirm 
Horowitz’ suggestion since they do not particu-
larly emphasise a separate autonomous region 
within Guatemala, much less a separate state. 
65 Lecture given at the University of Oslo, 8 April 
1999. 
there must be some sense of identity 
between the component units: the mem-
bers of the component units must feel loy-
alty to the federation. There must also be 
a dual identity among the citizens, and 
one identity must not exclude another, but 
there can be a variety of emphases on the 
different identities. Federalism need not 
be a slippery slope towards disintegration, 
but if politicians want to use it to destroy 
political unity, it gives them good oppor-
tunities. Federalism can also be required, 
particularly as a way of keeping larger 
political units together. 
To summarise: unity and solidarity 
will increase in Guatemala when the orga-
nisation, institutional practices, and sym-
bols of the state reflect the interests and 
cultures of the whole and not just part of 
the Guatemalan population. The citizens’ 
willingness to sacrifice for the commun-
ity, for example through paying taxes, 
will grow when the state ceases to be per-
ceived as an instrument for the benefit of 
the few and a vehicle of oppression 
against the many. Solidarity with fellow 
citizens will increase when individual atti-
tudes shift towards tolerance and respect 
for cultural difference. Christine Inglis 
draws the following conclusion from her 
study of the experiences with multicul-
turalism as a policy in Sweden, Canada 
and Australia:  
 
 From the perspectives of members of eth-
nic minorities, the opportunities which 
have existed for them to participate fully in 
society without needing to reject their eth-
nic identity has clearly been a factor en-
couraging a high level of commitment to 
the Australian, Canadian or Swedish soci-
ety and State. From the perspective of the 
dominant ethnic group there has clearly 
been a high level of tolerance and accept-
ance not only of diversity but, also, of the 
advantages which all members of the soci-
ety can gain from it (Inglis 1998:18).  
 
What are the likely consequences of the 
two approaches for political and social 
unity in Guatemala? Both ‘recognition’ 
and ‘non-discrimination’ require ending 
discrimination and the cultural monopoly 
of the Ladino over the Guatemalan State, 
and achieving that is likely to increase 
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unity and solidarity in Guatemala. Group-
differentiated rights, generally required by 
‘recognition’, are also likely to increase 
unity, partly because they reflect a wish to 
integrate, partly because they will have 
integrative consequences. 
On what should unity in multicultural 
democracies be based? Mason (1999) dis-
tinguishes between a sense of belonging 
to a polity versus a sense of belonging to-
gether. When a person has a sense of be-
longing to a polity, she sees the principal 
political institutions and most of their 
practices as valuable and that they reflect 
her interests. A sense of belonging toge-
ther, on the other hand, means that the 
citizens believe there is a reason why they 
should associate together, which is some-
thing more than sharing a set of political 
institutions. A sense of belonging together 
usually implies that the citizens share a 
‘national identity’. Mason mentions the 
USA and Switzerland as countries where 
people share a strong sense of belonging 
to a polity and a weak sense of belonging 
together. 
Kymlicka (1995a:188-9) argues that 
unity in multicultural states requires a 
shared identity and denies the possibility 
of an identity with the state that is not 
related to ‘national identity’. But, as 
Gerald Doppelt (1998:247) points out, 
this assertion is problematic because ‘on 
[Kymlicka’s] conception of identity, the 
only plausible basis for a shared identity is 
nationality. From this conception…it fol-
lows that there is no basis for a shared 
identity among all the citizens of the mod-
ern multinational state’. Ethnic identities, 
understood as a community based on a 
belief in common ancestry, are bound to 
search for their sources and justifications 
for group-based identities and feelings of 
belonging in the past. An identity centred 
on the state, on the other hand, is focused 
on the future, on the common projects of 
its citizens (Adams 1996:49). 
Mason (1999) believes that a liberal 
polity can be viable even if the citizens 
lack a sense of belonging together, as long 
as they have a sense of belonging to it. He 
also (op.cit.:273) underlines that the cre-
ation of a sense of belonging to a polity 
can create or reinforce the sense of 
belonging together. All that is required is 
that different groups share a common fate, 
which can be achieved by belonging to 
the same polity and not being excluded or 
marginalised by its institutions and prac-
tices. When the citizens share a sense of 
belonging to a polity ‘they are more likely 
to accept the authority of those instituti-
ons to resolve any conflicts of interest that 
arise between them and to trust the institu-
tions to do so’ (op.cit.:278). Similarly, 
Habermas (1994:135) argues that a sense 
of belonging to a polity, a sense of ‘con-
stitutional patriotism’ is the only possible 
basis for unity in multicultural societies. 
Mason moreover believes that it is not 
unlikely that there can be a widespread 
consensus on the need for redistributive 
social policies, even if the citizens do not 
converge on principles of social justice. 
Self-interest, humanitarian considerations, 
and the belief that the enjoyment of the 
goods of citizenship requires the fulfil-
ment of basic needs can be reasons why 
redistributive policies enjoy widespread 
support even in the absence of a strong 
national identity. 
Mason (1999:277) argues that a sense 
of belonging to a polity is difficult to 
achieve when the members of a particular 
group feel that certain institutions or prac-
tices are based on their discrimination and 
exploitation. It may nevertheless be pos-
sible that a sense of belonging to a polity 
can be achieved if the institutions are 
changed so as to be perceived as benefi-
cial. Self-determination within a state, in 
Mason’s view, need not run contrary to 
the creation of a sense of belonging to a 
polity because: ‘if members of the com-
munity possess the degree of legal and 
political autonomy they desire, they will 
identify with the constitutional framework 
which provides for it’ (op.cit.:283). This 
contrasts with Kymlicka’s (1995a:181) 
view that: ‘demands for self-govern-
ment…reflect a desire to weaken the 
bonds with the larger political commun-
ity, and indeed question its very authority 
and permanence.’ 
According to Mason (op.cit.:285), 
there are two factors which may make it 
hard to achieve or sustain a widespread 
sense of belonging to a polity: ‘First, 
when one or more of the culturally 
defined groups within it has suffered a 
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history of oppression or unfair treatment 
in which the state is implicated…Second, 
when the particular character of the public 
institutions reflects the dominant culture.’ 
On this background, the Ladino opposi-
tion to the claims of the Maya on the 
grounds of unity seems rather self-contra-
dictory. If unity is the aim, they should 
work towards the eradication of discrimi-
nation and ending the monopoly of 
Ladino culture and language in the Guate-
malan state. In short, unity in Guatemala 
requires the accommodation of difference. 
Chapter 5:   
Conclusion
5.1 ‘Non-Discrimination’ or 
‘Recognition’ for Guatemala? 
 
Based on my discussion so far, I shall 
conclude by attempting to answer the ini-
tial question of this thesis: is ‘recognition’ 
or ‘non-discrimination’ most likely to cor-
respond with liberal equality and political 
unity in Guatemala? From chapter 4 we 
recall that the answer to this question in 
part depends on determining the impor-
tance of particular ethnic identites in a 
society. ‘Recognition’ is typically associ-
ated with countries that are multiethnic, 
not because different groups have chosen 
to move to a new land, but because ‘their 
homeland has been incorporated into a 
larger state’ (Kymlicka 1995b:11). These 
groups are likely to demand political auto-
nomy or self-government and may favour 
a federalisation of or even secession from 
the state in order to ensure continued 
development of their distinctive cultures 
(Kymlicka 1995a:10, Inglis 1998:22). 
Equal treatment is sought through some 
degree of independence from the state’s 
institutions. Glazer (1995:134) argues that 
this approach is appropriate if ‘the model 
that a society has for itself, today and in 
the future, is that of a confederation of 
groups, that group membership is central 
and permanent, and that the divisions 
between groups are such that it is unreal-
istic or unjust to envisage these group 
identities weakening in time to be repla-
ced by common citizenship’.  
‘Non-discrimination’, on the other 
hand, is ‘appropriate whenever the gov-
ernment aims at integrating disparate 
groups into a single national culture’ 
(Kymlicka 1995b:11). It is associated 
with groups that have migrated to a new 
country, and that are likely to seek a state 
that to the largest extent possible is neu-
tral concerning culture. It would seem 
then that since the Maya, Garifuna and 
Xinca were involuntarily incorporated 
into the Guatemalan state, these groups 
would seek an organisation of the state 
according to ‘recognition’. However, the 
claims of the Mayan movement point in 
several directions: some concern social 
and redistributive justice, others concern 
ending discrimination and establishing 
equal opportunities to compete for public 
positions and increased presence in the 
institutions of the Guatemalan state. Only 
a few of their claims concern self-govern-
ment. The claims of the indigenous are 
moreover voiced by a small minority of 
indigenous intellectuals, so it is not clear 
what the majority of the indigenous desire 
in terms of multicultural politics. More-
over, the four so-called ‘peoples’ of 
Guatemala (Maya, Ladino, Garifuna, and 
Xinca) are very diverse and fragmented, 
so it is an open question whether the 
‘basic structure’ of the Guatemalan soci-
ety would consist of these four or some 
other identity based on language, socio-
economic position, religion, etc. In short, 
the choice between ‘recognition’ and ‘dis-
crimination’ cannot be determined simply 
by looking at the ethnic composition of 
Guatemala, nor do the two approaches 
find their justification on this background. 
We need to weigh the normative argu-
ments supporting either of the approaches 
with the characteristics of today’s situ-
ation in Guatemala. I shall therefore brief-
ly summarise the arguments raised for and 
against ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘recogni-
tion’ in the previous discussion and relate 
these to the situation in Guatemala. 
Kymlicka’s principal argument for 
group-differentiated rights, and hence for 
‘recognition’, is that individual freedom 
depends on membership in societal cul-
tures, and that this membership should 
therefore be considered a ‘primary good’. 
I agree with Kymlicka in that our personal 
freedom, our values and beliefs, and our 
capacity to revise these are dependent on 
the cultural context in which we live and 
take part. Due to the importance of culture 
for freedom, Kymlicka argues that certain 
groups are entitled to group-differentiated 
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rights to protect the survival of their cul-
tures. But cultures do not die; they just 
change, and do so constantly.66 Indeed, 
particular traditions, rituals, products, 
music and other aspects of culture may 
disappear when people cease to practice 
or produce them. The state may give 
incentives for the preservation of these 
particular traditions, folklore, and so 
forth, though when the context into which 
they are practised changes, these practices 
are likely to change also. If basic liberal 
values of freedom and equality are 
respected, such cultural changes ought to 
be the consequence of individual choices. 
These changes are therefore not unjust, 
nor do they require any form of 
compensation.  
Seeing the cultural context of particu-
lar individuals as inevitably tied to parti-
cular ethnic identities runs the risk of 
treating cultures as static and self-con-
tained units. As Marco Martinello argues, 
 
 when the political philosopher Kymlicka 
seems to state that the individual must 
generally belong to one culture only and 
display one ethno-national identity, he is 
actually adopting a highly debatable essen-
tialist and primordialist view of culture 
and identity (Martinello 1998:912-3). 
 
Much research on ethnic identity and cul-
ture generally as well as in Guatemala in 
particular indicates how the perceptual 
categories which are used to classify indi-
viduals into ‘people’, ‘linguistic groups’, 
and other type of ethnic categories are 
often strenuously linked to culture under-
stood as what ‘provides its members with 
meaningful ways of life across the whole 
range of human activities’ (Kymlicka 
1995a:76). Moreover, Kymlicka’s (1995a: 
101) claim that it is possible to divide a 
society into a finite number of groups is, 
as argued in chapter three, problematic 
concerning Guatemala. The language of 
rights requires clearly delineated and sta-
tic categories, and it is doubtful at best if 
these can be provided by actual ethnic 
identities in Guatemala. Kymlicka’s 
defence for group-differentiated rights on 
the basis of how individual freedom de-
                                                     
66 Alternatively it could be argued that cultures are 
in a constant process of death and rebirth. 
pends on culture is therefore, on my 
account, problematic. 
Minority groups around the world fre-
quently face discrimination. In some 
places their cultures, customs and religi-
ons are restricted or prohibited. Such 
restrictions and prohibitions are imper-
missible according to a liberal theory of 
politics, unless the cultural practices in 
question violate fundamental human 
rights or some other superior good. In 
numerous other cases, the state privileges 
the majority culture, language, and reli-
gion in various ways, a domination that 
finds scarce support in basic liberal val-
ues, and is frequently the source of injus-
tice. Ending the discrimination often 
implied by majority domination of the 
state is in my understanding required by 
‘non-discrimination’. It is therefore not 
necessarily the case that justice in multi-
cultural societies would require ‘recog-
nition’. 
This, however, does not fully answer 
the issue at hand. Individuals may experi-
ence a situation of disempowerment, 
exclusion, and political marginalisation 
due to their ethnic identity, irrespective of 
whether it is possible to talk of ‘cultural 
debasement or decay’ as a consequence. 
Individual autonomy, essential for both 
political liberalism (Kymlicka 1989, 
1990, 1995a) and democracy (Midgaard 
1996), may thus be impaired. Hence, it 
might be by direct reference to the value 
of autonomy that rectifying measures, 
such as group-differentiated rights, ought 
to be justified, and not by reference to the 
problematic connection between culture, 
autonomy, and ethnic identity. 
Kymlicka’s second principal justifica-
tion of group-differentiated rights is that 
some groups have an historic right to 
define the terms of incorporation into the 
state. Certain groups are sovereign, they 
have rights to self-government that follow 
either from historic treaties that define 
their terms of incorporation, or from being 
involuntarily incorporated into a larger 
political unit. On the historic account, the 
incorporation of the Maya, Xinca, and 
Garifuna into the Guatemalan state was 
involuntary. It is less clear whether it 
would be possible to talk of the Maya as a 
‘people’: the Mayan ‘people’ is best seen 
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as a political aim of the Mayan move-
ment, the outcome of which is yet to be 
seen. As John Watanabe argues,  
 
 pan-Mayanists appeals to a more general-
ised, abstract Mayanness could…easily 
prove too arbitrary – or too politically self-
serving – for local Maya to accept, especi-
ally where so-called primordial Maya 
customs no longer hold sway. Should pan-
Mayanists insist on some singular excoti-
cised Maya identity, unreconstructed Maya 
may simply begin to take them for another 
Ladinised, if now Indianist, elite doing 
what the Ladinos have always done — dic-
tating to the Maya what they are and how 
they should behave (Watanabe 1994:38). 
 
An argument sometimes raised against the 
historic right to self-government is that 
many groups have undergone dramatic 
changes, to the point where they are prac-
tically indistinguishable from the larger 
society in which they live. These changes 
also make the connection between those 
who claim descendancy from historic self-
governing groups and their presumed 
forefathers tenuous. However, this cri-
tique of the historic argument can be 
rejected because it essentialises ethnic 
identity by defining its ‘authenticity’ in 
accordance with some historical standard. 
It may nevertheless be problematic defin-
ing who the self-governing ‘people’ 
should be, and to which particular rights 
they may be entitled.  
What matters on the liberal account is 
that the state respects basic liberal values 
and sticks to its legal commitments, and 
this can in theory be achieved in a unitary 
state, in a federation of separate self-gov-
erning groups, or through the creation of 
several independent states. Through the 
ILO Convention no. 169, the indigenous 
in Guatemala have a legal right to be con-
sulted on matters that affect them. The 
existence of a number of stable liberal 
democracies that have adopted group-dif-
ferentiated rights indicates the viability of 
many of the demands of the indigenous in 
Guatemala, also those that concern self-
government. However, since nearly all 
political matters in Guatemala affect the 
Maya, the fulfilment of this commitment 
may just as well imply increased partici-
pation in the actual political institutions, 
as some kind of self-government.  
In chapter two I discussed ‘the intrin-
sic value of culture’. Though this argu-
ment cannot serve as a justification for 
neither ‘recognition’ nor ‘non-discrimina-
tion’, this does not imply that it should not 
be given any consideration. The interrelat-
edness and mutual enrichment of different 
cultural practices and historic traditions 
are frequently stressed by indigenous as 
well as non-indigenous in Guatemala. 
Another justification for ‘recognition’ 
is the importance of the state’s policies for 
individual self-esteem. Several authors 
(Geertz 1994, Phillips 1995, Taylor 1994 
and 1998, Young 1990) underline the 
power of the state to impose or reinforce 
images of inferiority and superiority on 
perceived members of different groups. 
What is less clear is that the individual 
need for public recognition of the equal 
dignity and worth of different identities is 
more properly dealt with through ‘recog-
nition’ than ‘non-discrimination’. Indeed, 
‘recognition’ gives some collective pro-
jects the public acknowledgement some 
individuals search for. It is, however, less 
likely that public acknowledgement can 
be given to all the possible groups and 
within-groups which compose society. 
Perhaps some identities are given more 
weight than others by most citizens, or are 
suffering from a larger degree of margi-
nalisation and discrimination, but it still 
remains likely that a great number of the 
expressive needs of individual members 
of society cannot be addressed by the 
state.  
‘Non-discrimination’ avoids the pro-
blem of selecting a (limited) number of 
groups entitled to recognition. According 
to ‘non-discrimination’, the negative ster-
eotypes and internalised images of inferi-
ority are sought changed by ending the 
cultural monopoly of the dominant 
group(s) on the state. Is this enough to 
change prevailing images of ‘racial’ and 
cultural inferiority? Or is ‘non-discrimina-
tion’ insufficient to deal with situations of 
pervasive injustice and discrimination? 
Even though I do not have the answer to 
these question, it should be noted that 
both approaches require ending discrimi-
nation, and this alone is a vast mandate 
Trygve Bendiksby 
nupi june 00 
80
for change in Guatemala. Moreover, most 
of the demands of the Mayan movement, 
for example those concerning education, 
the official uses of language, and equal 
access to public positions are required by 
both ‘recognition’ and ‘non-discrimina-
tion’. Whether group-differentiated rights 
would be required in addition to this to 
achieve liberal justice in Guatemala is 
uncertain.  
Andreas Føllesdal (1999) has sugges-
ted that a group may have a reasonable 
claim to control the velocity of cultural 
change, which would imply giving minor-
ities access to institutional powers. One 
question then is who within the group 
should define what the actual content of ‘a 
culture’ is that needs protection, or accor-
ding to which standard should change be 
measured? Føllesdal’s argument seems to 
run the risk of empowering and giving 
legitimacy to the least change-oriented 
within a group. The argument neverthe-
less indicates the limitations of ‘non-dis-
crimination’ to address future issues of 
relevance for ‘cultural justice’ where con-
tentions may arise over the implications 
of ‘non-discrimination’ for cultural differ-
ence. 
It may also be argued that liberal poli-
tical theory in general is insufficient to 
achieve justice in multicultural societies. 
Doppelt argues that  
 
 Kymlicka’s emphasis on group rights to 
resolve national and ethnic tensions shares 
liberalism’s excessive reliance on law, 
rights and the state to accomplish aims 
which require a broader cultural transfor-
mation of other institutions and practices 
central to the way people represent, iden-
tify and treat one another (Doppelt 
1998:247). 
 
He therefore concludes: 
  
 Kymlicka’s reliance on the existing cul-
tural identities of minorities and majori-
ties, and group rights, can exacerbate the 
very problems of freedom and equality he 
hopes to alleviate…a genuinely liberal-
democratic societal culture, or a set of 
such cultures, must foster a universal iden-
tity among its members based upon respect 
for common human dignity, and for all 
persons’ individuality as people with more 
particular cultures and identities (Doppelt 
1998:246) [emphasis in the original]. 
  
However, few people would deny that the 
state, through its laws and regulations, is a 
powerful agent for achieving such cultural 
changes and perhaps creating the ‘univer-
sal identity’ Doppelt calls for, and there 
are few alternatives for achieving such 
changes. Moreover, unless the state gets 
involved in ending discrimination, it is 
unlikely that such changes will occur. 
Laws that prohibit discrimination, which 
regulate the use of languages in public 
administration and protect basic individu-
al rights of association, freedom of 
expression, and religious liberties are 
indispensable conditions for the achieve-
ment of justice in multicultural societies. 
The state’s aims, laws and regulations 
also have wider cultural implications: they 
affect or determine the content of educa-
tion and often determine the conditions 
for a wide variety of cultural activities. 
The state’s use of symbols and the ideas 
and values expressed by government, 
legislative assemblies and other instituti-
ons can also have a great impact on per-
ceptions and values more generally. 
What is the relevance for Guatemala of 
the arguments against ‘recognition’ raised 
in chapter three? Generally speaking, the 
static categories required by law may to 
some extent interfere in processes of 
group creation and change. Recognition 
of for example a Maya and a Xinca 
‘people’ is likely to strengthen the cohe-
siveness of these groups. Decisions about 
which groups to give group-differentiated 
rights are thus likely to affect and perhaps 
determine the social structure of Guate-
mala in the future. Of relevance for both 
‘non-discrimination’ and ‘recognition’ is 
the fact that the incorporation of indigen-
ous languages into the institutional struc-
ture of the Guatemalan state is likely to 
imply a certain degree of standardisation, 
thus affecting the development of these 
languages.  
Another critique raised against ‘recog-
nition’ in chapter 3 was that the criteria 
suggested by Kymlicka for distinguishing 
between different types of groups are pro-
blematic. In Guatemala, the application of 
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these could imply the exclusion of some 
ethnic groups, such as the Guatemalan 
Chinese. Moreover, members of the smal-
ler Mayan linguistic groups are often 
sceptic to the concept of a ‘Mayan nation’ 
because they fear domination by the 
larger Mayan groups. Generally, the pro-
posed criteria are likely to lead to the cre-
ation of new minorities and majorities. 
However, both approaches require some 
sort of criteria; ‘recognition’ for selecting 
and distinguishing different types of 
groups, ‘non-discrimination’ for selecting 
the languages, national holidays, and so 
forth to be incorporated into a country’s 
shared institutions. 
A further concern was that ‘recogni-
tion’ could restrict individual freedom. 
This is perhaps most clearly seen in 
Kymlicka’s definition of polyethnic 
rights, because he ties the enjoyment of 
these rights to membership in particular 
groups, thereby essentialising identity. 
Individual citizens who do not conform to 
the pre-established standard of group 
membership will thus be denied the 
enjoyment of these rights. On the other 
hand, as argued in section 4.6, it seems 
less likely that ‘recognition’ in Guatemala 
would impede integration and lead to a 
polarisation of the society. On my 
account, both ‘non-discrimination’ and 
‘recognition’ are likely to have a positive 
effect on political unity and social cohe-
sion in Guatemala. Political unity will be 
strengthened by ending discrimination, 
which is required by both approaches. 
Group-differentiated rights will probably 
have the same effect, partly because many 
of these rights reflect a wish to integrate, 
partly because such rights, even self-
government, are likely to have integrative 
consequences in Guatemala. 
However, indigenous self-government 
in Guatemala could prove to be counter-
productive by cementing their current 
situation of marginalisation and exclusion, 
and it is unlikely to achieve much in terms 
of changing the racist attitudes the indi-
genous are confronted with. The concern 
that ‘recognition’ may protect illiberal 
minorities seems less relevant. Political 
practices are probably on the average no 
more illiberal in mainly indigenous areas 
than they are in areas where the Ladino 
dominate. Nevertheless, attention should 
be paid to the paternalistic traditions in 
many indigenous (and non-indigenous) 
communities, and to the aspects of com-
munity law that can be at variance with 
basic liberal values and democracy. 
The role ethnic identity plays in 
people’s lives varies greatly, in Guate-
mala as elsewhere. Groups are likely to 
differ in their characteristics and degree of 
cohesiveness. A multicultural state need 
not be seen as a federation or a conglome-
ration of groups that are separate and per-
haps self-governing, and that possess a 
strong internal identity and an identical 
attachment to the state. The construction 
of Maya, Ladino, Garifuna, and Xinca 
‘nations’ is not a prerequisite for the cre-
ation of a multicultural state (Adams 
1997), and attempts to reinforce these 
identities through group-differentiated 
rights can, as just argued, run contrary to 
a liberal theory of politics. Kymlicka sug-
gests that   
 
 in countries that are both polyethnic and 
multinational, cultural groups are not only 
diverse, but they have diverse images of 
the country as a whole. People not only 
belong to separate political communities, 
but they also belong in different ways. 
This means that the members of a poly-
ethnic and multinational state must not 
only respect diversity, but also respect a 
diversity of approaches to diversity 
(Kymlicka 1995a:190).  
 
A liberal approach to justice in multicul-
tural democracies should not only ensure 
equal treatment for members of different 
groups through the accommodation of 
cultural difference, and tolerate differen-
ces in the attachements of these groups to 
the state, as Kymlicka argues above. Such 
an approach must also ensure that respect 
for diversity within these groups is main-
tained, and keep the possibility of not 
identifying with any such group open. If, 
when and how ethnic (and other) identi-
ties are important should then to the 
greatest extent possible be a matter of 
individual choice. ‘Recognition’ seems to 
require at least some homogeneity in the 
latter sense, by presupposing that indivi-
dual citizens identify with a finite and 
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clearly delineated set of groups. As 
Christine Inglis concludes from her study 
on multicultural policies: 
 
 As an examination of the [multicultural] 
policies makes plain, its aim is to provide 
meaningful ‘choice’ for individuals from 
diverse ethnic backgrounds so that they are 
neither excluded in separatist sectors of the 
society nor forced to assimilate to the 
mainstream society. Both strategies may 
marginalise individuals and thus create 
pre-conditions for the emergence of ethnic 
conflict and violence (Inglis 1998:18). 
 
In this sense, ‘non-discrimination’ seems 
to be a more adequate approach to diver-
sity. 
This discussion has obvious limitati-
ons. Others may disagree with my inter-
pretations of the arguments on multi-
culturalism and justice or my characteri-
sation of the situation in Guatemala. 
Many of the conclusions above presup-
pose a constructivist approach to ethnic 
identity, which, though dominating the 
current studies on Guatemala, is some-
what controversial.67 Moreover, there are 
likely to be other relevant arguments that 
are not taken into account here, so this can 
at best be a modest contribution to a large 
and complex debate. However, with these 
limitations in mind it seems that 
Kymlicka’s unequivocal preference for 
‘recognition’ and his rejection of ‘non-
discrimination’ need to be reconsidered, 
at least for the case of Guatemala. Indeed, 
on the above account ‘non-discrimination’ 
may seem preferable to ‘recognition’ as 
an approach to justice (as defined by poli-
tical liberalism), in Guatemala.  
Nevertheless, I am not at ease in draw-
ing this conclusion, in part because ‘non-
discrimination’, if taken to its logical con-
clusion, implies that it would be very 
difficult to justify the support by the state 
for any cultural projects at all (Bell 1993: 
229-230). This is a conclusion I assume 
very few persons would adhere to. For 
example, state support for cultural activi-
ties such as operas, theatres and so forth 
                                                     
67 For example, Mason (1999:263) argues that no 
overall best account can be given on the choice 
between ‘constructivism’ (subjectivism) and 
‘primordialism’ (objectivism).  
would arguably be impossible according 
to ‘non-discrimination’. What we need 
then is an approach to justice that, in addi-
tion to conforming to basic liberal values 
and the requirements of unity, combines 
the advantages of both approaches: it 
must, in accordance with ‘non-discrimina-
tion’, avoid favouring particular groups 
and the exclusive emphasis on ethnic 
identities, while, in accordance with 
‘recognition’, making the maintenance of 
and support for particular cultural projects 
possible. 
5.2 ‘Associational Democracy’: A 
Middle Ground? 
The complex issue of identifying the 
groups entitled to recognition could per-
haps be avoided by providing support for 
citizens associations at large. For ex-
ample, the state could give economic and 
non-intervening support to all private non-
profit organisations, regardless of their 
origins, be it ‘ethnic groups’, or environ-
mentalist groups, or orchestras, and so 
forth. These associations could ‘take upon 
themselves many of the responsibilities 
now claimed by central government’ 
(Phillips 1995:179). The heterogeneous 
needs, aspirations and interests of the 
population could thus be attended to 
through these associations. A strengthen-
ing of local government and diverse civil 
organisations through a decentralisation 
of the polity may increase the autonomy 
of groups (Midgaard 1996: 35).68 Accord-
ing to Robert Dahl, 
 
 in a democratic order on the large scale of 
a country, associational pluralism, com-
bined with a good deal of decentralisation 
of decisions to local governments, would 
help to ensure that the interests of citizens 
in different publics would be given more 
or less equal consideration. In that sense, 
the public good would be achieved in a 
pluralist democracy (Dahl 1989:295). 
 
The more power is decentralised, for 
example to local Mayan communities, the 
more local groups would be ensured a say 
                                                     
68 A question is how far such a decentralisation 
should go. It may make it more difficult to 
attend issues of the ‘common good’ (Dahl 
1989, Midgaard 1989:35-6).  
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in politics. An emphasis on ‘associational 
democracy’ would thus appear to solve 
the dilemma of combining the advantages 
of ‘non-discrimination’ and ‘recogni-
tion’.69 Moreover, Sieder (1996:21) pre-
sents the argument that ‘an efficient 
decentralisation of power and solid forms 
of local government are essential for guar-
anteeing democratic stability’ in ethni-
cally divided societies. 
A number of objections can be made 
against this approach, however. First, 
economic support is insufficient for some 
groups. What they often want and argue 
they have a legitimate claim to is recogni-
tion of their special status within society, 
a claim not to be put on an equal footing 
with any other type of association.  
Second, associational democracy can-
not be a substitute for participation in the 
central decision-making institutions of the 
state (Phillips 1995:181-2). Excluded 
groups may still need to be present to 
affect the agendas and the decisions of 
these institutions. Moreover, Phillips’s 
arguments for presence are valid at all 
levels of government, central as well as 
local, and may be extended to include 
non-governmental associations as well, 
because the minority-majority issue tends 
to get reproduced at different levels.  
Third, some criteria would be needed 
to select which organisations and associ-
ations are entitled to support. This should 
at least be the prohibition against any 
internal restrictions; the requirement to 
maintain an internal democratic process 
and respect for basic liberal values within 
these associations. 
Fourth, there are likely to be differen-
ces in the resources different associations 
have access to, and not all individuals are 
likely (to be able) to organise (Dahl 1989: 
296-7). An emphasis on associations may 
therefore result in inequalities, in particu-
lar if economic support is not provided 
equitably by the state. Economic support 
                                                     
69 For a survey of theories on ‘associational demo-
cracy’, see Phillips (1995). A lengthy discus-
sion on this topic falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. The point is rather to indicate the poten-
tial of ‘associational democracy’ for solving the 
above dilemma. Dahl (1989) discusses these 
issues at more length. Note also the parallel 
between associational democracy and 
Lijphart’s (chapter 4, above) emphasis on self-
definition of ethnic groups. 
is, however, likely to be costly, and may 
place an unreasonable and unjustifiable 
burden on the citizens. It would probably 
also be limited to rather affluent countries, 
and exceed the financial capacity of the 
Guatemalan state. In Guatemala today the 
funding of the indigenous associations 
takes place largely through international 
donors. This means that the funding is 
likely to be rather selective and limited, 
and less stable and predictable than in a 
similar scheme provided by the state. It 
may also liberate the Guatemalan state 
from its responsibilities in this regard, 
thus reinforcing current patterns of exclu-
sion. Nevertheless, the emphasis on ‘asso-
ciational democracy’ is a powerful argu-
ment for the continued funding of these 
organisations as a step towards the 
achievement of liberal justice and demo-
cracy in Guatemala. 
Lastly, it should be underlined that 
practical solutions to the challenge of 
multiculturalism should be adopted to 
local conditions and applied with pragma-
tism. For example, the legitimacy of parti-
cular measures may depend upon timing 
(Kymlicka 1995a:110) and may be seen 
as temporary means to combat discrimina-
tion, not permanent rights pertaining to 
groups. More importantly, it should be 
made clear that any liberal approach to 
justice in multicultural societies would be 
an agenda for profound change in Guate-
mala. Ending discrimination, exclusion, 
and the cultural monopolisation of the 
state by a limited segment of the popu-
lation is a sine qua non for any demo-
cracy. 

Literature 
AIDPI (Acuerdo sobre Identidad y Derechos de los 
Pueblos Indígenas) (1995) in Recopilación de 
los acuerdos de paz. Editorial Saq’be, Guate-
mala. Chapter 5. 
Adams, Richard (1995): Etnias en evolución social. 
Estudios de Guatemala y Centroamérica. Uni-
versidad Autónoma Metropolitana, México. 
 (1996): ‘Comunidad y cultura en el proceso 
étnico-estado’ in AVANCSO: De la Etnia a la 
Nación. AVANCSO, Guatemala. pp. 47-72. 
 (1997): ‘Identidad Ladina y democracia multi-
cultural’ in Iximulew. CECMA/Siglo Vein-
tiuno/Cholsamaj, Guatemala. 23 July.  
Anderson, Benedict (1994): ‘Imagined Communi-
ties’ in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith 
(eds.): Nationalism. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. pp. 89-96. 
Arias, Arturo (1990): ‘Changing Indian Identity: 
Guatemala’s Violent Transition to Modernity’ 
in Carol A. Smith (ed.): Guatemalan Indians 
and the State. Austin: University of Texas 
Press. pp. 230-57. 
Arrivillaga Cortés, Alfonso (1998): ‘Respecto de 
las ideas políticas en el Caribe centro ameri-
cano – el caso garinagu.’ Unpublished docu-
ment. 
ASIES (Asociación de Investigación y Estudios 
Sociales) and Development Associates, Inc., 
University of Pittsburgh (1998): La cultura 
democrática de los guatemaltecos. ASIES, 
Guatemala. Tercer Estudio 1997. Summary. 
Asturias, Linda (1996): ‘Etnia Ladina: es o no es?’ 
in Iximulew. CECMA/Siglo 
Veintiuno/Cholsamaj. 13 October. 
 Barth, Frederik (1994): ‘Enduring and Emerging 
Issues in the Analysis of Ethnicity’ in Hans 
Vermeulen and Cora Govers (eds.): The 
Anthropology of Ethnicity. Beyond ‘Ethnic 
Groups and Boundaries’. Het Spinhuis Publish-
ers, the Netherlands. pp. 11-32. 
Barth Eide, Espen (1997): ‘‘Conflict Entrepreneur-
ship’: On the Art of Waging Civil War’ in 
Anthony McDermott (ed.): Humanitarian 
Force. PRIO, Oslo, Norway. 
Bastos, Santiago and Manuela Camus (1995): 
Abriendo Caminos. Las organizaciones mayas 
desde el Nobel hasta el Acuerdo de Derechos 
Indígenas. FLACSO, Guatemala. 
 (1996): Quebrando el silencio. Organizaciones 
del pueblo maya y sus demandas. FLACSO, 
Guatemala. 3rd edition. 
Bell, Daniel (1993): Communitarianism and its 
Critics. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Berganza, Gustavo (1997): ‘Opiniones de un 
Ladino’ in  Iximulew. CECMA/ Siglo Veinti-
uno/Cholsamaj, Guatemala. 16 November. 
Black, James (1998). ‘Scorched Earth in a Time of 
Peace’ in NACLA — Report on the Americas. 
Vol. 27, No. 1. pp. 11-5. 
Bordewich, Fergus M. (1996): Killing the White 
Man’s Indian. Reinventing Native Americans at 
the End of the Twentieth Century. Doubleday, 
New York. 
Bulmer, Martin and John Solomos (1998): ‘Intro-
duction: re-Thinking Ethnic and Racial Studies’ 
in Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol.21. pp. 819-
37. 
Burawoy, Michael (1991): ‘Introduction’ in 
Burawoy et al.: Ethnography Unbound. Power 
and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis. Uni-
versity of California Press, Berkley. pp. 1-7. 
Butenschøn, Nils A. (1980) Sionistisk ideologi, 
isrealske konfliktforestillinger og jødisk identi-
tet. En historisk-empirisk tilnærming til studiet 
av sionistisk selvforståelse og det palestinske 
problem. Department of Political Science, Uni-
versity of Oslo. ‘Magistergradsavhandling’. 
— (1993): The Politics of Ethnocracies. Strategies 
and Dilemmas of Ethnic Domination. Depart-
ment of Political Science, University of Oslo, 
Oslo. Working Paper no. 1. 
Casáus Arzú, Marta (1998): La Metamorfosis del 
Racismo en Guatemala. Cholsamaj, Guatemala. 
Castro de Comparini, Arabella (1996): ‘Foro’ in 
AVANCSO: De la Etnia a la Nación. 
AVANCSO, Guatemala. pp. 109-12. 
CEDIM (1992): Foro del pueblo maya y los candi-
datos a la presidencia. Cholsamaj, Guatemala. 
CEH (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico): 
(1999): Guatemala – memoria del silencio. 
Conclusiones y recomendaciones del Informe 
de la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento His-
tórico. CEH, Guatemala. 
 At:http://hrdata.aaas.org/ceh/report/spanish/toc.
htlm 
Coe, Michael D. (1993): The Maya. Thames and 
Hudson, New York. 5th  edition. 
Cojtí Cuxil, Demetrio (1995): Configuración del 
pensamiento político del pueblo maya. 2da. 
parte. Cholsamaj, Guatemala. 
 (1996a): ‘Ficha del Acuerdo sobre Identitad y 
Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas’ in 
Trygve Bendiksby 
nupi june 00 
86
Iximulew. CECMA/Siglo Veintiuno/Cholsamaj, 
Guatemala. 31 March. 
— (1996b): ‘Identidades de y discriminaciones 
entre Mayas y Ladinos’ in Iximulew. CECMA/ 
Siglo Veintiuno/ Cholsamaj, Guatemala. 13 
October.   
 (1996c): ‘Identidad étnica/identidad nacional’ in 
AVANCSO: De la Etnia a la Nación. 
AVANCSO, Guatemala. pp. 73-90. 
— (1997a): Ri Maya’ Moloj pa Iximulew – El 
movimineto Maya en Guatemala. Cholsamaj, 
Guatemala. 
— (1997b): ‘Gobernabilidad democrática y 
derechos indígenas en Guatemala’. Paper pre-
pared for the conference ‘Guatemala after the 
Peace Accords’, Institute of Latin American 
Studies, University of London, 6-7 November 
1997.  
Comité para el Decenio del Pueblo Maya (1996): 
Foro: El pueblo maya y los candidatos a la 
presidencia 1996-2000.  Rutzijol, Guatemala. 
Constitución Política de la Républica de Guate-
mala, Decretada por la Asamblea Nacional 
Constituyente el 31 de mayo de 1985. (1993) 
Editorial Piedra Santa, Guatemala. 
Córdova, Irma V. (1995): ‘Los Garífunas: una 
didactica propia’ in Ethnos. San Carlos Univer-
sity, Guatemala. No.7 (1995). Bulletin. 
Dahl, Ottar (1973): Grunntrekk i historieforskning-
ens metodelære. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo. 2nd  
ed. 
Dahl, Robert (1989): Democracy and its Critics. 
Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London. 
Dary, Caludia: (1994): ‘Ladino: apuntes para la 
historia de un término’ in Ethnos. San Carlos 
University, Guatemala. No.2 (1994). Bulletin. 
 (1997): El derecho internacional humanitario y 
el orden jurídico maya: una perspectiva histór-
ico cultural. FLACSO, Guatemala. 
— (1997): ‘Repensando al Ladino’ in Iximulew. 
CECMA/Siglo Veintiuno/ Cholsamaj, Guate-
mala. 23  July.  
Das, Veena (1995): Critical Events. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Delhi.  
de Paz, Marco Antonio (1993): Pueblo maya y 
democracia. SPEM/CEDIM, Guatemala. 
— (1996): ‘Mayas y Ladinos descubren su identi-
dad’ in Iximulew. CECMA/ Siglo Veintiuno/ 
Cholsamaj, Guatemala. 13 October. 
 Doppelt, Gerald (1998): ‘Is There a Multicultural 
Liberalism?’ in Inquiry. Vol. 41. pp. 223-48. 
Duarte, Pablo (1996): ‘Foro’ in AVANCSO: De la 
Etnia a la Nación. AVANCSO, Guatemala. pp. 
113-5. 
Ekern, Stener (1998): ‘Las organisaciones mayas 
de Guatemala: Panorama y retos institucio-
nales’ in Mayab – Sociedad española de estu-
dios mayas. No. 11. pp. 68-83. 
Elster, Jon (1993): ‘Majority Rule and Individual 
Rights’. Amnesty Lecture. Oxford University, 
Oxford. Unpublished document. 
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (1993): Ethnicity and 
Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives. 
Pluto Press, London. 
 (1997): ‘Multiculturalism, Individualism and 
Human Rights: Romanticism, the Enlighten-
ment and Lessons from Mauritius’ in Richard 
A. Wilson (ed.): Human Rights, Culture and 
Context. Anthropological Perspectives. Pluto 
Press, London. pp. 49-69. 
 (1998): ‘UNESCO’s kulturbegrep under lupen’ 
in Mennesker og rettigheter. Year 16. pp. 338-
48. 
Esquit, Edgar (1997): ‘La diversidad del Ladino’ in 
Iximulew. CECMA/Siglo Veintiuno/Cholsamaj, 
Guatemala. 23 July. 
Falla, Ricardo (1992): Masacres de la selva. Ixcán, 
Guatemala (1974-1982). Editorial universitaria, 
Guatemala. 
Ferrigno, Víctor (1997): ‘La Nación a debate’ in 
Iximulew. CECMA/Siglo Veintiuno, Guate-
mala. 15 October.  
Føllesdal, Andreas (1996): ‘Minority Rights: A 
Liberal Contractualist Case’ in Juha Räikkä 
(ed.): Do We Need Minority Rights? Concep-
tual Issues. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague. pp. 59-83. 
 (1999): ‘Global Ethics, Culture and Ethics’ in 
Forum for Development Studies. No.1. pp. 5-
21. 
Gálvez Borrell, Víctor (1997a): ‘Ladinos en Guate-
mala: unidad o diversidad?’ in Iximulew. 
CECMA/SigloVeintiuno/ Cholsamaj, Guate-
mala. 16 November. 
— and Alberto Esquit Choy (1997b): The Mayan 
Movement Today. Issues of Indigenous Culture 
and Development in Guatemala. FLACSO, 
Guatemala. 
—, Claudia Dary Fuentes, Edgar Esquit Choy and 
Isabel Rodas (1997c): Qué sociedad quere-
mos?: una mirada desde el movimiento y las 
organizaciones mayas. FLACSO, Guatemala. 
— and Luis Fernando Mack (1999): Guatemala: 
Descentralización y Asociacionismo Municipal. 
La Descentralización desde la Perspectiva de 
las Municipalidades. CASC-UCA and 
FLACSO-Guatemala, Managua, Nicaragua. 
Garrard-Burnett, Virginia (1999): ‘All Indians are 
Drunks and all Drunks are Indians: Alcohol and 
Literature 
NUPI  june 00 
87
Indigenismo in Guatemala, 1900-1935’ at the 
Society of Latin American Studies’ Annual 
Meeting and Conference, 9-11 April 1999, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom. Lecture. 
Geertz, Clifford (1994): ‘Primordial and Civic 
Ties’ in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. 
Smith (eds.): Nationalism. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. pp. 29-33. 
Glazer, Nathan (1995): ‘Individual Rights against 
Group Rights’ in Will Kymlicka (ed.): The 
Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. pp. 123-38. 
Grandin, Greg (1999): ‘A Pestilent Nationalism’: 
Guatemala’s 1937 Cholera Epidemic Revisited’ 
at the Society of Latin American Studies’ 
Annual Meeting and Conference,  9-11 April 
1999, Cambridge, United Kingdom. Lecture. 
Gutmann, Amy (1993): ‘The Challenge of Multi-
culturalism in Political Ethics’ in Philosophy 
and Public Affairs. Vol. 22, No.3. pp. 3-24. 
— (1994): ‘Introduction’ in Amy Gutmann (ed.): 
Multiculturalism — Examining the Politics of 
Recognition. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. pp. 3-24. 
Guzmán Böckler, Carlos and Jean-Loup Herbert 
(1995):  Guatemala: Una interpretación his-
tórico-social. Cholsamaj, Guatemala. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1994): ‘Struggles for Recogni-
tion in the Democratic Constitutional State’ in 
Amy Gutmann (ed.) Multiculturalism – Exami-
ning the Politics of Recognition. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, Princeton. pp. 107-48. 
Hendrickson, Carol (1997): ‘Imágenes del maya en 
Guatemala: el papel del traje indígena en las 
construcciones del indígen y del ladino’ in 
Mesoamérica. Year 18, no. 33. pp.15-40. 
Hobsbawn, Eric (1994): ‘The Nation as Invented 
Tradition’ in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. 
Smith (eds.): Nationalism. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. pp. 76-82. 
Horowitz, Donald (1994): ‘The Logic of Secessi-
ons’ in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith 
(eds.): Nationalism. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. pp 261-9. 
IRELA (Instituto de Relaciones Europeo-Latino-
americanas) (1995): Guatemala: Elecciones y 
Pacificación. Madrid, Spain. 3 November 
1995. Informe de IRELA. 
ILO Convention no. 169 (adopted 27 June 1989): 
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries. 11 pages 
 At:www.mastifffoundation.org/docs/inter/ilo/1
69. 
Inglis, Christine (1996): Multiculturalism: New 
Policy Responses to Diversity. Management of 
Social Transformations (Most), UNESCO. 
Policy Paper no. 4. 
Jay, David and Julia Jay (eds.) (1995): The Harper 
Collins Dictionary of Sociology. Harper 
Collins, Glasgow. 
Kukhatas, Chandran (1995): ‘Are There Any Cul-
tural Rights’ in Will Kymlicka (ed.): The Rights 
of Minority Cultures. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. pp. 228-255. 
Kymlicka, Will (1989): Liberalism, Community 
and Culture. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
— (1990): Contemporary Political Philosophy. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
— (1995a): Multicultural Citizenship — A Liberal 
Theory of Minority Rights. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 
— (1995b): ‘Introduction’ in Will Kymlicka (ed.): 
The Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford. pp. 1-27. 
— (1997): States, Nations and Cultures. Van 
Gorcum, Amsterdam. Spinoza Lectures. 
Le Bot, Yvon (1995): La guerra en tierras mayas. 
Comunidad, violencia y modernidad en Guate-
mala (1970-1992). Fondo de cultura econó-
mica, México. 
Lijphart, Arend (1995): ‘Self-Determination versus 
Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in 
Power-Sharing Systems’ in Will Kymlicka 
(ed.): The Rights of Minority Cultures. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. pp. 275-87. 
Linz, Juan (1999): Lecture given at the University 
of Oslo, Oslo. 8 April 1999. 
Malnes, Raino (1997): Filosofi for statsvitere. Tano 
Aschehoug, Oslo. 
Martinello, Marco (1998): ‘Wieviorka’s multicul-
turalism: a critique’ in Ethnic and Racial 
Studies. Vol.21. pp. 911-6.  
Mason, Andrew (1999): ‘Political Community, 
Liberal Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimi-
lation’ in Ethics. Vol. 109. pp. 261-86. 
Maybury-Lewis, David (1998): Indigenous 
Peoples, Ethnic Groups and the State. Allyn 
and Bacon, Massachusetts.  
McCleary, Rachel M. (1997): ‘Guatemala’s Post-
war Prospects’ in Journal of Democracy. Vol. 
8, No. 2. pp. 129-43. 
Midgaard, Knut (1996): Mot en bedre organisert 
verden. Momenter til en teori om legitime og 
gode styreformer. ARENA, Oslo, Norway. 
Working Paper no. 7.  
Mydske, Kjell Reidar (1998): Sivilsamfunn og 
lokaldemokrati. En studie av organisasjonslivet 
i Patzún, Guatemala. Institute of Sociology and 
Social Geography, University of Oslo, Oslo. 
Thesis for the Degree of Cand. Polit. 
Trygve Bendiksby 
nupi june 00 
88
 Nozick, Robert (1989): The Examined Life. Touch-
stone, New York. 
Orantes, Carlos (1996): ‘Identidad ladina e identi-
dad nacional’ in AVANCSO: De la Etnia a la 
Nación. AVANCSO, Guatemala. pp. 91-97. 
Oskal, Nils (1999): ‘Kultur og rettigheter’ in 
Harald Eidheim (ed.): Samer og Nordmenn. 
Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, Oslo, Norway. 
pp. 141-63. 
Otzoy, Irma (1997): ‘Fantasía y desdén. Imágenes y 
contestación’ in Mesoamérica. Year 18, no. 33. 
pp. 1-14. 
Palma Murga, Gustavo (1996): ‘Los proyectos de 
nación en Guatemala’ in AVANCSO: De la 
Etnia a la Nación. AVANCSO, Guatemala. pp. 
39-46. 
Parekh, Bhikhu (1993): ‘The Cultural Particularity 
of Liberal Democracy’ in David Held (ed.): 
Prospects for Democracy. North, South, East, 
West. Polity Press, Cambridge. pp. 156-75. 
Payeras, Mario (1980): Los días de la selva. Casa 
de las Américas, La Habana, Cuba. 
Phillips, Anne (1995): The Politics of Presence. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Pitkin, Hanna F. (1967): The Concept of Represen-
tation. University of California Press, Berkely. 
Plant, Roger (1997): ‘Ethnicity and the Guatemalan 
Peace Process: Conceptual and Practical Chall-
enges’. Paper prepared for the conference: 
‘Guatemala after the Peace Accords’, Institute 
of Latin American Studies, University of 
London, 6-7 November 1997.  
Poitevin, René (1997): Interview in Prensa Libre. 
12 October. 
Pop, Alvaro (1997): ‘Muchas necesidades, una 
aspiración, una propuesta de cambio’ in Iximu-
lew. CECMA/ Siglo Veintiuno/Cholsamaj, 
Guatemala. 15 October.  
Porras, Gustavo (1996): ‘Panorama de los pueblos 
prehispánicos’ in AVANCSO: De la Etnia a la 
Nación. AVANCSO, Guatemala. pp. 31-7. 
Quemé Chay, Rigoberto (1997): ‘Identidad Ladina: 
mito, tabú o realidad?’ in Iximulew. CECMA/ 
Siglo Veintiuno/ Cholsamaj, Guatemala. July 
24. 
Quej, Haroldo (1996): Interview in  Iximulew. 13 
October. 
Räikkä, Juha (1996): ‘Is a Membership-Blind 
Model False by Definition?’ in Räikkä (ed.): 
Do we Need Minority Rights? Conceptual 
Issues. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague. pp. 3-19. 
Rawls, John (1971): A Theory of Justice. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
— (1993): Political Liberalism. Columbia Univer-
sity Press, New York. 
Rodas, Isabel (1997): ‘Historias paralelas, historias 
excluyentes’ in  Iximulew. Siglo Veintiuno/ 
Cholsamaj/CECMA, Guatemala. 16 November. 
Rojas Lima, Flavio (1988): La Cofradía. Reducto 
Cultural Indígena. Seminario de Integración 
Social, Guatemala. 
Sayre-McCord, Geoffery (1996): ‘Coherentist 
Epistemology and Moral Theory’ in Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons (eds.): 
Moral Knowledge? Oxford University Press. 
pp. 137-89. 
Sen, Amartya (1999): ‘Democracy as a Universal 
Value’ in Journal of Democracy.  Vol. 10, no. 
3. pp. 3-17. 
Sieder, Rachel (1996): Derecho consuetudinario y 
transición democrática en Guatemala. Guate-
mala: FLACSO. 
Siglo Veintiuno (1998a): ‘Enmiendas a la Carta 
Magna aprobadas por el Congreso de la 
República’ 17 October. 10 pages. 
In: Siglo21 [online] at 
http://www.sigloxxi.com/cgibin/s22/creator?fil
e=hjqen01 
— (1998b) ‘Más de cien linchamientos en dos 
años’. 9 November. 
Smith, Carol A. (1991) ‘Maya Nationalism’ in 
NACLA — Report on the Americas. Vol. 25, 
No. 3. pp. 29-33. 
Solares, Jorge (1994): ‘El contexto político del con-
flicto étnico’ in Ethnos. San Carlos University, 
Guatemala. No. 2 (1994). Bulletin. 
— (1995): ‘Reflexiones en torno al Acuerdo sobre 
identidad y derechos de los pueblos indígenas’ 
in Ethnos. San Carlos University, Guatemala. 
No. 7 1995. Bulletin.  
Son Turnil, Benjamín (1999): ‘Consecuencias 
socio-económicas de la guerra en Guatemala’. 
Paper presented at the seminar ‘Guatemala – 
Dilemmas in Democratisation’ Oslo, 7-8 May 
1999. 
Stavenhagen, Rodolfo (1994): ‘Indigenous Rights: 
Some Conceptual Problems’ in W.J. Assies and 
A. J. Hoekema (eds.): Indigenous Peoples’ Ex-
periences With Self-Government. IWGIA 
Document no. 76. IWGIA, Copenhagen. pp. 9-
29. 
Stoll, David (1993): Between Two Armies in the Ixil 
Towns of Guatemala. Columbia University 
Press, New York. 
 (1997): Prospects for Democratization in North-
ern Quiche. Paper prepared for the conference 
‘Guatemala after the Peace Accords’, Institute 
Literature 
NUPI  june 00 
89
of Latin American Studies, University of 
London, 6-7 November 1997.  
Taylor, Charles (1994): ‘The Politics of Recogni-
tion’ in Amy Gutmann (ed.): Multiculturalism 
— Examining the Politics of Recognition. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. pp. 25-
73. 
— (1998): ‘The Dynamics of Democratic Exclu-
sion’ in Journal of Democracy. Vol. 9, No. 4. 
pp. 143-56. 
Tilley, Virginia (1997): ‘The terms of the debate: 
untangling language about ethnicity and ethnic 
movements’ in Ethnic and Racial Studies. 
Vol.20. pp. 497-522. 
TSE (Tribuna Supremo Electoral) (1999): ‘Docu-
mento Informantivo’. UCADE-TSE, Guate-
mala. 
Tuyuc, Rosalina (1996): Interview in Iximulew. 
CECMA/Siglo Veintiuno, Guatemala. 31 
March.   
United Nations (1998): Eighth Report of the 
Human Rights Area of the United Nations 
Verification Mission in Guatemala 
(MINUGUA). United Nations General 
Assembly, New York. 15 June. 
Vásquez, Juana (1996): Interview in Iximulew. 
CECMA/Siglo Veintiuno/ Cholsamaj, Guate-
mala. 31 March. 
Vermuelen, Hans and Cora Govers (1994): ‘Intro-
duction’ in Hans Vermuelen and Cora Govers 
(eds.): The Anthropology of Ethnicity. Beyond 
‘Ethnic Groups and Boundaries’. Het Spinhuis, 
The Netherlands. pp. 1-10. 
Walzer, Michael (1994): ‘Comment’ in Amy 
Gutmann (ed.): Multiculturalism – Examining 
the Politics of Recognition. Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton. pp. 99-103. 
— (1995): ‘Pluralism: A Political Perspective’ in 
Will Kymlicka (ed.): The Rights of Minority 
Cultures. Oxford, Oxford University Press. pp. 
139-54. 
Warren, Kay (1997): ‘Identidad indígena en Guate-
mala: una crítica de los modelos norteamerica-
nos’ in Mesoamérica. Year 18, no. 33. pp. 73-
91. 
 (1998): Indigenous Movements and Their 
Critics. Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Watanabe, John M. (1994): ‘Unimagining the 
Maya: Anthropologists, Others and the Inescap-
able Hubris of Authorship’ in Bulletin of Latin 
American Research, Vol. 14. pp. 25-45. 
— (1999): ‘State Formation as Bureaucratic 
Formalism in the Late Nineteenth-century 
Guatemala’ at the Society of Latin American 
Studies’ Annual Meeting and Conference,  9-11 
April 1999, Cambridge, United Kingdom. 
Lecture. 
Wievorka, Michel (1998): ‘Is multiculturalism the 
solution?’ in Ethnic and Racial Studies. Vol.21, 
no.5. pp. 881-910. 
Wilson, Richard (1995): Maya resurgence in 
Guatemala — Q’eqchi’ experiences. University 
of Oklahoma Press, London. 
— (1999) ‘Culture and Rights’. University of Oslo, 
Oslo. 1 September (1999). Lecture. 
Woodward, Ralph Lee, Jr. (1971): ‘Social Revolu-
tion in Guatemala — The Carrera Revolt’ in 
Applied Enlightenment. Middle American 
Research Institute, Tulane University, New 
Orleans. Publication 23. pp. 43-70. 
Yin, Robert K. (1994): ‘The Case-study as a Seri-
ous Research Strategy’ in Knowledge: Cre-
ation, Diffusion, Utilisation. Vol. 3, no. 1. pp. 
97-114. 
Young, Iris Marion (1989): ‘Polity and Group 
Difference. A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship’ in  Ethics.  Vol. 99. pp. 250-74. 
 (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
 (1995): ‘Together in Difference: Transforming 
the Logic of Group Political Conflict’ in Will 
Kymlicka (ed.): The Rights of Minority 
Cultures. Oxford University Press, Oxford. pp. 
155-76. 
Zapeta, Estuardo (1997): ‘El Ladino alebestrado’ in 
Iximulew. CECMA/ SigloVeintiuno/Cholsamaj, 
Guatemala. 23 July.  
— (1998): ‘Indígenas debaten la Nación’ in Siglo 
Veintiuno. 6 February. 

Summary 
This thesis analyses the implications 
of taking cultural diversity into 
account when discussing the elabora-
tion of a just political system and just 
policies in Guatemala. In 1996, a 
long-lasting civil war came to its end 
in Guatemala, and since then the 
implications of cultural diversity for 
the organisation of the Guatemalan 
state has been at the centre stage of 
public debate. The demands and pro-
posals of the Guatemalan indigenous 
movement and a peace accord that 
addresses the ‘identity and rights of 
the indigenous peoples’ provide the 
framework for this debate.  
The thesis examines the situation 
in Guatemala in light of contemporary 
normative political theory. Political 
liberalism, one of the major schools of 
contemporary political thought, is 
chosen as the basic normative frame-
work for understanding the require-
ments of a just political system and 
just policies. Two different appro-
aches for how cultural differences 
should be accommodated in demo-
cratic states are examined, and the 
implications of them for Guatemala 
are discussed. The two approaches or 
policies, both of which have a long 
history within liberal political theory, 
can be outlined as follows: non-discri-
mination requires that the state is 
‘neutral’ when it comes to the particu-
lar cultural identities of its citizens. 
According to this approach, the state 
should not seek to identify, protect, or 
promote any particular ethnic identity 
or culture.  
Recognition, on the other hand, 
requires that the state gives explicit 
recognition to the particular cultural 
identities of its citizens, usually 
through a system of rights that differ-
entiates between members of different 
ethnic groups. The Canadian philoso-
pher Will Kymlicka’s book, Multicul-
tural Citizenship, is a comprehensive 
and highly acclaimed liberal defence 
of ‘recognition’, and it provides the 
theoretical focus throughout this 
thesis. However, a discussion of the 
characteristics of ethnicity, political 
participation, political autonomy and 
concerns for social unity in Guatemala 
leads to a conclusion which diverges 
from Kymlicka’s, and a third 
approach is suggested that may solve 
some of the dilemmas created by both 
‘non-discrimination’ and ‘recognition’ 
for the achievement of justice. 

 
